



Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics Report

August 5, 2020



**Homeland
Security**

Message from the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

August 5, 2020

The “Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics Report” is submitted pursuant to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which directs that “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall develop metrics, informed by situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness of security” between ports of entry, at ports of entry, in the maritime environment and to measure the effectiveness of the aviation assets and operations of Air and Marine Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Act further directs the Secretary to annually assess, report, and implement the specified metrics.

The outcome-based performance measures called for by the Act are the most comprehensive, rigorous set of border security metrics required of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to date. Through previous efforts, DHS has established processes and procedures to collect and analyze essential data to meet most, but not all, of the Act’s requirements. This 2019 report identifies which measures are still unavailable; DHS commits to continuing efforts to comply with all the measures of the Act.



Thank you for your continuing support and commitment to strengthening the operating effectiveness of DHS.

Pursuant to congressional requirements, this notification is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable Ron Johnson

Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Gary Peters

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Bennie Thompson

Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Mike Rogers

Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security

Inquiries relating to this report may be directed to the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs at (202) 447-5890.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Scott L. Glabe".

Scott L. Glabe
Senior Official Performing the Duties of Under Secretary
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans



DHS Border Security Metrics Report

Table of Contents

I. LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE	5
II. INTRODUCTION	6
III. SEC. 1092 BORDER SECURITY METRICS	8
§ 1092(b) METRICS FOR SECURING THE BORDER BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY	8
§ 1092(c) METRICS FOR SECURING THE BORDER AT PORTS OF ENTRY	29
§ 1092(d) METRICS FOR SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER	39
§ 1092(e) AIR AND MARINE SECURITY METRICS IN THE LAND DOMAIN	46
§ 1092(g)(3)(D) OTHER APPROPRIATE INFORMATION	51
IV. CONCLUSION	57
Appendix A – Repeated Trials Model Methodology	58
Appendix B – Drugs Seizures – All Ports of Entry	64
Appendix C – Personal Owned Vehicles (POV) and Commercial Owned Vehicles (COV) Wait Time	65
Appendix D - Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate at Each Land POE	73
Appendix E - Frequency of Secondary Inspections at Each Land POE	77
Appendix F - Ratio of Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned - Maritime POE	80

I. LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE

Section 1092 of the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), signed into law December 23, 2016, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide annually to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate specific “Metrics for Securing the Border Between Ports of Entry,” “Metrics for Securing the Border At Ports of Entry,” “Metrics for Securing the Maritime Border,” and “Air and Marine Security Metrics in the Land Domain.” The NDAA further directs that the Secretary, “in accordance with applicable privacy laws, make data related to apprehensions, inadmissible aliens, drug seizures, and other enforcement actions available to the public, law enforcement communities, and academic research communities.”

II. INTRODUCTION

As President Donald J. Trump indicated in Executive Order 13767 entitled “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements” (January 25, 2017), border security is critically important to the national security of the United States. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS or the Department) ability to measure its border security inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes is essential to the effective and efficient management of the Department, including management of the new activities and investments directed by the President’s Executive Orders on border security and immigration enforcement.

Comprehensive and rigorous performance management data provide Departmental leadership with the foundation to support responsible evidence-based decision-making for resource allocation and investments and for operational and mission management. Further, DHS implementation of this approach provides a pair of unifying border security goals under the Department’s mission to secure and manage U.S. borders. As summarized in the 2014 DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), the Department’s first two goals under the border security mission area are to “Secure U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders and Approaches” by preventing illegal entry and to “Safeguard and Expedite Lawful Travel and Trade” by safeguarding key nodes, conveyances, and pathways, and by managing the risk of people and goods in transit. Ultimately, the border security metrics described in this report are designed to assess the ability of the Department’s border security policies and investments to achieve these goals.

For analytic purposes, the metrics included in this report may be divided into three categories:

- **Inputs:** Resources acquired or expended to secure the border. Examples of border security inputs include the number of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents deployed, miles of fencing and other border infrastructure, and numbers of aircraft committed to the border security mission.
- **Outputs:** Specific actions taken to secure the border. Examples of border security outputs include illegal border crossers apprehended, travelers admitted or denied admission at ports of entry (POEs), and weight of narcotics seized. Outputs may also be defined as rates, such as the rate at which intending unlawful border crossers are apprehended or interdicted, and the accuracy of screening results for travelers and goods at POEs.
- **Outcomes:** The ultimate impacts of border security policies. As defined by the QHSR, the most important border security outcomes are the numbers of aliens illegally entering and quantities of illegal goods entering the United States (Goal 2.1), and the ease with which lawful travelers and goods pass through POEs (Goal 2.2).

In general, border security inputs and outputs are directly observable and can be measured with a high degree of reliability. Policymakers have direct control over resource allocation and data on inputs are available in budget and acquisitions documents. Operational agencies also track enforcement activities as part of their case management process. In short, the Department knows exactly how many agents it deploys, how many miles of fence it erects, how many aliens it apprehends, and how many travelers it admits. Input and output measures tend to provide insight into the level and type of enforcement effort undertaken—what the Department is doing—that are useful for workload management and tactical decision-making; but in and of themselves these metrics typically provide limited insight into the state of border security.

Outcome measures often provide more insight than inputs and outputs when it comes to evaluating border security and may be powerful tools for policy and program evaluation. Many outcome metrics are difficult to measure directly because illegal border crossers actively seek to evade detection, and some flows are undetected and therefore can never be measured directly. This challenge is nearly universal when measuring illegal activities, which is why law enforcement agencies typically rely on crime reports as indicators of total criminal activities, for example. Measuring border security outcomes is also difficult because of the diversity and complexity of the enforcement mission along the United States’ 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,471 miles of coastline, and 350 POEs. Moreover, enforcement outcomes only partially depend on border security policies, since immigration flows also reflect numerous factors

outside enforcement agencies' control, including the broader set of U.S. immigration policies and numerous economic, demographic, and other structural factors.

Historically, DHS and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) addressed these measurement challenges by relying on alien apprehensions (an output metric) as a proxy measure of illegal immigration between POEs (an outcome metric). More recently, CBP and DHS have initiated new estimation strategies to better model unknown flows. These efforts have focused primarily on border security between POEs in the land domain (NDAA § 1092(b)), a domain that has been identified by Congress and the last several Administrations as a top enforcement priority.

Some of this research remains a work in progress, as DHS continues to work to validate certain modeling assumptions and fully quantify the uncertainty around its new estimation techniques. The FY 2019 version of this report marks an important step forward, however, as it includes a new section in Appendix A describing the statistical uncertainty around two key metrics and the sensitivity of DHS model-based estimates to several key assumptions. In addition, many of the metrics in this report remain limited to the Southwest Border. The current version of this report includes several methodological updates to the FY 2017 and FY 2018 reports, along with certain updated or expanded datasets. These updates are flagged in the report text. The Department's future work on border metrics will continue to refine these new indicators of border security between POEs and expand data collection and methodologies to the Northern Border, while also developing additional indicators of border security, including those still identified as incomplete in this report.

Pursuant to the NDAA, this report covers a mix of input, output, and outcome metrics between POEs, at POEs, in the maritime domain, and with respect to air and marine security in the land domain for FY 2018. While most of these measures involve data the Department have tracked for many years, some remain under development or fall outside the scope of the Department's existing measurement methodologies. This report includes the following information for each border security metric:

- Definition of the metric and brief description of how the metric contributes to the Department's understanding of border security;
- Discussion of the Department's current methodology for producing the metric and related methodological limitations; and
- Data for FY 2018, along with up to 10 years of historical data where possible, and brief discussion of implications for the current state of border security.

The following sections of this report provide this information for each metric directed by the NDAA. In addition to the specific metrics identified in NDAA § 1092(b) – (e), this report includes supplemental measures that inform the Department's assessment of the state of border security between POEs, as directed by NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D).

Throughout the rest of this report, years refer to the federal fiscal year (October 1–September 30) unless otherwise noted. Numbers in the text of this report are rounded to the nearest hundred (for numbers between 1,000 and 10,000) or nearest thousand (for numbers between 10,001 and 1 million); refer to data tables for precise figures.

III. SEC. 1092 BORDER SECURITY METRICS

§ 1092(b) METRICS FOR SECURING THE BORDER BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(i) Attempted unlawful border crosser apprehension rate

Definition

In general, the attempted unlawful border crosser apprehension rate is defined as the proportion of attempted border crossers that is apprehended by USBP:

$$\text{Apprehension Rate} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions}}{\text{Unlawful Entry Attempts}}$$

While USBP has reliable administrative data on apprehensions, the Department does not have an exact count of unlawful entry attempts since an unknown number of illegal border crossers evade detection. As a result of this so-called “denominator problem,” the Department must estimate the apprehension rate. Current methodologies allow DHS to produce two apprehension rate estimates:

- **Model-based apprehension rate** ($AR_{\text{Model-based}}$) – Based on statistical modeling, the estimated share of all attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs that is apprehended.
- **Observational apprehension rate** ($AR_{\text{Observational}}$) – Based on direct (unlawful border crossers observed by USBP) and indirect (residual evidence of a border crosser, e.g., footprints) observations of attempted unlawful border crossers, the estimated share of observed attempted unlawful border crossers that is apprehended.

The apprehension rate is an *output measure* that describes the difficulty of illegally crossing the border successfully.

A conceptual limitation of apprehension rate data is that they include information about border *apprehensions*, but exclude information about *turn backs* (see NDAA § 1092 (b)(1)(A)(iv) for definition). Turn backs are a key element of USBP’s enforcement strategy, with underlying operational implications. In this sense, measures of the apprehension rate understate USBP’s overall enforcement success rate. On the other hand, some analysts consider information about turn backs difficult to interpret since an unknown share of turn backs make additional entry attempts.

Methodology and Limitations

Model-based apprehension rate

The model-based apprehension rate is based on the repeated trials model (RTM) methodology. As explained in detail in Appendix A, the RTM methodology yields an estimated partial apprehension rate (PAR) for Southwest Border crossers, which focuses on a relatively small share of attempted unlawful border crossers. The current version of this report includes minor updates to the PAR methodology, including an analysis of the uncertainty surrounding the PAR (see Appendix A).

Following the calculation of the PAR, the $AR_{\text{Model-based}}$ methodology consists of four additional steps. First, all attempted unlawful border crossers are divided into two groups, which are labeled “impactable” and “non-impactable” by traditional DHS enforcement policies. Impactable border crossers include adults without children who are not asylum seekers and (prior to 2017) who are not from Cuba. Aliens in this group are described as impactable because they are generally subject to the full range of DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement consequences, and therefore potentially impacted by existing border enforcement. Non-impactable border crossers include

unaccompanied alien children, family units, individuals who request asylum, and (prior to 2017) Cubans. Aliens in this group are described as non-impactable because, historically, they have usually been released into the United States with a Notice to Appear in immigration court for removal proceedings on a future date, rather than being subject to immediate DHS enforcement consequences. These aliens are assumed generally to be non-impactable by traditional DHS enforcement activities at the border because even if they are apprehended, they are typically unlikely to be immediately removed.¹ The current version of this report updates the methodology used to divide the USBP apprehensions dataset into its impactable and non-impactable sub-groups (see Appendix A).

Second, the AR_{Model}-based methodology assumes an apprehension rate for each of these two groups: 1) all attempted unlawful border crossers in the impactable population are assumed to be apprehended at the partial apprehension rate generated by the RTM methodology; and 2) all unlawful border crossers in the non-impactable population are assumed to intentionally present themselves to a USBP agent or OFO officer and therefore to have a 100 percent apprehension rate. Notably, these assumptions do not reflect the actual behavior of all border crossers, as noted below, but they serve to construct a probability model.

Third, the partial apprehension rate is used to calculate the total number of impactable aliens making illegal entry attempts. The methodology assumes (in the previous step) that all impactable aliens are apprehended at the PAR rate generated by the RTM methodology:

$$PAR = \frac{\text{Apprehensions Impactable}}{\text{Attempts Impactable}}$$

Mathematically, this equation can be rearranged to define the total number of impactable aliens making an illegal entry attempt as follows:

$$\text{Attempts Impactable} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions Impactable}}{PAR}$$

Since non-impactable aliens are assumed to have a 100 percent apprehension rate, the number of entry attempts of non-impactable aliens is equal to the number of their apprehensions.

Finally, the total apprehension rate is calculated as a weighted average of the total numbers of impactable and non-impactable aliens attempting unlawful entry times their respective apprehension rates:

$$AR_{\text{Model-based}} = \frac{(\text{Attempts Impactable} * PAR) + (\text{Attempts Non-impactable} * 100\%)}{(\text{Attempts Impactable} + \text{Attempts Non-impactable})}$$

The current AR_{Model}-based methodology makes a number of assumptions that cannot be fully validated. First, the AR_{Model}-based methodology builds on the RTM's partial apprehension rate, and so incorporates all the RTM modeling assumptions and associated limitations discussed in Appendix A. In addition, the current AR_{Model}-based methodology also assumes: that the entire cohort of border crossers can be divided into impactable and non-impactable groups, that the entire impactable group is apprehended at the same rate as RTM aliens included in the PAR analysis, and that the entire non-impactable group is apprehended 100 percent of the time. Each of these additional assumptions introduces potential biases into the estimated apprehension rate. The current version of this report includes a sensitivity analysis at the end of appendix A that quantifies the potential impact of these assumptions on the model-based apprehension rate for 2018.

¹ Cubans were considered non-impactable between 1995 and January 2017 because they were routinely granted parole into the United States if they reached U.S. soil, under the "wet foot/dry foot" policy. The Obama Administration terminated the special parole component of the wet foot/dry foot policy in January 2017. The wet foot/dry foot policy was the name given to a former interpretation of the 1995 revision of the application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

Observational apprehension rate

The observational apprehension rate is calculated as the ratio of USBP apprehensions to the sum of apprehensions and observed (directly or indirectly) got aways:

$$AR_{\text{Observational}} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions}}{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Got Aways}}$$

“Got aways” are defined as subjects at the Southwest Border who, after making an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents.

Since 2014, USBP has implemented a standard, Southwest Border-wide methodology for determining when to report a subject as a got away. Some subjects are observed directly as evading apprehension or turning back; others are acknowledged as got aways or turn backs after agents follow evidence that indicate entries have occurred such as foot sign (i.e., tracks), sensor activations, interviews with apprehended subjects, camera views, and communication between and among stations and sectors. The scope of these data includes all areas of the Southwest Border at or below the northernmost law enforcement posture (typically a USBP checkpoint) within a given area of responsibility, and those individuals apprehended less than 30 days after entering the United States.

In an effort to maintain reliable best practices, command staff at all Southwest Border stations ensure all agents are aware of and utilize proper definitions for apprehensions, got aways and turn backs at their respective stations. They also ensure the necessary communication takes place between and among sectors and stations to minimize double-counting when subjects cross more than one station’s area of responsibility. In addition to station-level safeguards, designated USBP Headquarters components validate data integrity by utilizing various data quality reports.

The primary limitation to $AR_{\text{Observational}}$ is that the denominator excludes an unknown number of unobserved got aways. Over the past several years, DHS has invested millions of dollars in technology that has facilitated the ability to see and detect more at the border. Improvements in situational awareness give DHS an ever-increasing, real-time ability to understand how much illegal activity agents are encountering at the immediate border and their ability to respond. As a result, despite the fact that overall border entries are substantially lower today than in any previous fiscal year, agents are currently interdicting slightly lower percentages of the total known flow. This observation reflects USBP’s increased domain awareness—that through technological advances, the agency has improved its awareness of illegal entry attempts (known got aways)—rather than experienced a reduction in enforcement effectiveness. Increasing situational awareness narrows the gap between the known and unknown flow and puts DHS in a position to build ever better observational estimates of border security.

An additional methodological limitation is that the estimated count of got aways aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken a number of steps to establish reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Ongoing Modeling Efforts

Other model-based estimation methodologies can supplement the Department’s current RTM. USBP has contracted with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to develop a different approach by examining each station along the Southwest Border from an operational perspective. The method utilizes modeling and simulation of operational data and conditions and incorporates terrain and sensor models; resource deployment of infrastructure and agents; and the movement of both USBP Agents and border threats across known trails and patrol routes. Pilot analysis has been completed for all line stations along the Southwest Border. Sensitivity analysis is now taking place in the development of the 2020 version of this report with 2019 data and incorporation of additional operational elements are being built into the model.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 1 provides the estimated model-based apprehensions rate for 2000-2018 and the estimated observational apprehension rate for 2006-2018, the years for which these data are available.

Table 1.**Model-Based and Observational Apprehension Rates, FY 2000 – FY 2018**

Year	Model-based Apprehension Rate	Observational Apprehension Rate
2000	42.5	NA
2001	41.1	NA
2002	35.7	NA
2003	32.5	NA
2004	36.0	NA
2005	35.8	NA
2006	37.5	63.5
2007	38.6	64.1
2008	40.9	67.7
2009	43.7	70.7
2010	44.2	74.4
2011	41.6	79.4
2012	50.9	77.5
2013	53.1	70.8
2014	60.5	74.8
2015	74.6	76.7
2016	83.9	79.4
2017	71.8	74.5
2018	69.6	75.3

Note: Model-based apprehension rate estimates for FY 2002 - FY 2017 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A for details.

Overall, both available measures of the apprehension rate indicate that USBP apprehends large majorities of intending border crossers, and that the apprehension rate has substantially improved over the last decade.

The model-based apprehension rate climbed from 43 percent in 2000 and a low point of 33 percent in 2003 to 84 percent in 2016 before falling back to 70 percent in 2018. Increases in the model-based apprehension rate have been sharpest since 2012, reflecting increases during this period in the estimated at-the-border deterrence rate, the estimated apprehension rate for impactable border crossers (i.e., the PAR), and an increase in the share of border crossers who are non-impactable and therefore assumed to be apprehended 100 percent of the time. (see NDAA §1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information section within this report for discussions of the deterrence rate and of non-impactables as a share of border crossers.)

The observational apprehension rate has also shown improvements since 2006. Despite its limitations, the upward trend in $AR_{\text{Observational}}$ is noteworthy because it independently reinforces the upward trend observed in the model-based estimate. Moreover, with increasing situational awareness along the border during this period, it is likely that CBP detects an increasing share of total got aways over time, as noted above. As a result, the upward trend in $AR_{\text{Observational}}$ likely underestimates the actual increase in the total share of attempted border crossers that are apprehended.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(ii) Detected unlawful entries

Definition

Detected unlawful entries – The total number of attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs who are directly or indirectly observed or detected by USBP.

Detected unlawful entries is an outcome measure that describes the numbers of aliens detected crossing or attempting

to cross the border unlawfully. Detected unlawful entries is not a comprehensive outcome measure since it excludes undetected unlawful entries, as discussed below. The ratio of detected to undetected unlawful entries, also discussed below, is an output measure that describes the Department's ability to detect unlawful entries.

Methodology and Limitations

The number of detected unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, got aways, and apprehensions. Turn backs are defined as subjects who, after making an illegal entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension or got away. Got aways are defined as subjects who, after making an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents. Apprehensions are defined as inadmissible aliens arrested by USBP.

Turn backs and got aways are observational estimates; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of turn backs and got aways based on direct and indirect observations as described above. Apprehensions are calculated based on nationwide DHS administrative data and are not limited to the Southwest Border; USBP apprehension data are considered a reliable count of apprehensions.

The primary limitation to detected unlawful entries is that this metric incorporates turn back and got away estimates that aggregate potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Available Data and Discussion




Figure 1 depicts available data on estimated detected unlawful entries for 2006-2018, the years for which data are available. As the figure indicates, estimated detected unlawful entries (the sum of apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways) fell from 2.0 million to 627 thousand during this period, a 69 percent decrease.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(iii) Estimated undetected unlawful entries

Definition

Undetected unlawful entries – An estimate of the number of attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs who are not directly or indirectly observed or detected by USBP. By assumption, undetected unlawful entries evade apprehension and enter the United States unlawfully.

Undetected unlawful entries is an outcome measure that describe the numbers of aliens who completely evade detection and successfully enter the United States unlawfully. Undetected unlawful entries is not a comprehensive outcome measure since it excludes detected unlawful entries, discussed above. The ratio of detected to total unlawful entries (i.e., the probability of detection) is an output measure that describes the Department’s ability to detect unlawful entries, as discussed below. At present, this methodology only exists for the Southwest Border between POEs.

Methodology and Limitations

Currently, the Department’s best available methodology for estimating undetected unlawful entries builds on the RTM methodology to produce a model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. The estimated number of undetected unlawful entries is calculated as the difference between the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries and USBP’s observational estimate of got aways (i.e., detected successful unlawful entries):

$$\text{Undetected Unlawful Entries} = \text{Total Successful Unlawful Entries} - \text{Detected Got Aways}$$

As explained in detail in Appendix A, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossers. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps.

First, as in the calculation of the model-based apprehension rate discussed above, all attempted unlawful border crossers are divided into “impactable” and “non-impactable” groups (also see NDAA §1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information). Second, based on the assumption that impactable aliens apprehended at the same rate as RTM aliens included in the PAR analysis, the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry for aliens within the impactable population group.² Third, the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the number of impactable aliens apprehended times the odds of successful entry among this group. Because non-impactable aliens are assumed to be apprehended 100 percent of the time (i.e., none of them successfully enters without being apprehended) only impactable aliens contribute to the estimated count of successful unlawful entries:

$$\text{Total Successful Unlawful Entries} = \text{Apprehensions Of Impactable Aliens} * \text{Odds Of Successful Entry}$$


The estimated number of undetected unlawful entries is derived from the observational estimate of detected unlawful entries, with limitations discussed above, and the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries, which in turn is derived from the RTM methodology and the model-based apprehension rate, with additional limitations discussed above. See Appendix A for further discussion of the assumptions involved in the estimate of total successful unlawful entries, including a sensitivity analysis for the 2018 estimate.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 2 depicts available data on estimated undetected unlawful entries. As the figure indicates, estimated undetected unlawful entries fell from over one million in 2006 to fewer than 57,000 in 2017, a 95 percent decrease.

² Mathematically, odds of successful entry = $\left(\frac{1 - \text{PAR}}{\text{PAR}}\right)$

Figure 2.
Estimated Southwest Border Undetected Unlawful Entries, FY 2006 – FY 2018



Note: Data for FY 2012 – FY 2017 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A for details.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv) Turn backs

Definition

Turn backs – An estimate of the number of subjects who, after making an illegal entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension or got away.

Turn backs are an output measure that USBP uses for tactical decision-making.

Turn backs also contribute to several other border security metrics, including detected unlawful entries, discussed above, and the unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate, discussed below.

Methodology and Limitations

Turn backs are a nationwide observational estimate; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of turn backs based on direct and indirect observations as described above.

The primary limitation to detected turn backs is that the estimate aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above. In addition, some unlawful border crossers might enter the United States to drop off drug loads or to act as decoys to lure agents away from a certain area and then return to Mexico, and therefore may be misidentified as turn backs.³ However, USBP believes these instances are too infrequent to have a substantial impact on the total number of turn backs.

³ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs," GAO-13-330T, February 26, 2013, p. 15.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 2.
Southwest Border Turn Backs between POEs, FY 2009 – FY 2018

2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
178,566	150,005	121,007	121,079	156,433	147,025	105,670	108,601	91,998	111,003

The number of turn backs has decreased 38 percent since 2009. This decrease is consistent with numerous other between-POE metrics that suggest a decrease in flow over the past 10 years.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(v) Got aways

Definition

Got aways – An estimate of the number of subjects who, after making an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents.

Total successful unlawful entries – An estimate of the total number of subjects who cross the border unlawfully and who enter the United States without being apprehended.

Methodology and Limitations

Got Aways

Got aways are an observational estimate; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of got aways based on direct and indirect observations as described above. While got aways are recorded by USBP at all borders, got aways in this section refer to the Southwest Border between POEs only.

The primary methodological limitation of got aways is that the estimate aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken a number of steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Conceptually, the got aways metric is limited to observed (directly or indirectly) flows; it is not a comprehensive measure of successful unlawful entries. USBP's recent work to increase situational awareness, including using Geospatial Intelligence, gives the Department growing confidence in its got away count. As situational awareness continues to improve, observed got aways will become an increasingly comprehensive measure of successful unlawful entries. USBP and DHS are working to refine USBP's observational methodology and to more precisely describe the gap between observed and unobserved got aways.

Total Successful Unlawful Entries

The current methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries is based on the RTM methodology. As explained in detail in Appendix A, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossings, which focuses on a relatively small share of attempted unlawful border crossers. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps, as described above: attempted border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups; the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry; and the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the odds of successful entry among this group times the number of apprehensions of impactable aliens.

The RTM methodology to estimate the PAR confronts a number of methodological limitations, as discussed in Appendix A. Each of the additional assumptions involved in using the PAR to estimate total successful unlawful entries introduces additional methodological limitations and potential biases. See Appendix A for a discussion of the impact of these assumptions.

Available Data and Discussion




Figure 3 depicts Southwest Border between POEs detected got aways for 2006-2018 and estimated total successful unlawful entries for 2000-2018. As the figure illustrates, estimated total successful unlawful entries declined from over 2.1 million to 173 thousand between 2000 and 2018, a 92 percent decrease. Estimated got aways declined from 615 thousand to 127 thousand between 2006 and 2018, a 79 percent decrease.

Notably, the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries declined at a faster rate than observed got aways, with the model-based estimate falling 90 percent between 2006 and 2018 (the period for which both data series are available), versus a 79 percent decrease for detected got aways during this period. Relatedly, the two series have substantially converged over this time-period, with observed got aways accounting for 34 percent of total estimated successful unlawful entries in 2006 versus 74 percent in 2018. These facts suggest that USBP detects an increasingly comprehensive share of all attempted unlawful border crossers.

§ 1092(b)(1)(B) A measurement of situational awareness achieved in each U.S. Border Patrol sector

Definition

Situational awareness – Knowledge and understanding of current unlawful cross-border activity.

Situational awareness is an output measure that describes the Department’s awareness of unlawful cross-border activity.

Methodology and Limitations

DHS is in the process of developing a defensible, analytically sound measure for situational awareness for each USBP

sector that meets the intent of the NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(B). DHS anticipates this measure will be reported in the annual report due to Congress in November 2020. In the interim, a number of the Department's existing metrics are informed by the Department's awareness of migrants and other threats in the near border regions (CBP has operational jurisdiction within 100 miles of U.S. borders) and in the approaches (See NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(A)(ii to v) and § 1092(b)(1)(D)).

§ 1092(b)(1)(C) Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate

Definition

Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate – The estimated percentage of all attempted unlawful border crossers that is interdicted by USBP, where interdictions include apprehensions and turn backs.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is an output measure that describes how difficult it is for unlawful border crossers to enter the United States without being interdicted.

Methodology and Limitations

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is calculated by dividing the number of apprehensions and turn backs between land POEs by the sum of the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and total estimated successful unlawful entries:

$$\text{Effectiveness Rate} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn backs}}{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn backs} + \text{Successful unlawful entries}}$$

The NDAA calls for an effectiveness rate that incorporates USBP's observational estimate of turn backs and DHS's current model-based estimate of total estimated successful unlawful entries. This measure would confront all of the methodological challenges associated with each of its component parts, as discussed above.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is conceptually similar to the estimated apprehension rate, with the difference being that the effectiveness rate includes data on turn backs and apprehensions while the apprehension rate focuses exclusively on apprehensions. An advantage to examining the effectiveness rate, rather than the apprehension rate, is that effectiveness rate more completely captures USBP's actual enforcement practices, which include efforts to turn back border crossers, in addition to efforts to apprehend them. On the other hand, some analysts consider the effectiveness rate (along with IER) to be an ambiguous indicator of enforcement success since an unknown share of turn backs make additional entry attempts.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is also conceptually similar to USBP's interdiction effectiveness rate (IER), which USBP reports in its Annual Performance Report pursuant to the GPRM Modernization Act of 2010. The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate differs from the IER in that the former includes total estimated successful unlawful entries in its denominator and IER only includes known got aways:

$$\text{Interdiction Effectiveness Rate (IER)} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn backs}}{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn backs} + \text{Got aways}}$$

A limitation of IER is that changes in the Department's situational awareness make changes in IER somewhat difficult to interpret. In particular, increases in the share of aliens apprehended or turned back may be offset by gains in the share of intending border crossers observed by USBP (i.e., in the accuracy of the observational got away estimate).

Despite its shortcomings as an analytic tool, only the IER is currently available for analysis at the sector level. While a Southwest Border-wide estimate has been developed for the model-based apprehension rate, sector-level estimates of unlawful entries and attempts for this metric have not yet been produced and validated by DHS. DHS continues to evaluate sector level estimates for possible inclusion in future reports.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 3.
Interdiction Effectiveness Rate by Southwest Border Sector, FY 2014 – FY 2018

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	SW Border Total
2014	72%	76%	85%	92%	74%	80%	89%	75%	91%	80%
2015	77%	73%	83%	90%	74%	82%	88%	80%	95%	81%
2016	70%	79%	81%	89%	78%	83%	89%	82%	96%	83%
2017	67%	72%	81%	91%	72%	80%	87%	71%	96%	79%
2018	54%	73%	83%	91%	69%	81%	85%	75%	97%	80%

The only sector with changes in IER of more than three percentage points between 2017 and 2018 were Big Bend (seven percentage point decrease) and Tucson (four percentage point increase). Over the 5 years 2014-2018, only the Big Bend sector saw changes of more than six percentage points, as its IER dropped from 72 percent to 54 percent. This change likely reflects increased situational awareness (i.e., that a larger share of got aways are being observed), rather than a drop in the share of intending crossers being apprehended or turned back. On the Northern Border, the concern of physical security of the immediate border does not focus on the apprehension rate of illegal entrants, since the number of such attempted and successful entries is small.

§ 1092(b)(1)(D) Probability of detection rate

Definition

Estimated probability of detection – The estimated probability that DHS detects attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs.

The estimated probability of detection is an output measure that describes the ability of attempted unlawful border crossers to enter without being detected. Because successful unlawful entry estimates are available only for the Southwest Border POEs, data in this section refer exclusively to this region.

Methodology and Limitations

The estimated probability of detection is defined as the ratio of detected unlawful entries to estimated total unlawful entries:

$$\text{Probability of detection} = \frac{\text{Detected unlawful entries}}{\text{Estimated total unlawful entries}}$$

As described above, the number of detected unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, got aways, and apprehensions, a mix of observational estimates and administrative data. The primary limitation to detected unlawful entries is that this metric incorporates turn back and got away estimates that aggregate potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Estimated total unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, apprehensions, and the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. As described above, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries begins with the RTM methodology's partial apprehension rate, discussed in detail in Appendix A. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps: attempted border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups; the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry; and the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the odds of successful entry among this group times the apprehension count among impactable aliens.

The RTM methodology to estimate the PAR confronts a number of methodological limitations, as discussed in Appendix A. Each of the additional assumptions involved in using the PAR to estimate total successful unlawful entries introduces additional methodological limitations and potential biases. The current version of Appendix A updates the Department's previous discussion of the impact of these limitations on its estimate of total successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion




Figure 4 depicts the estimated probability of detection for 2006-2018, the years for which data are available. As the figure indicates, the estimated probability increased from 63 percent in 2006 (when an estimated 2.0 million unlawful border crossers were detected out of an estimated 3.2 million total unlawful border crossers) to a high of 89 percent in 2016 before falling to 78 percent in 2018 (627 thousand detected out of 800 thousand total estimated unlawful border crossers).

§ 1092(b)(1)(E) Apprehensions in Each U.S. Border Patrol Sector

Definition

Apprehension – The arrest of an inadmissible alien by USBP.

Apprehensions are output measures that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal entries, an outcome measure.

For many years, DHS and the legacy INS also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of successful unlawful border crossings, i.e., an outcome measure. Over the long-term and across multiple locations, apprehensions are a problematic indicator of enforcement outcomes since the relationship between apprehensions and successful unlawful entries depends on the apprehension rate, which changes over time and may also differ by location. But in the short-term and in a fixed geographic area, DHS continues to view changes in apprehensions as a useful outcome indicator because short term changes in apprehensions are more likely to be driven by changes in the number of unlawful border crossing attempts than by changes in the apprehension rate.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. USBP's count of apprehensions is considered reliable.

Apprehensions displayed below are event counts, meaning each apprehension of the same alien in a year is counted separately. These data do not represent a count of unique aliens apprehended.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 4a.

Southwest Border Apprehension by USBP Sector, FY 2009 – FY 2018

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2009	6,360	17,082	33,521	14,999	40,569	60,989	118,721	241,673	6,951	540,865
2010	5,288	14,694	32,562	12,251	35,287	59,766	68,565	212,202	7,116	447,731
2011	4,036	16,144	30,191	10,345	36,053	59,243	42,447	123,285	5,833	327,577
2012	3,964	21,720	23,916	9,678	44,872	97,762	28,461	120,000	6,500	356,873
2013	3,684	23,510	16,306	11,154	50,749	154,453	27,496	120,939	6,106	414,397
2014	4,096	24,255	14,511	12,339	44,049	256,393	29,911	87,915	5,902	479,371
2015	5,031	19,013	12,820	14,495	35,888	147,257	26,290	63,397	7,142	331,333
2016	6,366	23,078	19,448	25,634	36,562	186,830	31,891	64,891	14,170	408,970
2017	6,002	13,476	18,633	25,193	25,460	137,562	26,086	38,657	12,847	303,916
2018	8,045	15,833	29,230	31,561	32,641	162,262	38,591	52,172	26,244	396,579

Total Southwest Border apprehensions fell by over 25 percent between 2016 and 2018. Since 2013, the Rio Grande Valley Sector has displaced the Tucson Sector as the leader in apprehensions, with roughly 100 thousand more apprehensions than the next leading sector in 2018. Apprehensions were down across the board in 2018, with each sector reporting decreases. The largest numeric decrease was in the Rio Grande Valley Sector with roughly 50,000 fewer apprehensions in 2018 than in 2016, while the largest percentage decrease was in Tucson, where apprehensions fell by 40 percent. Tucson and San Diego, historically major sectors for apprehensions, continue to report considerably lower numbers than those seen a decade earlier, with Tucson reporting 38,657 apprehensions in 2018, as compared to 378,239 in 2007 (a 90 percent decrease).

Table 4b.

Northern Border Apprehension by USBP Sector, FY 2017 – FY 2018

Year	Blaine, WA	Buffalo, NY	Detroit, MI	Grand Forks, ND	Houlton, ME	Havre, MT	Spokane, WA	Swanton, VT	Total
2017	288	447	1,070	496	30	39	208	449	3,027
2018	359	384	1,930	461	52	47	347	736	4,316

Northern Border apprehensions represented about 1 percent of total USBP apprehensions in 2018. Detroit was the leading Northern Border sector with 1,930 aliens apprehended – more than double the next leading sector, Grand Forks (461 apprehensions). Havre, MT reported the fewest apprehensions in 2018 (47).

Table 4c.

Coastal Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2017 – FY 2018

Year	Miami, FL	New Orleans, LA	Ramey, PR	Total
2017	2,280	920	388	3,588
2018	2,169	798	280	3,247

Coastal border apprehensions also represented about 1 percent of total USBP apprehensions in 2017. Of the 3,588 coastal apprehensions, more than 63 percent occurred in the Miami Sector (2,280). Ramey reported the fewest apprehensions in 2017 (388).

§ 1092(b)(1)(F) Apprehensions of unaccompanied alien children

Definition

Unaccompanied alien child (UAC) – a child who has no lawful immigration status in the United States; has not attained 18 years of age, and with respect to whom; 1) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or 2) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody [6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)].

UAC apprehensions are an output measure that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal entries, an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. Since 2008, USBP systems have included a flag for children who are found to meet the legal definition of a UAC. USBP's count of apprehensions is considered reliable, but some outside analysts have raised questions about agents' ability to reliably distinguish among older children and young adults (e.g., to distinguish between 17 and 18 year-olds) and to confirm whether children are traveling alone or in family groups.⁴

USBP began collecting data on UACs apprehended between POEs in 2008; data are unavailable for earlier years.

Data and Discussion

Tables 5a – 5d provide counts of UAC apprehensions by citizenship and by USBP sector for 2009-2018.

After averaging 15,000 UAC apprehensions per year during 2008-2011, such apprehensions along the Southwest

Table 5a.
Total Southwest Border Apprehensions of UACs, FY 2009 – FY 2018

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2009	147	1,085	673	889	1,901	3,835	3,028	7,606	276	19,440
2010	197	1,014	448	1,011	1,570	4,977	980	7,998	216	18,411
2011	189	1,113	457	697	1,608	5,236	549	5,878	222	15,949
2012	168	1,618	498	659	2,658	10,759	524	7,239	280	24,403
2013	125	2,135	434	744	3,795	21,553	656	9,070	247	38,759
2014	256	3,268	662	1,029	3,800	49,959	954	8,262	351	68,541
2015	839	2,285	668	1,662	2,459	23,864	1,084	6,019	1,090	39,970
2016	951	2,689	1,379	3,885	2,953	36,714	1,553	6,302	3,266	59,692
2017	811	1,349	1,531	3,926	2,033	23,708	1,551	3,659	2,867	41,435
2018	989	1,297	2,715	5,461	2,879	23,757	2,491	5,023	5,424	50,036

⁴ OIG-10-12 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. *Age Determination Practices for Unaccompanied Alien Children in ICE Custody*. November 2009

Table 5b.**Southwest Border Apprehensions of UACs from Mexico, FY 2009 – FY 2018**

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2009	127	851	631	841	1,308	2,401	2,990	6,582	258	15,989
2010	180	772	404	947	886	2,787	950	6,485	204	13,615
2011	183	801	427	663	1,022	3,009	523	4,893	192	11,713
2012	137	911	418	616	1,369	4,361	480	5,405	246	13,943
2013	104	1,082	328	654	1,652	6,366	598	6,241	194	17,219
2014	102	821	278	698	1,354	7,081	740	4,394	166	15,634
2015	73	798	397	823	1,299	3,243	823	3,412	144	11,012
2016	118	867	610	1,149	1,515	3,389	851	3,293	134	11,926
2017	166	512	688	768	1,112	2,791	702	2,004	134	8,877
2018	190	541	1,162	806	1,545	2,466	1,164	2,118	144	10,136

Table 5c.**Southwest Border Apprehensions of UACs from Northern Triangle Countries, FY 2009 – FY 2018**

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2009	19	229	42	46	523	1,389	37	938	15	3,238
2010	16	238	42	58	598	2,057	28	1,326	8	4,371
2011	6	307	29	32	528	2,030	25	927	28	3,912
2012	29	701	70	40	1,228	6,229	44	1,753	34	10,128
2013	18	1,044	104	80	2,028	14,696	48	2,731	36	20,785
2014	151	2,422	379	290	2,329	42,020	209	3,727	178	51,705
2015	760	1,479	269	824	1,113	20,260	255	2,497	930	28,387
2016	824	1,806	641	2,685	1,382	32,935	625	2,904	3,091	46,893
2017	633	821	667	3,093	858	20,620	701	1,639	2,722	31,754
2018	798	741	1,238	4,563	1,091	20,893	825	2,839	5,201	38,189

Table 5d.**Southwest Border Apprehensions of UACs from All Other Countries, FY 2009 – FY 2018**

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2009	1	5	0	2	70	45	1	86	3	213
2010	1	4	2	6	86	133	2	187	4	425
2011	0	5	1	2	58	199	1	58	2	326
2012	2	6	10	5	61	169	0	82	0	335
2013	3	9	2	10	115	491	10	98	17	755
2014	3	25	5	41	117	858	5	141	7	1,202
2015	6	8	2	15	47	361	6	110	16	571
2016	9	16	128	51	56	390	77	105	41	873
2017	12	16	176	65	63	297	148	16	11	804
2018	1	15	315	92	243	398	502	66	79	1,711

Border increased an average of more than 60 percent per year in 2012-2014, peaking at 68,541 in 2014. UAC numbers returned to their 2013 level in 2015, climbed again to 59,692 in 2016 and 50,036 in 2018. This growth has been driven entirely by UACs from the Northern Triangle, with apprehensions increasing from an average of under 4,000 in 2009- 2011 to an average of 39,000 in 2014-2018, while Mexican UAC apprehensions fell from 14,000 to 12,000 in the same years. As in previous years, more than half of all UACs were reported in the Rio Grande Valley Sector (20,893), while increasing numbers in 2018 were also apprehended in Yuma (5,201) and El Paso (4,563).

While apprehensions of UACs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle represent a small portion of total UAC apprehensions, their share of the total reached an all-time high of 3 percent in 2018. Almost one in three non-Mexican, non-Northern Triangle UACs were apprehended in the San Diego Sector (502 out of 1,711), followed by Rio Grande Valley (398) and El Centro (315). The leading countries of citizenship of UACs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle were India (737), Bangladesh (386), and Nicaragua (336).

Most of UAC apprehensions in 2018 occurred along the Southwest Border. A total of only 53 UACs were apprehended across the Northern Border, while 56 were apprehended along the coastal borders.

§ 1092(b)(1)(G) Apprehensions of family units

Definition

Family unit – a group consisting of an alien minor with his or her adult alien parent or legal guardian. For example, a mother and child apprehended together are counted as two family units.

Apprehensions of Family Unit Aliens (FMUAs) are output measures that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal entries, an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. USBP's count of apprehensions is considered reliable, but agents may not always be able to reliably identify family units.

USBP began collecting data on FMUAs apprehended between POEs in 2012; data on FMUAs are unavailable for earlier years.

Data and Discussion

Tables 6a – 6d provide counts of FMUA apprehensions by citizenship and by USBP sector for 2012-2018.

Table 6a.

Total Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMUAs, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	76	349	1,127	265	1,825	2,625	1,373	3,254	222	11,116
2013	102	711	365	298	1,688	7,265	1,576	2,630	220	14,855
2014	176	4,950	630	562	3,591	52,326	1,723	3,812	675	68,445
2015	807	2,141	675	1,220	1,372	27,409	1,550	2,930	1,734	39,838
2016	1,051	3,549	1,593	5,664	1,640	52,006	2,863	3,139	6,169	77,674
2017	941	2,453	1,798	8,609	865	49,896	2,944	2,042	6,074	75,622
2018	741	2,829	3,539	12,312	597	63,278	4,408	4,954	14,554	107,212

Table 6b.**Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMUAs from Mexico, FY 2012 – FY 2018**

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	56	218	699	241	1,623	1,555	1,325	2,940	194	8,851
2013	90	177	294	267	1,116	1,690	1,343	2,216	163	7,356
2014	61	141	260	213	779	1,832	1,213	1,057	83	5,639
2015	40	174	196	188	713	1,326	854	696	89	4,276
2016	38	229	163	224	518	1,392	346	487	84	3,481
2017	37	118	158	213	363	815	257	256	54	2,271
2018	56	144	233	167	292	706	373	226	64	2,261

Table 6c.**Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMUAs from Northern Triangle Countries, FY 2012 – FY 2018**

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	10	120	12	19	175	989	31	130	3	1,489
2013	8	522	40	23	522	5,354	39	254	19	6,781
2014	100	4,753	337	291	2,767	49,790	351	2,553	392	61,334
2015	764	1,929	470	1,002	602	25,296	617	2,127	1,556	34,363
2016	1,005	3,233	1,380	4,634	827	49,919	1,615	2,496	5,298	70,407
2017	900	2,290	1,502	7,134	477	48,732	2,414	1,755	5,941	71,145
2018	680	2,665	3,243	11,870	295	61,809	3,877	4,712	14,358	103,509

Note: Northern Triangle Countries refers to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Table 6d.**Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMUAs from All Other Countries, FY 2012 – FY 2018**

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	10	11	416	5	27	81	17	184	25	776
2013	4	12	31	8	50	221	194	160	38	718
2014	15	56	33	58	45	704	159	202	200	1,472
2015	3	38	9	30	57	787	79	107	89	1,199
2016	8	87	50	806	295	695	902	156	787	3,786
2017	4	45	138	1,262	25	349	273	31	79	2,206
2018	5	20	63	275	10	763	158	16	132	1,442

Total FMUA apprehensions increased six-fold between 2012 (the first year for which data are available) and 2014, fell from 68,445 to 39,838 between 2014 and 2015, and almost tripled between 2015 and 2018 (107,212). Growth occurred across seven out of nine Southwest Border sectors (all but Big Bend and Laredo), with the largest numbers of apprehensions in Rio Grande Valley (63,278), Yuma (14,554), and El Paso (12,312).

As with UAC apprehensions, the growth in FMUA numbers was driven entirely by families from the Northern Triangle, which accounted for 97 percent of the total. Indeed, while FMUA apprehensions from the Northern Triangle increased in 5 of the previous 6 years (all but 2014-2015), FMUA apprehensions from Mexico have fallen each year since 2012, from 8,851 in that year to a low of 2,261. FMUA apprehensions from countries other than Mexico peaked at 3,786 in 2016 and fell to 1,442 in 2018, with the largest drop coming in the El Paso Sector (1,262 apprehensions in 2017 versus 275 in 2018). The leading countries of citizenship of FMUAs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle were Nicaragua (640), Romania (164), and Brazil (151).

Northern and coastal border apprehensions represented a small portion of the FMUA count in 2018. A total of 230 FMUAs were apprehended across the Northern Border, while 48 were apprehended along the coastal border.

§ 1092(b)(1)(H) Between the ports illicit drugs seizure rate

Definition

Between the ports illicit drugs seizure rate – For each type of illicit drug seized by USBP between POEs, the ratio of the illicit drugs seized in any year relative to the average amount seized in the immediately preceding 5 years.

The illicit drug seizure rate is an output measure, which compares trends in activity data over time.

Methodology and Limitations

Between the ports drug seizure data are obtained from USBP administrative records. These data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug seizure rate directed by NDAA § 1092 (b)(1)(H), the drug seizure rate describes the ratio of each year’s seizures relative to illicit drugs seizures in the preceding 5 years; the measure does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are seized.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 7.

Illicit Drugs Seized Relative to Preceding 5 Years (“Illicit Drug Seizure Rate”) between POEs, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Drug Type	Rate/Amt	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Marijuana	Rate	101%	100%	83%	81%	72%	45%	29%
	Kg seized	1,043,201	1,102,285	872,052	697,764	586,972	390,648	209,120
Cocaine	Rate	117%	53%	57%	206%	71%	123%	93%
	Kg seized	5,516	2,085	2,066	5,089	2,483	4,239	2,971
Heroin	Rate	151%	142%	142%	141%	129%	177%	88%
	Kg seized	195	261	275	235	257	432	258
Methamphetamines	Rate	228%	160%	149%	215%	168%	199%	174%
	Kg seized	1,685	1,624	1,783	2,922	3,730	4,685	5,132
Fentanyl	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Kg seized	NA	NA	NA	NA	47	82	176

Note: USBP began tracking fentanyl seizures in July 2016 so it is not possible to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for 2016–2018.

Drug seizure trends varied in 2018 by type of illicit drug. Marijuana seizures continued a 5-year pattern of steep declines, from 2.4 million pounds in 2013 and 861 thousand pounds in 2017 to 461 thousand pounds in 2018, for an illicit drug seizure rate of 29 percent. Seizures of cocaine and heroin were also down from 2017 and from their 5-year averages, though their drops were less dramatic. At the same time, seizures of methamphetamines were up from 3,580 pounds in 2013 and 10,328 pounds in 2017 to an all-time high of 11,314 in 2018, for an illicit drug seizure rate of 174 percent. And seizures of fentanyl more than doubled from 181 pounds in 2017 (the first full year for which data are available) to 388 pounds in 2018.

§ 1092(b)(1)(I) Estimates of the impact of the consequence delivery system on recidivism

Definition

Consequence delivery system (CDS) – a process implemented by USBP to uniquely evaluate each apprehended subject and to identify the most effective and efficient consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity.

Recidivist rate – The share of subjects apprehended by USBP who are apprehended more than once in the same year.

The annual recidivist rate is an output measure that offers insight into what share of repatriated aliens are deterred from making additional unlawful entry attempts, though not accounting for unknown attempts/entries. USBP uses the annual recidivist rate as one of its 13 metrics of the effectiveness of enforcement consequences under the CDS.

Methodology and Limitations

Since 2007, USBP has collected biometric data (including fingerprints and digital photographs) from most unlawful border crossers it apprehends. For the purpose of this report, these data are used to identify subjects apprehended more than once in a given year. USBP data on re-apprehensions in the same year is considered reliable. The annual recidivist rate is defined as the number of unique subjects apprehended multiple times in a year divided by the total number of unique subjects in the year:

$$\text{Annual recidivist rate} = \frac{\text{Number of unique subjects apprehended multiple times}}{\text{Total number of unique subjects}}$$

The annual recidivism rate is a valid indicator of the probability that individuals previously apprehended make subsequent attempts at unlawful re-entry in that a drop in the annual recidivism rate very likely reflects a reduction in re-apprehensions. The measure has the further advantages that USBP can calculate annual recidivism based strictly on its own apprehension data and that it can reliably be calculated at the end of each year. These features make the annual recidivism rate a useful measure for USBP performance management and an important operational measure.

Nonetheless, as the GAO has argued, if the goal is to accurately describe the share of individuals previously apprehended who make additional unlawful entry attempts, the current measure of recidivism could be strengthened in at least two ways: 1) count re-apprehensions based on the date on which a subject is removed or returned, rather than that the date of apprehension; 2) count re-apprehensions that occur within a fixed period of time defined by the subject's repatriation date, rather than by the year.⁵ When based on a 1-year window, these refinements yield a more expansive definition of the recidivism rate that DHS refers to as the "Total One-Year Recidivism Rate"; the next version of this report will include estimates of the impact of CDS on both the annual recidivism rate and a longer-term recidivism rate.

Interpreting recidivism rates must be done with caution. While declines in recidivism may suggest greater deterrence and/or improvements by USBP, changes in the overall flow may be the result of more first-attempt border crossers, thus driving down the recidivism rate; changes to the recidivism rate should be examined alongside the overall flow. Furthermore, changes to push factors over time may also play a role in a decrease in subsequent entry attempts.

Additionally, the impact of CDS on recidivism within a given year is not solely a measure of USBP consequences and operations. All enforcement actions that occur after apprehension and processing subjects into a consequence are controlled and timed by other components. Some subjects are never returned and therefore would not be represented in the metric. A subject that remains in the United States, pending a hearing 5 years away, has been successfully prevented from re-entry. Recidivism, calculated as described here, is influenced by court schedules and the operational ability of other immigration components as well as USBP consequences.

⁵ U.S. GAO, "Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Post-Apprehension Consequences," GAO-17-66, January 2017, pp. 13-17.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 8.
CDS Recidivism Rate by Sector: FY 2012 – FY 2018

Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	EL Centro, CA	EL Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	6.90%	6.80%	38.28%	8.12%	13.35%	12.73%	30.49%	19.32%	18.20%	16.60%
2013	7.58%	7.28%	35.94%	10.22%	12.27%	11.62%	32.34%	21.24%	17.01%	15.73%
2014	6.74%	5.22%	32.63%	11.16%	11.59%	11.81%	32.46%	18.59%	13.26%	14.06%
2015	4.95%	6.14%	31.70%	8.63%	11.82%	12.66%	31.35%	15.71%	11.32%	14.02%
2016	5.59%	6.73%	24.52%	8.32%	13.01%	9.93%	27.34%	15.73%	5.37%	12.27%
2017	4.73%	5.51%	22.73%	6.22%	13.29%	8.27%	21.76%	12.46%	3.77%	10.48%
2018	7.65%	5.05%	22.70%	4.37%	14.03%	8.25%	21.36%	14.05%	2.68%	10.81%

Since the implementation of CDS in 2012, seven out of nine Southwest Border sectors have seen decreases in annual recidivism rates, including drops of five or more percentage points in the El Centro, San Diego, Tucson, and Yuma Sectors. The largest decreases in recidivism were observed in El Centro (from 38 percent in 2012 to 23 percent in 2018) and Yuma (from 18 percent in 2012 to 3 percent in 2018). No sector saw changes of more than three percentage points in its recidivism rate between 2017 and 2018. While six out of nine sectors saw very modest drops in recidivism between 2017 and 2018, the Big Bend, Laredo, and Tucson Sectors saw modest increases (from 5 to 8 percent in Big Bend, 13 to 14 percent in Laredo, and 12 to 14 percent in Tucson).

Recidivism data are not available to calculate the impact of CDS at the Northern Border or coastal boundaries.

§ 1092(b)(1)(J) Examination of each consequence under the CDS

Definition

Consequence – An administrative, programmatic, or criminal justice process imposed on a subject following the subject’s apprehension. CDS is designed to identify, for any given subject, the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity.

Methodology and Limitations

USBP’s current methodology for assessing the CDS involves analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of each enforcement consequence. One of the key effectiveness metrics is the annual recidivism rate, which is calculated separately for each enforcement consequence.

Under the CDS, USBP specifically targets aliens with more extensive records of unlawful border crossing behavior for consequences that are designed to have a greater deterrent impact. As a result, differences in recidivism rates by enforcement consequence may reflect differences in the propensity of the targeted population to make further re-entry attempts, in addition to the possible impact of each consequence on recidivism.

An additional limitation of currently-available data is that they are based on apprehension data for a given year, not repatriation data. Depending on the consequence and the timing of the apprehension, some individuals may not be repatriated to their country of origin during the year of their apprehension, and therefore may not have an opportunity to attempt re-entry. For example, long waits to appear in immigration courts for non-detained aliens mean very few aliens issued warrants of arrest and notices to appear are removed in the same year as their apprehension, which results in artificially low recidivism rates for aliens subject to that consequence. DHS and CBP are working to refine their analysis of CDS and will seek to address these limitations in subsequent versions of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 9.
Annual Recidivism Rate by Consequence, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Type	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Voluntary Return	27.06	28.61	30.5	27.03	24.55	24.65	25.31
Warrant of Arrest/ Notice to Appear	3.83	1.44	0.6	0.89	0.41	0.36	0.47
Expedited Removal	16.44	16.66	17.54	18.08	15.46	13.5	14.1
Reinstatement of Removal	15.88	16.42	15.8	15.41	16.62	15.02	15.64
Alien Transfer Exit Program	23.82	25.48	28.63	27.17	28.8	27.89	31.68
Criminal Consequence Program	10.3	9.26	8.24	6.67	8.36	6.17	9.25
Standard Prosecution	9.09	10.17	9.18	8.79	8.16	6.98	9.05
Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security	10.24	18.04	18.25	22.97	30.93	NA	NA

Note: The Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security program was discontinued after 2016.

While these data should be interpreted with caution for the reasons identified above, some trends are noteworthy. For example, the more punitive consequence programs such as the criminal consequence initiative and standard prosecution generally showed lower recidivism rates (9.3 percent, 9.1 percent) than less punitive programs like voluntary return (25.3 percent) or expedited removal (14.1 percent). Recidivism rates by consequence were up slightly across the board in 2018 compared to 2017; overall recidivism remained essentially unchanged, as noted above, as a larger share of aliens were subject to more punitive consequences.

§ 1092(C) METRICS FOR SECURING THE BORDER AT PORTS OF ENTRY

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(i) Total inadmissible travelers at ports of entry

Definition

Inadmissible alien – An alien seeking admission at a POE who is ineligible for admission pursuant to INA § 212(a).

Known inadmissible aliens – Aliens seeking admission at a POE who are found by OFO to be inadmissible.

Total attempted inadmissible aliens – The estimated number of inadmissible aliens who attempt to enter the United States. Total attempted inadmissible aliens include known inadmissible aliens and successful improper entries at POEs.

Inadmissible aliens and known inadmissible aliens are output measures that describes OFO officer workload. Known inadmissible aliens may also be used as a proxy indicator of total attempted inadmissible aliens, which is an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Known inadmissible aliens are recorded in OFO administrative records with a unique identifier created for each inadmissibility determination. OFO's count of known inadmissible aliens is considered reliable.

The Department continues to improve the Compliance Examination (COMPEX) program to be capable of estimating successful unlawful entries at POEs, which is necessary to estimate total inadmissible travelers. As of 2019, the program is capable of estimating undetected major infractions, but CBP is still working to validate the reliability of COMPEX's estimate of successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 10.
Known Inadmissible Aliens at POEs, FY 2009 – FY 2018

2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
225,149	231,306	216,355	197,362	205,920	224,927	254,637	292,614	216,157	279,009

An average of 234 thousand aliens were identified as inadmissible at POEs between 2009 and 2018, with the highest numbers observed in 2016 (292,614) and 2018 (279,009).

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(ii) Refusal and interdiction rates at ports of entry

Definition

Refusal rate – The share of all travelers seeking admission at a POE that is found inadmissible. Refusal rate is an output measure that describes OFO officer workload.

POE interdiction rate – The share of attempted inadmissible aliens that is found inadmissible. POE interdiction rate is an output measure that describes the difficulty of entering the United States unlawfully through a POE.

Methodology and Limitations

The refusal rate is calculated by dividing known inadmissible aliens (i.e., aliens found inadmissible by OFO officers at POEs) by the total number of travelers (i.e., all persons seeking to enter at POEs):

$$\text{Refusal Rate} = \frac{\text{Inadmissibility determinations}}{\text{Travelers}}$$

Data on inadmissibility determinations and total travelers are obtained from OFO administrative records; these data are considered reliable.

The Department continues to improve the COMPEX program to be capable of estimating successful unlawful entries at POEs, which is necessary to estimate the interdiction rate. As of 2019, the program is capable of estimating undetected major infractions, but CBP is still working to validate the reliability of COMPEX’s estimate of successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 11.
Inadmissible Aliens and Refusal Rate at POEs, FY 2009 – FY 2018

Year	Passengers	Inadmissible	Refusal Rate
2009	361,191,781	225,149	0.06%
2010	352,980,607	231,306	0.07%
2011	340,364,884	216,355	0.06%
2012	351,551,007	197,362	0.06%
2013	362,333,988	205,920	0.06%
2014	374,974,750	224,927	0.06%
2015	383,200,225	254,637	0.07%
2016	390,592,745	292,614	0.07%
2017	397,407,840	216,157	0.05%
2018	413,878,570	279,009	0.07%

The number of travelers at POEs continuously increased from 2011 to 2018 (from 340 million to 414 million), though traveler arrivals remain below the levels observed prior to the 2008-2009 recession. The number of known inadmissible aliens is always a very small share of travelers coming through POEs, hovering within a within a range of 0.5-0.7 percent throughout this period.

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(iii) Unlawful entries at ports of entry

Definition

Successful unlawful entries – The estimated number of inadmissible aliens who improperly enter the United States through POEs.

Successful unlawful entries is an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

The Department continues to improve the COMPEX program to be capable of estimating successful unlawful entries at POEs. As of 2019, the program is capable of estimating undetected major infractions, but CBP is still working to validate the reliability of COMPEX’s estimate of successful unlawful entries.

§ 1092(c)(1)(B) Illicit drugs seized at ports of entry

Definition

Drug seizures – Seizures of illicit drugs by CBP officers at POEs.

Drug seizures are an output measure. Drug seizures may also be interpreted as a proxy indicator of illicit drug inflows through POEs, an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Drugs seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records, measured in kilograms. These data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

Detailed drug seizure data at POEs are contained in Appendix B. Total seizures fell from 401 thousand kilograms in 2015 and 368 thousand kilograms in 2016 to a recent low of 250 kilograms in 2018. This reduction is mainly explained by the reduction in marijuana seizures, which account for an average of 63 percent of all drug seizures (by weight) during this period.

§ 1092(c)(1)(C) Port of entry illicit drug seizure rate

Definition

POE illicit drug seizure rate – For each type of illicit drug seized by OFO at POEs, the ratio of the amount of illicit drugs seized in any year to the average of the amount seized in the immediately preceding 5 years.

Methodology and Limitations

At POEs illicit seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug seizure rate directed by NDAA § 1092(c)(1)(C), the drug seizure rate describes recent seizure trends (i.e., current year compared to previous 5 years); the measure does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are seized.

The drug seizure rate is an output measure, which compares trends in activity data over time. Drug seizures may be interpreted as a proxy indicator of illicit drug inflows through POEs, an outcome measure.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 12.
POE Illicit Drug Seizure Rate, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Drug Type	Rate/Amt	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Marijuana	Rate	61%	63%	66%	72%	70%	72%	62%
	Kg seized	237,085	215,705	198,670	273,434	233,827	166,221	135,814
Cocaine	Rate	106%	119%	117%	124%	137%	137%	105%
	Kg seized	20,531	20,976	20,559	17,396	23,958	28,275	23,407
Heroin	Rate	158%	138%	120%	104%	89%	87%	116%
	Kg seized	1,718	1,822	1,963	2,732	1,916	1,758	2,361
Methamphetamines	Rate	865%	626%	433%	329%	257%	201%	229%
	Kg seized	6,460	9,512	10,639	13,192	17,137	22,885	33,567
Fentanyl	Rate	NA						
	Kg seized	NA	NA	NA	32	270	882	860

Note: OFO began tracking fentanyl seizures partway through 2015 so it is not possible to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for 2015–2018.

Marijuana seizures at POEs declined from a recent high of 273 thousand kilograms in 2015 to 136 thousand kilograms in 2018, a drop of 50 percent. Cocaine seizures also dropped from the record high level of 28 thousand kilograms in 2017 down to 23 thousand kilograms in 2018, a return to levels of seizure seen in 2016. Heroin and methamphetamines seizures both saw overall increases from 2012 to 2018, with heroin seizures increasing nearly 40 percent from 1,700 kilograms in 2012 to 2,400 in 2018 and methamphetamines up more than five-fold during that period (from nearly 6,500 to over 33,000 kilograms). Fentanyl seizures climbed from 270 kilograms in 2016, the first full year in which data are available, to 860 kilograms in 2018, an increase of more than 300 percent.

§ 1092(c)(1)(D) Major infractions at ports of entry

Definition

Major infractions – OFO defines major infractions to include all offenses subject to criminal arrest, including arrests related to terrorism, drugs, immigration crimes (including zero tolerance arrests), currency, merchandise, agriculture products, National Crime Information Center (NCIC) hits, and Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) hits, among others. Infractions are not equivalent to arrests of individuals, as each individual may be charged with multiple infractions and not all infractions may ultimately lead to an arrest.

Known major infractions – The number of major infractions interdicted by OFO.

Undetected major infractions – The estimated number of major infractions not interdicted by OFO.

Known major infractions are an output measure. Undetected major infractions are an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Known major infractions are recorded in OFO administrative records and are considered reliable. For the purpose of this report, OFO has updated its reporting methodology to limit data to passenger-related infractions, excluding infractions involving mailed goods and other non-passenger-related events.

Undetected major infractions are estimated through comprehensive audits on a statistical sampling of travelers known as COMPEX who were processed by CBP without secondary inspection and admitted into the United States. The randomly selected travelers undergo a systematic series of checks to reveal any admissibility, customs, or agriculture infractions. The rate of infractions found within the sample is applied to the population of travelers processed by CBP without secondary inspections. The program to develop these estimates operates at 19 airports and all POV crossings and is being expanded to pedestrian operations. Numbers reported below are for the airports and POV crossings within the program. Estimates are limited to the assumption that CBP secondary inspections and comprehensive audits find all infractions. This assumption is likely more valid for customs-related screenings at airports than passenger screening given the 100 percent search of all baggage. Additionally, true random sampling is more likely at POV lanes where automated systems select vehicles for additional screening – these automated systems do not yet exist for airports.

This is the best available estimate of undetected major infractions with major reliability enhancements implemented in 2015 and 2016.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 13.
Known Major Infractions at POEs, FY 2009 – FY 2018

Year	Travelers	Seizure Counts	Infraction Rate
2009	361,191,781	39,412	0.01%
2010	352,980,607	61,146	0.02%
2011	340,364,884	54,548	0.02%
2012	351,551,007	47,521	0.01%
2013	362,333,988	51,391	0.01%
2014	374,974,750	42,190	0.01%
2015	383,200,225	44,380	0.01%
2016	390,592,745	53,545	0.01%
2017	397,407,840	45,601	0.01%
2018	413,878,570	54,420	0.01%

Note: This table updates previous versions of this report to align reported values with passenger-related known major infractions (i.e., excluding non-passenger-related incidents)."

OFO officers made 54 thousand seizures based on major infractions at POEs in 2018, a 19 percent increase over 2017 and the largest number of seizures since 2011.

Table 14.
Estimated Undetected Major Infractions at POEs, FY 2011 – FY 2018

Year	Air	POV
2011	12,506	36,149
2012	14,970	32,499
2013	16,114	28,659
2014	13,334	12,376
2015	14,852	27,432
2016	16,158	29,251
2017	12,386	30,295
2018	8,736	29,879

The estimated number of undetected major infractions at airports fell to 8,700 in 2018, down 29 percent from 2017 and down 46 percent from a recent high of 16,000 in 2016. Undetected major infractions in passenger vehicle lanes were roughly unchanged during the same period at around 30,000 all 3 years.

§ 1092(c)(1)(E) Cocaine seizure effectiveness rate

Definition

Cocaine seizure effectiveness rate – In consultation with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the amount of cocaine seized by OFO at land POEs compared to the total estimated flow of cocaine through land POEs.

Cocaine seizures are an output measure. Some analysts also treat seizures as a proxy indicator of total attempts to import cocaine, an outcome measure. Seizure effectiveness rate (i.e., cocaine seized as compared to the total estimated cocaine flow) is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records and is considered reliable. Estimates of the total cocaine flow are provided by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The U.S. Government does not have an estimate of the share of the total cocaine flow that passes through land POEs, but the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency's National Drug Threat Assessment states that the Southwest Border remains the key entry point for the majority of the cocaine entering the United States.

The DIA estimate is based on a U.S. Government estimate of cocaine departing South America towards the United States incorporating estimates of cocaine movement, cocaine production, and U.S. consumption derived from various U.S. Government agencies. The estimated amount of cocaine available to enter the United States (Estimated Flow in Table 15) is derived by subtracting seizures, high-confidence losses, and consumption in transit zone countries as well as documented departures from the transit zone towards non-U.S. destinations from the total estimate of cocaine departing South America towards the United States.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 15.

Cocaine Seizures and Estimated Flows at Land POEs, FY 2016 - FY 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Total Seizures	24.0	28.3	25.8
Land Seizures	9.1	10.8	10.0
Estimated Flow	1,274	1,136	1,187
Seizure Effectiveness Rate	1.89%	2.49%	2.17%

Note: Seizures and estimated flows in metric tons. DIA data on estimated flow does not provide a break out for land flows, and seizure effectiveness rate is calculated as the ratio of total seizures to total estimated flow. See accompanying text for notes on estimated flow methodology.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(i) Average wait times and traffic volume

Definition

Average wait time – Average minute wait time for vehicles to pass through a land POE.

Private vehicle volume – The number of private vehicles passing through a land POE per year.

Commercial vehicle volume – The number of commercial vehicles passing through a land POE per year.

Average wait time is an output measure describing the ease of crossing the border. Vehicle volume is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

OFO uses two primary methodologies for calculating vehicle wait times at the border: line-of-sight and automated technology such as Bluetooth and Radio Frequency Identification. For ports using line-of-site methodology, ports manually record wait times once per hour at the top of each hour using the Border Wait Time Administrative Tool. For automated ports, wait times are recorded automatically in 5-10 minute increments every hour, which OFO averages prior to reporting out. OFO records wait times for 72 land border crossings, excluding small border POEs with negligible wait times. In March 2018, OFO leadership updated CBP's policy guidance for measuring and recording wait times at CBP land border POEs. The updated policy consolidates all previously issued policy regarding manual and automated wait time reporting and further clarifies Active Land Management as a means to more effectively manage traffic flow, primary inspections and associated resource allocations.

OFO records counts of Personally Owned Vehicles (POV) and Commercially Owned Vehicles (COV) as administrative data in its Operations Management Report (OMR); these data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

Data on average wait times and counts of private and commercial vehicles for each land POE for which data are available are contained in Appendix C. Comparisons should be made with caution given the differences in flow and type of traffic at each port.

The most notable improvement in passenger vehicle wait times occurred in the San Ysidro, CA POE, where the average wait time fell to 19 minutes in 2018, down from 47 minutes in 2017 and 81 minutes in 2013. Average passenger wait times increased in Brownsville, TX (24 minutes in 2018, up from 14 minutes in 2017) and Santa Teresa, NM (49 minutes, up from 14 minutes in 2017).

COV wait times vary more from year to year for each station and are consistently lower than POV wait times. The most notable change in 2018 was the continued increase in wait time at Pharr, TX, from 16 minutes in 2013 to 33 minutes in 2018 – an average well beyond the average COV wait time.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(ii) Infrastructure capacity utilization rate

Definition

Infrastructure capacity utilization rate – Average number of vehicles processed per booth, per hour at each land POE.

The infrastructure capacity utilization rate is an output measure that describes OFO’s ability to process traffic relative to the physical and staffing capacity.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from OFO administrative records. The data comes from CBP systems with booth hours and throughput as calculated fields. The hours serve as a proxy measure for the number of CBP officer hours spent processing and are measured on a one-for-one basis. Throughput is then calculated by summing all vehicles that passed through a site in a year and then dividing it by total booth hours.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 16.
Average Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Description	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
OFO National Average	43.1	43.5	45.3	46.6	47.4	49.6	51.1
Northern Border	36.2	38.2	39.0	35.7	34.6	36.3	37.2
Southern Border	47.7	46.8	49.1	53.0	54.4	56.6	58.6

Note: Table depicts average vehicles processed per lane, per hour.

Detailed infrastructure capacity utilization rate data are contained in Appendix D.

Each OFO land POE is unique in terms of staffing authorizations and physical layouts. Land POEs may be physically constrained by the available space around them and so unable to expand to yield greater capacity. Land POEs in the United States are also impacted by the adjoining Canadian and Mexican land POE management decisions on staffing and physical layouts. Both the OFO Mission Support Facilities Division and the CBP Office of Facilities and Asset Management are working on establishing methods to determine resourcing decisions for land POEs.

In general, the Southern Border reports higher utilization rates because of higher flows through the POEs. The overall utilization rate continued to increase in 2018 due to a combination of increased efficiency and increased traffic demand for a fixed number of processing lanes. Overall, CBP processed an average of 51.1 vehicles per lane, per hour in 2018 (37.2 on the Northern Border; 58.6 on the Southwest Border). Stanton Street in the El Paso Field Office averaged 133 vehicles per hour, per lane in 2018—once again the highest in the country by a sizeable margin.

However, Stanton Street only processes vehicles eligible for Dedicated Commuter Lanes (SENTRI and NEXUS program members) — the fastest-to-process class of travelers.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(iii) Secondary examination rate

Definition

Secondary examination rate – Percentage of passengers subject to secondary inspection at each land POE.

Secondary examination rate is an output measure that describes OFO workload and practices.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from OFO administrative records. Secondary examination rate is determined by the recorded number of passengers sent for secondary inspection versus the total number of recorded passengers.

Available Data and Discussion

Frequency of secondary inspections data is contained in Appendix E.

Among the Northern Border POEs, the average secondary inspection rate was 3.4 percent in 2018, down from an average of 7.5 percent from 2013-2018. The Southern Border Secondary Inspection Rate also averaged 3.4 percent in 2018, down from 12.1 percent between 2013-2017. The highest secondary inspection rates were reported at Northern Border POEs including Friday Harbor, WA (31 percent) and Morgan, MT (45 percent). Certain smaller land POEs have high secondary examination rates due to low volume of traffic that allows officers increased time to thoroughly examine a larger share of passengers.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(iv) Secondary examinations effectiveness rate

OFO conducts traveler and cargo-related secondary examinations for a variety of discretionary and mandatory investigative and enforcement reasons, including but not limited to CBP Officer enforcement referrals, alerts, subject complexity, NII inspection, and compliance examinations spanning a broad range of laws, rules, and regulations from multiple government agencies. Not all referred examinations are expected to result in significant enforcement results, such as disposals, fines and penalties, seizures, or arrests. Secondary examinations are often fully effective when they find no violations of any kind, as with compliance examinations or referrals due to subject complexity; and public awareness of CBP secondary inspection capabilities also serves as a deterrent to illegal activity. For these reasons, CBP is unable to categorize a given secondary examination as “effective” or “ineffective” and does not calculate a secondary examinations effectiveness rate.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(i) Number of potentially “high-risk” cargo containers

Definition

Potentially high-risk cargo containers – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using National Targeting Center (NTC) CBP national security criteria.

Potentially high-risk cargo containers are an output measure that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

All international cargo containers coming to the United States via the sea, land, and air modes of transportation are screened by CBP using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to identify those shipments that may be considered potentially high-risk according to CBP national security criteria. Any cargo container traveling via the maritime environment carrying a shipment identified as potentially high-risk is identified for immediate review and assessed or scanned prior to lading at a Container Security Initiative member foreign port of origin or at arrival at a U.S. POE.

Assessing, resolving, and when required, scanning and physically inspecting cargo found to be potentially high-risk ensures the safety of the public and minimizes the impact to the trade through the effective use of risk-focused targeting.

CBP's NTC periodically refines, improves, and revises the security criteria applied by the ATS, which in turn improves the focus of the risk assessment applied and somewhat reduces the overall number of cargo containers identified as potentially high-risk.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 17.
Potentially High-Risk Cargo Containers at Seaports, FY 2013 – FY 2018

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
89,598	74,509	72,974	71,815	36,209	18,625

The NTC's process of continual review and refinement of the security criteria applied and ATS methodology has led to realignment in the total number of maritime cargo containers identified as potentially high-risk since 2013. As a result, even as the amount of cargo arriving at U.S. POEs increased in 2016-2018, the number of containers identified as potentially high-risk dropped from 72 thousand in 2016 to 36 thousand in 2017 to 19 thousand in 2018, a decrease of 74 percent in 2 years.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(ii) Ratio of potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned relative to high-risk containers entering in previous fiscal year

Definition

Ratio of potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned – The ratio of potentially high-risk containers scanned relative to the number of potentially high-risk containers entering in the previous year.

The ratio of potentially high-risk containers scanned is an output measure, which compares trends in activity data over time. Ratio of high-risk containers scanned may also be interpreted as a proxy indicator of high-risk containers successfully scanned and entering through POEs, an outcome measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ratio compares potentially high-risk containers in 1 year to the number entering in the previous year and should not be confused with the percentage of potentially high-risk containers scanned relative to the number entering in the current year.

A container is considered "high-risk" if even one shipment within it is designated high-risk. One container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it which could cause the same container to be reviewed or scanned multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

The ratio of potentially high-risk containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned relative to the previous year's entries are contained in Appendix F.

With respect to the percentage scanned, all sea POEs reported 100 percent scanning of high-risk cargo containers in 2018 or indicated that no high-risk containers passed through the POE.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(iii) Potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE

Definition

Potentially high-risk containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using NTC security criteria that are reviewed, assessed, or scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE.

The number of potentially high-risk containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE is an output measure that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ATS targeting system provides an assessment of the security of shipments, as defined by bills of lading, not individual containers. A large shipment may span several containers or conversely one container may contain many individual shipments. A container is considered potentially “high-risk” if even one shipment within it is designated as high-risk. A single container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it, which could cause the same container to be flagged for review or scanning multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

In 2018, a total of 14,757 potentially high-risk shipments arrived at U.S. POEs. One hundred percent of these shipments were reviewed, assessed, or scanned, including 4,602 shipments reviewed for NTC national security criteria upon arrival at the U.S. port, and 10,155 processed at the designated foreign ports of origin through the Container Security Initiative agreement with host governments.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(iv) Potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE

Definition

Potentially high-risk containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using NTC security criteria that are reviewed, assessed, or scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE.

The number of potentially high-risk containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE is an output measure that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ATS targeting system provides an assessment of the security of shipments, as defined by bills of lading, not individual containers. A large shipment may span several containers or conversely one container may contain many individual shipments. A container is considered potentially “high-risk” if even one shipment within it is designated as high-risk. A single container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it, which could cause the same container to be flagged for review or scanning multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

A total of 10,155 shipments were reviewed, assessed, or scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE in 2018 for NTC national security criteria through the Container Security Initiative agreement with host governments at designated foreign ports of origin.

§ 1092(D) METRICS FOR SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER

§ 1092(d)(1)(A) Situational awareness in the maritime environment

Definition

The NDAA calls for DHS to develop a measure for situational awareness based on “knowledge and understanding of current unlawful cross-border activity, including the following: (A) Threats and trends concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful crossings; (B) The ability to forecast future shifts in such threats and trends; (C) The ability to evaluate such threats and trends at a level sufficient to create actionable plans; and (D) The operational capability to conduct persistent and integrated surveillance of the international borders of the United States.”⁶

Situational awareness is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

To improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of DHS aviation programs, the Department is developing the ability to analyze and report flight hour data consistently across Components and assess the contribution of aviation activity to DHS missions. In 2019, DHS Headquarters” conducted a “Flight Hour Study” of historical U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and AMO data in accordance with the DHS Agency Reform Plan, a response to Executive Order 13781, of March 13, 2017, Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch. This is an ongoing and multi-year effort that the Department will continue to report on in future versions of this report.

In the interim, the Department reports on the following operational activity metrics contributing to maritime domain situational awareness:

- CBP Aircraft Hours Flown for Situational Awareness or Interdiction Support
- USCG Aircraft Hours Flown for Situational Awareness or Interdiction Support
- USCG Cutter Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- CBP Boat Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- USCG Boat Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- CBP Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) Radar Operating Hours
- Number of Vessel Manifests Screened by Coastwatch

Available Data and Discussion

Table 18a.

CBP Aircraft Flight Hours Within/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2016 – FY 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Inside Transit Zone - CBP	6,420	6,273	6,528
Outside Transit Zone – CBP	13,188	12,422	17,576

In comparison to 2017, CBP aircraft hours increased in 2018 by 255 hours (4 percent) inside the transit zone and by 5,154 hours (41 percent) outside the transit zone.

Table 18b.

USCG Aircraft Flight Hours Within/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Description	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Inside Transit Zone – USCG	5,082	4,599	4,567	5,426	4,110	4,361	4,180
Outside Transit Zone – USCG	14,721	14,258	13,896	14,003	13,736	11,452	8,826

⁶ 2017 NDAA § 1092(a)(7).

The USCG reported a decrease in its number of flight hours in 2018, continuing a downward trend from 2012. The USCG flew about 4,200 hours inside the transit zone (down four percent from 2017 and down 11 percent from the average for 2012-2017) and 8,800 hours outside the transit zone (down 23 percent from 2017 and 35 percent from the 2012-2017 average).

Table 19.
USCG Cutter Underway Hours Within/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Description	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Inside Transit Zone	37,866	25,388	14,456	16,964	28,205	49,935	39,738
Outside Transit Zone	127,671	117,114	117,093	112,773	78,462	114,216	101,211

After sizeable increases in cutter underway hours in 2017, hours fell in 2018 to about 40,000 hours inside the transit zone (a decrease of 20 percent from 2017 but an increase of 38 percent over the 2012-2017 average) and about 101 thousand hours outside the transit zone (down 11 percent from 2017 and down 9 percent from the 2012-2017 average).

Table 20a.
CBP Boat Underway Hours Within/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2016 – FY 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Inside Transit Zone	0	9	0
Outside Transit Zone	40,241	34,451	36,110

Note: CBP maritime hours include Air and Marine Operations (AMO) vessel underway hours.

In 2018, CBP did not record any boat underway hours within the transit zone, down from nine the previous year. CBP's boat underway hours outside the transit zone totaled about 36 thousand hours in 2018, up 5 percent from 2017 but down 10 percent from 2016.

Table 20b.
USCG Boat Underway Hours Within/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Description	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Inside Transit Zone	0	2,031	0	0	0	0	487
Outside Transit Zone	46,326	37,640	30,726	32,701	28,525	29,667	26,441

The USCG reported about 500 boat underway hours inside the transit zone in 2018, marking the first year that the agency reported boat hours in the transit zone since 2013. Outside of the transit zone, USCG reported about 26 thousand boat underway hours, a decrease of 11 percent from 2017 and of 23 percent from the 2012-2017 average.

Table 21.
Total Operational Hours for TARS Radars, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Location	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Cudjoe Key, FL	5,752	6,289	6,165	6,306	4,886	5,728	2,448
Lajas, PR	0	0	12,301	5,049	4,559	3,922	2,105

Note: TARS site at Lajas, Puerto Rico crashed in 2011; CBP re-established operations in May 2014.
Source: CBP administrative records

CBP's AMO uses TARS to provide long-range detection of low-altitude aircraft and maritime traffic at the radar's maximum range. The elevated sensor mitigates curvature of the earth and terrain-masking limitations. Following hurricane damage in 2017, TARS hours remained lower than previous years in 2018, with about 2,400 surveillance hours from Cudjoe Key (down 57 percent from 2017 and down 58 percent from the 2012-2017 average) and about 2,100 hours from Lajas (down 46 percent from 2017 and down 67 percent from the 2014-2017 average).

Table 22.

Vessel Manifests Screened by Coastwatch for National Security Concerns Prior to Arrival at U.S. POEs, FY 2012 – FY 2018

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
118,098	126,112	124,661	122,133	117,736	115,006	117,575

USCG Coastwatch screened about 118 thousand vessel manifests for National Security Concerns in 2018, up 2 percent from 2017 and down 3 percent from the 2012-2017 average.

§ 1092(d)(1)(B) Known maritime migrant flow rate

Definition

Known maritime migrant flow - Total maritime migrant flow interdicted, identified directly or indirectly but not interdicted, or otherwise believed to have unlawfully entered the United States

Known maritime migrant interdiction rate – Total migrant interdictions in the maritime domain as a share of the known migrant flow.

Known maritime migrant flow is an outcome measure. Known maritime migrant interdiction rate is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Migrant flow data are obtained from USCG and CBP administrative records. The USCG maintains a robust accounting of USCG, international partner, and domestic partner interdictions and sightings of undocumented maritime migrants. The USCG relies upon its partners to report their interdictions to the USCG for compilation in the database. At times, undocumented maritime migrants are counted by both USCG and CBP (or other partners) when interdicted as agencies often cooperate during these operations. In certain limited cases undocumented maritime migrant interdictions by partners are not reported to the USCG, and these cases are not accounted for in the tables below. Additionally, while partners report cases to the USCG when undocumented maritime migrants are apprehended on shore or evidence is found of their arrival on shore, some migrants arrive without being apprehended and leave no evidence. These cases are never reported and are also excluded from the known maritime migrant flow figures below.

Total migrant interdiction data (i.e., interdictions by DHS and its international partners) are only available beginning in 2014; as a result, the Known Migrant Interdiction Rate is also limited to the years since 2014.

To improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of DHS aviation and marine programs, the Department will provide de-conflicted data when interdictions involve assets from multiple Components in future versions of this report. The Department will also report metrics on coordinated operations. This may be coordinated through a working group already convened to validate maritime CBP seizure data.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 23.

Migrant Interdictions in the Maritime Domain by DHS Component, Known Maritime Migrant Flow, and Known Maritime Migrant Interdiction Rate, FY 2009 – FY 2018

Year	USCG	CBP	DHS and Partners	Known Migrant Flow	Interdiction Rate
2009	3,682	NA	NA	9,850	NA
2010	2,121	NA	NA	4,443	NA
2011	2,458	NA	NA	4,566	NA
2012	2,732	NA	NA	5,298	NA
2013	2,093	NA	NA	7,631	NA
2014	3,587	NA	7,752	10,631	72.9%
2015	3,825	NA	6,028	8,057	74.8%
2016	6,326	2,683	8,167	10,319	79.3%
2017	2,512	1,229	3,952	4,760	83.0%
2018	1,671	1,224	3,603	5,007	72.0%

Note: Some interdictions may be counted by both USCG and CBP as some migrant interdictions involve assets from both agencies. Interdictions by DHS and partners include international partners.

Both the number of migrants interdicted in the maritime domain and the total known flow dropped by more than half in 2017 compared to the previous year and the previous 3-year average, a change likely resulting in part from immigration policy changes affecting Cuban migrants. Total interdictions and the known maritime flow stabilized somewhat in 2018, with interdictions falling 9 percent compared to the previous year to about 3,600 and the known flow increasing 5 percent to about 5,000. At 72 percent, the interdiction effectiveness rate was slightly below its previous 4-year average of 78 percent.

§ 1092(d)(1)(C) Illicit drugs removal rate

Definition

Illicit drugs removal rate – The ratio of illicit drugs removed by DHS maritime security in any year, including drugs abandoned at sea, relative to the average amount removed or abandoned in the immediately preceding 5 years.

The illicit drug removal rate is an output measure which compares trends in activity data over time.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug removals are obtained from USCG administrative records; these data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug removal rate directed by NDAA § 1092 (d)(1)(C), the illicit drug removal rate describes recent trends in drugs removed or abandoned at sea (i.e., current year compared to previous 5 years); the measure does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are removed.

Non-commercial maritime drug removals include those seized by the USCG, CBP, other law enforcement agencies, and international partners as well as those disrupted or abandoned by drug trafficking organizations. At present, only USCG data are reported, but the Department has convened a work group to validate maritime CBP seizure data, which will be included in future versions of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 24.

Ratio of Drugs Removed or Abandoned at Sea Relative to Previous 5 Fiscal Years (“Illicit Drug Removal Rate”), FY 2012 – FY 2018

Drug Type	Rate/Amt	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Marijuana	Rate	337%	137%	154%	100%	61%	32%	36%
	Kg seized	56,511	36,745	49,231	35,499	23,865	12,743	11,434
Methamphetamine	Rate	0%	150%	265%	36%	4,332%	283%	0%
	Kg seized	0	0	14.6	2.2	272.5	168.5	0.04
Heroin	Rate	762%	0%	0%	676%	327%	402%	209%
	Kg seized	10.9	7.9	0	23.8	20.0	44.0	40.0

Note: Data only includes removals by USCG. Table reflects OIS analysis of USCG data.

The illicit drug removal rate varies significantly by year and drug type. Marijuana removals fell for the fourth year in a row in 2018 to 11,434 kilograms, down 10 percent from 2017 and down 68 percent from the average for 2012-2017. Methamphetamine seizures fell almost to zero, down from 273 kilograms in 2016 and 169 kilograms in 2017. (Relatively little methamphetamine is removed or abandoned at sea because most methamphetamines entering the United States from the Western Hemisphere travel by land.) USCG removed 40 kilograms of heroin in 2018, down 9 percent from 2017 but up 125 percent from the 2012-2017 average.

§ 1092(d)(1)(D) Cocaine removal effectiveness rate

Definition

Cocaine removal effectiveness rate – In consultation with ONDCP, the amount of cocaine removed by DHS inside and outside the maritime transit zone compared to total estimated flow of cocaine through the maritime domain.

Cocaine removals is an output measure. Removals may also be used as a proxy indicator of total attempts to import cocaine, an outcome measure. Cocaine removal effectiveness rate (i.e., cocaine seized as compared to the total estimated cocaine flow) is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug removal data obtained from ONDCP, Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-S), and USCG administrative records through the Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB) are considered reliable. Flow quantities are the best estimates available based on intelligence reporting and case data. Additionally, while other government estimates for production in major cocaine-producing countries in South America and consumption of cocaine within the United States do not align with the estimated non-commercial maritime flow figures inside the transit zone derived from the CCDB, this metric was derived based upon the non-commercial maritime flow estimates.

For the purposes of this metric, based upon where the data were gathered, the transit zone is defined by the JIATF-S area of responsibility. Non-commercial maritime drug removals include those seized by USCG and other law enforcement agencies, and international partners, as well as those disrupted by anti-drug trafficking operations. The cocaine removal rate is based on estimates of noncommercial maritime cocaine flow from the CCDB. Outside the transit zone data are not considered as robust about intelligence on flow. As a result, the interdiction rate for cocaine outside the transit zone is not considered reliable.


The Department has convened a work group to validate maritime CBP seizure data, which will be included in future versions of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 25.
Cocaine Removed by DHS Relative to the Total Estimated Flow in the Maritime Transit Zone, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Location	Type	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Inside Transit Zone	Rate	23%	14%	14%	20%	14%	14%	12%
	Quantity Removed	207.3	182.1	154.6	266.2	409.3	417.2	363.8
	Estimated Flow	893.6	1,334.5	1,081.9	1,358.7	2,940.7	2,882.1	3,036.1
Outside Transit Zone	Rate	49%	19%	50%	73%	28%	NA	NA
	Quantity Removed	21.3	15.1	13.2	39	17.7	NA	NA
	Estimated Flow	43.8	81.5	26.2	53.2	62.3	NA	NA

Note: Removal and estimated flow quantities are measured in metric tons. Data are limited to USCG removals.
 Source: ONDCP



The flow of cocaine in the maritime transit zone is estimated to have risen to over 2,800 metric tons in 2016 following a decrease in aerial eradication of cocaine crops in Colombia and improved intelligence reporting throughout the transit zone. This new flow held relatively constant in 2017 and 2018, as did the estimated removal rate.

§ 1092(d)(1)(E) DHS maritime threat response rate

Definition

DHS maritime threat response rate – The ability of DHS maritime security components to respond to and resolve known maritime threats, whether inside or outside a transit zone, by placing assets on-scene, relative to the total number of known threats.

Methodology and Limitations

Currently, these data only exist associated with cocaine response activity. Further, DHS data are part of a larger set of interagency data and may not be able to be separated from the larger interagency dataset, which is currently assessed and reconciled on a cycle and process outside of DHS that does not support submission at this time. DHS, in cooperation with interagency partners, is exploring options to collect response data for non-cocaine response events, as well as options to provide the response rate measures data to meet the intent of the NDAA. This working group plans to have a metric available for subsequent versions of this report.

§ 1092(d)(1)(F) Intergovernmental maritime threat response rate

Definition

Intergovernmental maritime threat response rate – The ability of DHS maritime security components or other U.S. Government entities to respond to and resolve known maritime threats, whether inside or outside a transit zone, relative to the total number of known threats.

Methodology and Limitations

Currently, these data only exist associated with cocaine response activity. Further, DHS data are part of a larger set of interagency data and may not be able to be separated from the larger interagency dataset, which is currently assessed and reconciled on a cycle and process outside of DHS that does not support submission at this time. In cooperation with interagency partners, DHS is exploring options to collect response data for non-cocaine response events, as well as options to provide the response rate measures data to meet the intent of the NDAA. This working group plans to have a metric available for subsequent versions of this report.

§ 1092(E) AIR AND MARINE SECURITY METRICS IN THE LAND DOMAIN

§ 1092(e)(1)(A) Flight hour effectiveness rate

Definition

Flight hour effectiveness rate in the land domain – Number of flight hours flown by CBP AMO in the Land Domain as a percentage of AMO’s unconstrained flight hour requirements.

Flight hour effectiveness rate is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

This flight hour effectiveness rate is determined by dividing the total hours flown by the number of flight hour requirements determined during the annual collection process. The flight hour requirements for the subsequent year are collected by CBP AMO operating locations based on unconstrained requirements collected from USBP, ICE, and other partner agencies, as well as internal CBP AMO requirements.

The AMO unconstrained flight hour requirement is not a validated DHS measure.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 26.
Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate, FY 2016 – 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Unconstrained Flight Hour Requirement	295,225	242,185	284,644
Hours Flown	79,872	78,066	78,226
Unconstrained Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate	27%	32%	27%

AMO flew about 78,000 hours in the land domain in 2018, roughly unchanged from 2016 and 2017. This figure represented a drop of five percentage points in the flight hour effectiveness rate from 2017 as the unconstrained flight hour requirement increased from 242 thousand to 285 thousand hours.

§ 1092(e)(1)(B) Funded flight hour effectiveness rate

Definition

Funded flight hour effectiveness rate – Number of flight hours flown by AMO as a percentage of the number of flight hours funded by Congress.

Funded flight hour effectiveness rate is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Flight hour data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The funded flight hour effectiveness rate is determined by dividing the total hours flown by the number of flight hours funded by Congress.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 27.
Funded Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate, FY 2016 – 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Hours Funded	79,774	77,769	77,111
Hours Flown	79,872	78,066	78,226
Funded Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate	100%	100%	100%

AMO's funded flight hour effectiveness rate was 100 percent for each year 2016-2018.

§ 1092(e)(1)(C) AMO readiness rate

Definition

AMO readiness rate – The percentage of mission requests that AMO was able to fulfill, excluding those requests that could not be fulfilled due to reasons beyond AMO's control.

AMO Readiness Rate is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Missions data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The rate is determined by dividing the missions flown by the total number of mission requests minus missions cancelled for weather-related reasons and other factors beyond AMO control.

Table 28.
AMO Missions Cancelled and Readiness Rate, FY 2016 – 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Total missions requested by partner agencies	42,761	41,944	45,684
Missions not cancelled for reasons beyond AMO control	38,081	37,626	41,701
Missions cancelled within AMO control	6,716	7,308	7,029
Missions cancelled - asset availability	4,978	4,496	3,757
Missions cancelled - crew availability	1,738	2,812	3,272
Readiness rate due to causes within AMO control	82%	81%	83%

AMO's readiness rate was 83 percent in 2018, with about 7,000 out of 42,000 in-scope missions cancelled due to causes within AMO control. This rate represented an improvement of two percentage points over 2017.

§ 1092(e)(1)(D) AMO weather-related cancellation rate

Definition

AMO weather-related cancellation rate – The number of missions cancelled by AMO due to weather as a percentage of total planned AMO missions.

AMO weather-related cancellation rate is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Mission data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The weather-related cancellation rate is calculated by dividing the number of missions cancelled due to weather by the total number of missions requested by AMO's partner agencies.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 29.
AMO Weather-Related Cancellation Rate, FY 2016 – FY 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Total missions requested by partner agencies	42,761	41,944	45,684
Missions cancelled - weather	3,083	3,122	2,930
Cancellation rate due to weather	7%	7%	6%

AMO was forced to cancel about 2,900 missions in 2018 due to weather, out of about 46,000 total missions requested by partner agencies, a weather-related cancellation rate of 6 percent, down one percentage point from rates observed in 2016 and 2018.

§ 1092(e)(1)(E) AMO individuals detected

Definition

AMO individuals detected – Number of individuals detected by CBP AMO through the use of unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO individuals detected is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The Department's currently available data on detections by unmanned aircraft are limited to the number of Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) detections, and current data on detections from manned aircraft are limited to detections leading to apprehensions and arrests.

These data exclude certain detections because AMO does not presently track data from all sensors on unmanned and manned aircraft. For this reason, the Department considers the current AMO individuals detected measure to be a work in progress and expects to provide more comprehensive data on AMO detections as part of subsequent reports.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 30.
Individuals Detected by AMO by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 – FY 2018

Description	2016	2017	2018
Manned	54,879	35,374	41,061
Unmanned	7,908	10,711	18,081
Total	62,787	46,085	59,142

AMO detected about 41,000 individuals via manned aircraft and 18,000 individuals via unmanned aircraft in 2018. Total detections were relatively little changed over the 2-year period since 2016 (down 5 percent), but the unmanned aircraft accounted for a much larger share of total detections (31 percent in 2018, versus 13 percent in 2016).

§ 1092(e)(1)(F) AMO apprehensions assisted

Definition

AMO apprehensions assisted – USBP apprehensions assisted by AMO using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO apprehensions assisted is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The metric consists of apprehensions and arrests that are attributed to manned and unmanned aircraft operations. These data are based on AMO enforcement flight hours (non-maritime), therefore excluding DHC-8, P-3, and maritime enforcement aircraft (MEA) operations occurring in the maritime domain.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 31.

AMO Enforcement Flight Hours and Apprehensions Assisted by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 – FY 2018

Description	2016		2017		2018	
	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions
Manned	64,639	50,646	55,572	32,872	55,541	39,548
Unmanned	4,857	1,729	6,771	2,362	6,852	6,314
Total	69,496	50,646	62,343	35,234	62,393	45,862

Source: AMO.

In 2018, AMO flew about 56,000 manned enforcement flight hours that assisted in the apprehension of about 40,000 individuals, and 6,900 unmanned enforcement flight hours that assisted in the apprehension of 6,300 individuals. The number of flight hours were roughly unchanged from 2017, while the number of apprehensions were up 20 percent in the case of the manned flights and 167 percent in the case of the unmanned flights.

§ 1092(e)(1)(G) Illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO

Definition

Illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO - The number and quantity of illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

Illegal drug seizures assisted is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug seizure data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The metric consists of the total number of events and quantity in pounds of drug seizures using manned and unmanned systems. A “drug event” is defined as a single law enforcement action resulting in a drug seizure(s). These data are based on non-maritime enforcement flight hours and therefore exclude DHC-8, P-3, and MEA operations occurring in the maritime domain.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 32.
AMO Enforcement Flight Hours, Illicit Drug Events, and Drug Seizures by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 – FY 2018

Description	2016			2017			2018		
	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)
Manned	64,639	3,834	295,633	55,572	1,649	143,737	55,541	1,612	204,645
Unmanned	4,857	78	13,623	6,771	108	18,874	6,852	85	16,375
Total	69,496	3,912	309,256	62,343	1,757	162,611	62,393	1,697	221,021

Note: Data are limited to non-maritime enforcement flight hours.
Source: AMO.

AMO flew about 56,000 manned enforcement flight hours and 6,900 unmanned hours in 2018, similar to the hours flown in 2017. The manned flight hours resulted in a similar number of drug events in 2018 as those observed in 2017 (about 1,600 each year), but a larger number of drug seizures (205,000 kilograms in 2018 versus 144,000 kilograms in 2017). The unmanned flight hours resulted in slightly fewer drug events in 2018 than in 2017 (85 in 2018 versus 108 in 2017), and a reduction in drug seizures (16,000 kilograms, down from 19,000 kilograms in 2017).

§ 1092(e)(1)(H) AMO actionable intelligence

Definition

AMO actionable intelligence - The number of times that actionable intelligence related to border security was obtained using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

This measure is still under review and will be provided in future versions of the report.

§ 1092(G)(3)(D) OTHER APPROPRIATE INFORMATION

Pursuant to NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D), this section provides three additional metrics of border security between POEs: 1) selected characteristics of USBP apprehensions; 2) the estimated at-the-border deterrence rate; and 3) estimated border crossing costs.

Selected Characteristics of Recent USBP Apprehensions

Definition

Historically, most individuals apprehended between POEs along the Southwest Border have been Mexican adults, and very few of them have sought asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief from removal. The profile of USBP apprehensions has changed in important ways in recent years, as growing shares of individuals apprehended are: 1) from countries other than Mexico (primarily the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), 2) UACs or children and adults traveling together as FMUAs, and/or 3) seeking asylum or other forms of protection from removal by claiming fear of removal to their countries of citizenship.

These shifting characteristics have an important impact on border security and USBP border enforcement because existing enforcement policies were largely designed with the more traditional alien profile in mind. For example, many consequences under CBP's Consequence Delivery Program such as the Alien Transfer Exit Program and the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program are only applicable to Mexican nationals. And UACs, FMUAs, and aliens found to have a credible fear generally cannot be expeditiously removed and have been considered "not impactable" by traditional USBP enforcement efforts because upon apprehension they have typically been released into the United States with a Notice to Appear in immigration court on a future date. More generally, the drivers of migration from countries other than Mexico and for aliens who may seek humanitarian relief or protection from removal may be different from those that motivated earlier generations of unlawful border crossers, potentially causing U.S. policymakers to rethink their policy response.

To monitor these changing dynamics, the Department tracks two main sets of characteristics:

- *Apprehensions by citizenship* – The share of aliens apprehended by USBP from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and all other countries.
- *Apprehensions by potential humanitarian equities* – The share of aliens apprehended by USBP who are unaccompanied alien children, are apprehended as part of a family unit, are Cuban migrants during the wet foot/dry foot era, and/or who make successful credible or reasonable fear claims. These four sub-groups of aliens are considered "non-impactable" for purposes of the Department's model-based apprehension rate and its model-based estimate of illegal entries. (See Appendix A).

Apprehensions is an output measure.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. Apprehensions by citizenship, by UAC status, and by family unit status are generally considered reliable, though agents may not always be able to identify UACs or family units.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 33.

USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by Citizenship, FY 2009 – FY 2018

Location	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Mexico	495,582	396,819	280,580	262,341	265,409	226,771	186,017	190,760	127,938	152,257
El Salvador	11,181	13,123	10,368	21,903	36,957	66,419	43,392	71,848	49,760	31,369
Guatemala	14,125	16,831	17,582	34,453	54,143	80,473	56,691	74,601	65,871	115,722
Honduras	13,344	12,231	11,270	30,349	46,448	90,968	33,445	52,952	47,260	76,513
All Other	6,633	8,727	7,777	7,827	11,440	14,740	11,788	18,709	13,087	20,718
Total	540,865	447,731	327,577	356,873	414,397	479,371	331,333	408,870	303,916	396,579

In recent years, the demographics of apprehensions have started to shift from consisting overwhelmingly of Mexican nationals to an equal share of Mexican nationals and border crossers from other areas, mostly Northern Triangle countries. As recently as 2009, Mexicans accounted for 92 percent of Southwest Border apprehensions. Their share fell below 50 percent for the first time ever in 2014, remained below 50 percent in each of the 3 years 2016–2018, and fell to an all-time low of 38 percent in 2018. This shift has been driven both by a sharp drop in Mexican apprehensions, which fell to a more than 50-year low in 2017 (128,000) before rebounding to 152,000 in 2018—still down 69 percent over the last decade—and by large increases in apprehensions of Salvadorans (up 181 percent since 2009), Guatemalans (up 719 percent), Hondurans (up 473 percent), and all other nationals (up 212 percent).

Table 34.

USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by Potential Humanitarian Claim, FY 2012 – FY 2018

Type	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Fear Claims	15,327	35,508	45,983	39,155	79,313	56,143	78,377
UAC	24,403	38,759	68,541	39,970	59,692	41,435	50,036
FMUA	NA	NA	68,435	39,838	77,674	75,622	107,212
Cuban	40	73	98	106	78	147	74
Total Apprehensions	356,873	414,397	479,371	331,333	408,870	303,916	396,579

Source: Fear Claims data for 2012 based on OIS analysis of CBP Apprehension and USCIS Defensive APSS data systems; Fear Claims data for 2013–2018 based on OIS Enforcement Lifecycle data; other data based on OIS analysis of USBP Apprehensions data.

Note: Table rows are not mutually exclusive categories; individuals may be counted as FMUA/UAC as well as Cuban and/or fear claimants.

Fear claims refer to those apprehended between POEs by USBP who claimed credible and/or reasonable fear at any time during the enforcement process. USBP did not systematically collect FMUA data prior to 2014. The Obama administration announced the end of the Cuban wet foot/dry foot policy on January 12, 2017; therefore only Cubans apprehended prior to this date are included in the 2017 count of potential humanitarian claims.

NA Not Available.

Along with the shift from Mexicans to Central Americans, the other noteworthy trend in Southwest Border apprehensions has been the rising share of aliens with potential humanitarian claims (i.e., aliens considered “non-impactable” by traditional border enforcement policies). Specifically, the number of aliens apprehended by USBP and eventually making fear claims (i.e., initiating the credible fear process or filing an asylum application) increased from 15,000 in 2012 (4 percent of that year’s apprehensions) to 78,000 in 2018 (20 percent of apprehensions, and an increase of over 400 percent in 6 years). The number of UACs increased 105 percent from 2012 to 2018, while their share of all apprehensions grew from 7 to 13 percent. The number of FMUAs increased 57 percent between 2014 (the first year for which data are available) and 2018, while their share of apprehensions grew from 14 to 27 percent.

At-the-Border Deterrence

Definition

Deterrence – the estimated share of aliens who, following a failed unlawful entry attempt, are deterred from making a subsequent reentry and decide instead to return home or otherwise remain in Mexico.

The deterrence rate is an output measure associated with the difficulty of crossing the border unlawfully because it reflects decisions by people who have already decided to migrate illegally to abandon their effort.

Methodology and Limitations

As with the apprehension or interdiction rate, deterrence cannot be observed directly.

DHS currently estimates deterrence based on migrant surveys; the Department believes surveys or interviews are one of the only ways to directly measure deportees' intentions to make a further illegal entry attempt. The most important survey data on deterrence comes from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte International Border Survey (EMIF, by its Spanish acronym), which interviews deportees immediately at repatriation facilities upon their removal to Mexico and asks them about their intentions to return to the United States. The EMIF survey has asked deportees about their intention to attempt another trip to the United States within the next 7 days each year since 1993 and began asking migrants about their intention to attempt another trip within the next 90 days in 2012.

While the EMIF survey is well respected, the survey is not weighted to match the actual population of Mexican deportees or to account for the enforcement consequences they are subjected to. Thus, in its work for DHS to develop a model-based apprehension rate and estimate of successful illegal entries, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Corporation used a combination of EMIF and CBP data to build a regression model of 90-day deterrence for all USBP apprehensions since 2000 that accounts for relevant characteristics of Mexican deportees.⁷ IDA's model for the years 2000-2007 (i.e., before CBP's implementation of the Consequence Delivery System) focuses exclusively on deportees' demographic characteristics, and its model for 2008 forward also incorporates data on aliens' enforcement histories and anticipated future consequences.


In addition to the standard concerns about the validity of survey samples and survey instruments, questions about deterrence are especially hard to measure accurately given the ever-evolving enforcement environment. In particular, the survey measures deportees' intention to make a further entry attempt or not at the time of their repatriation, but an unknown portion of those who indicate that they will try again may in fact be deterred before making another entry attempt (and vice versa). A further limitation is that the EMIF data is restricted to Mexican Northern Border deportees and cannot be assumed to apply to migrants from other regions/countries because they face different trade-offs and geographic barriers when considering a re-entry attempt.

⁷ John W. Bailey et al., "Assessing Southern Border Security," Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper NS P-5304, May 2016.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 6.

EMIF Survey Data on at-the-Border-Deterrence for Mexican Deportees, 1993 – 2018



Source: OIS analysis of Colegio de la Frontera Norte EMIF data.
 Note: Data are for calendar years.

The EMIF survey data describe relatively limited deterrence levels prior to 2007 (20-40 percent in responses to the 7-day survey question), and substantial growth in the deterrence rate since that time. According to EMIF’s survey results, more than 75 percent of respondents in each year since 2012 have indicated they will not attempt to re-enter within 7 days, and more than 50 percent have indicated they will not attempt re-entry within 90 days, including all-time high proportions of 73 percent in 2017 and 81 percent in 2018.

Figure 7.

Model-Based 90-Day Deterrence Model, FY 2000 – FY 2018




Figure 7 depicts IDA’s regression model of deterrence that accounts for migrant characteristics and enforcement consequences. OIS updated the IDA regression model for the years 2012-2018 to incorporate EMIF 90-day survey data. In addition, in an improvement new to the 2019 version of this report, OIS used the upper- and lower-bounds of the regression model’s predicted values to construct a 95 percent confidence interval around the estimated deterrence rate for the years for which an updated regression model is available (i.e., for 2012-2018). Overall, regression model predicts 90-day deterrence rates of 11-26 percent for the years 2000-2010, climbing to a high of 66 percent in 2015-2016, falling to 61 percent in 2018. The 95 percent confidence interval consistently describes a range of seven to eight percentage points (i.e., plus or minus 3.5-4 percentage points on either side of the estimated deterrence rate).

Border Crossing Costs

Definition

Percent hiring smuggler – the share of migrants who hire a smuggler.

Border crossing costs – the average fees that smugglers charge.

Smuggling usage and average smuggling fees are output measures associated with the difficulty of crossing the border unlawfully. Migrants will only tolerate higher fees to the extent that smugglers provide an essential and successful service. Smugglers also compete to attract customers by offering their services at the lowest profitable rate, so higher fees indicate rising costs to smugglers. Rising smuggling fees also reflect an increased risk to smugglers of a criminal conviction; smugglers pass this risk along to customers in the form of higher fees.

Methodology and Limitations


The only available data on smuggling fees come from migrant surveys and USBP custodial interviews. These data may be subject to response bias if migrants are reluctant to admit to hiring a smuggler, but such bias should be broadly consistent over time, so changes in survey/interview data should reflect changes in the difficulty of crossing the border.

Available Data and Discussion

One finding across multiple surveys is that smuggler usage rates have increased steadily over the last 5 decades. Previous research by the Office of Immigration Statistics found that smuggler usage rates climbed from 40-50 percent during the 1970s, to 59 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 70-80 percent in the 1980s to 1990s, 80 to 93 percent in the 1990s to 2000s, and 95 percent for first-time crossers surveyed in 2006. Similarly, according to USBP interviews, relatively few illegal border crossers hired a smuggler prior to 2001, but usage rates climbed to 80-95 percent among apprehended border crossers in recent years, a trend partly driven by transnational criminal organizations’ (TCOs) control of crossing points along the Mexican side of the border.

Figure 8.

Border Crossing Cost Estimates, FY 2000 – FY 2018



Source: U.S. Border Patrol apprehension records, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte Encuestas sobre Migracion en las Fronteras Norte y Sur de Mexico (EMIF).
Note: EMIF discontinued its question on smuggler fees in the "from North" and "from South" survey module in 2018.

Survey results also indicate steady increases in fees paid to migrant smugglers. Averaging across the available sources depicted in Figure 8, smuggling fees increased by 5 percent per year during the 1980s, 1 percent per year during the 1990s, and have doubled since 2012 (according to EMIF data) or since 2014 (according to USBP data).

These numeric trends may understate the actual increase in border crossing costs. Custodial interviews conducted by subject matter experts within CBP have found that smuggling fees are often paid in stages. The range of smuggling fees also differs greatly depending on tactics and procedures utilized by TCOs in various border crossing locations. Initial fees required to approach staging locations along the border were often lower than \$100 prior to the late 2000s, and an additional \$1,000-\$3,000 in fees were charged upon delivery to the destination. More recently, smuggling fees for Mexicans and Central Americans reportedly have increased partially due to enhanced security measures in Mexico, and have been as high as \$1,300 for the initial staging payment and up to \$12,000 at the destination. Custodial interviews also find evidence of an increase in alternative forms of payment in exchange for passage, including migrants being required to participate in smuggling controlled substances or other illicit items across the border or to work off debts upon arrival in the United States, as well as reports of harsh negotiations concerning payment plans with family members.

IV. CONCLUSION

DHS recognizes that its ability to accurately measure its border security outcomes, outputs, activities, and inputs is essential to the effective and efficient management of the Department. The metrics contained in this report are the baseline that DHS uses to measure its progress towards meeting the goals contained in the Executive Order on *Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements*. As such, the Department will continue to refine these metrics through internal and external engagement and collaboration, including with Congress. DHS looks forward to updating Congress on this progress through periodic briefings and formally with the submission of future Border Security Metrics Reports.


Appendix A – Repeated Trials Model Methodology

The Department’s current model-based estimates of the apprehension rate, of the total number of successful unlawful entries, and of related measures such as undetected unlawful entries build on research conducted for DHS by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) based on long-standing social science research on the Repeated Trials Methodology (RTM).⁸ The Department views some of IDA’s assumptions as problematic and continues to work to validate and refine the modeling methodology, as discussed below.

The Institute for Defense Analyses RTM Methodology

Based on IDA’s work for DHS, the primary building block for the model-based apprehension rate and total estimated successful unlawful entries is an estimated apprehension rate for a particular subset of border crossers that DHS refers to as a partial apprehension rate (PAR). The approach focuses on illegal border crossers who are apprehended and removed to the Mexican border and who make a subsequent re-entry attempt. The logic of the PAR is to use USBP biometric data to assess what share of migrants who make repeated entry attempts is subsequently re-apprehended.

The PAR methodology consists of three main steps (see Figure A1). First, the model identifies a subset of illegal border crossers who are candidates to attempt re-entry, the so-called RTM population. Under IDA’s methodology, this group excludes all non-Mexicans, those removed to the Mexican interior or remotely through the Alien Transfer and Exit Program, aliens who have ever requested asylum, those facing criminal charges, and children under 18 years old.



⁸ For a full discussion of IDA’s model-based estimate, see John W. Bailey et al., “Assessing Southern Border Security,” Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper NS P-5304, May 2016. Also see Thomas J. Espenshade, “Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Frontier,” *International Migration Review* (1995): 545-565; Joseph Chang, “CBP Apprehensions at the Border,” Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, 2006.

The second step in calculating the PAR is to distinguish between deportees who give up and return home or otherwise remain in Mexico versus those who attempt to re-enter the United States. IDA estimates this share based on the survey of recent deportees in the Colegio de la Frontera Norte International Border Survey (EMIF, by its Spanish acronym), as discussed above (see NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information, At-the-Border Deterrence).

Third, by definition, the RTM model assumes deportees who are not deterred following an apprehension always make a subsequent reentry attempt. Thus, by observing in DHS administrative records how many migrants from the RTM population are re-apprehended, the model infers the number that successfully re-enters. The ratio of re-apprehensions to successful re-entries is used to estimate the partial apprehension rate.

The PAR model confronts important limitations at each point in the modeling process. The most notable and challenging to overcome is the assumption of the RTM that subjects who are not deterred will always attempt re-entry until successful. One problem with this assumption is the lack of reliable data on who is deterred. IDA relies primarily on the EMIF survey (modified to better reflect the demographic characteristics and enforcement histories of the actual RTM population) to estimate the deterrence rate. While the EMIF is widely recognized as one of the best migrant surveys available, its results are still dependent on the characteristics of the sample, the quality of the survey instrument, and the honesty of the respondents. More fundamentally, the EMIF survey asks recent deportees about their intentions to re-enter the United States, and it therefore does not take account of shifting border enforcement efforts, potential changes in behavior by individuals who have been exposed to consequence programs, or other deterrent factors along the border. The structure of the RTM model means that any resulting undercount in the estimate of the deterred population results in a downward bias in the PAR.

Second, the RTM population represents a shrinking share of Southwest Border apprehensions. Mexican adults quickly deported to the nearest border accounted for about 95 percent of apprehensions when the RTM methodology was developed in the 1990s. But changes in the composition of border flows (i.e., rising numbers of Central Americans and asylum seekers); changes in Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) enforcement strategy to emphasize criminal charges, lateral repatriation, and other enforcement consequences; and IDA's restrictive modeling choices mean that only about 20 percent of Southwest Border apprehensions are used to estimate the PAR in recent years. In addition, because the RTM sample excludes aliens who are more likely to surrender to U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) (i.e., aliens with a higher apprehension rate), the PAR is biased downwards as an indicator of the overall apprehension rate; this bias may be substantial given the number of aliens excluded from the RTM sample.

Third, IDA makes somewhat restrictive assumptions about which re-apprehensions to include in the final stage of the PAR calculation. In particular, IDA excludes apprehensions occurring at check points and other remote locations and those occurring more than 4 days after an illegal entry. Given USBP's defense-in-depth strategy, which places resources at and behind the border, these assumptions result in a slight further downward bias in the PAR.

Refinements to IDA's Model-Based Estimate and Impacts on Reported Metrics

Despite these limitations, the Department views the RTM methodology as a promising approach to estimating an apprehension rate that takes great advantage of USBP's collection of biometric data since 2000. In implementing the RTM methodology to produce reportable metrics, the Department has made refinements to IDA's approach in each of the three Border Security Metrics Reports (BSMR) for 2017-2019. These refinements had modest impacts on certain reported metrics, and certain metrics were further affected by the inclusion in this year's report of updated historical data.

DHS made two refinements to IDA's approach to estimating the PAR when preparing metrics for the 2017 BSMR. First, the Department included a broader set of Mexican deportees in its definition of the RTM sample included in the calculation of the PAR: IDA's sample was defined to include Mexicans 18 and older repatriated to the border who had not been detained in the United States, who had never claimed asylum, and who had not been identified as suspected smugglers; the Department expanded the definition of the RTM sample by excluding from their sample only those aliens who claimed asylum with USBP and including Cubans apprehended after January 2017, at which point the wet foot/dry foot policy was terminated. Second, while IDA only counted apprehensions occurring in the immediate border region within 4 days of a migrant's illegal entry in its calculation of the re-apprehension rate, the Department also included apprehensions at CBP checkpoints and elsewhere in the border region occurring within 30 days of an illegal entry. As a result of the changes to the RTM sample, the deterrence rate shifted for most years, leading to

adjustments in the PAR for all prior years as well. Depending on the year, these adjustments may have increased or decreased the PAR, largely depending on the change in deterrence.

The Department made one additional change to IDA's approach when preparing the 2018 BSMR, in this case by refining the methodology for using the PAR to estimate total illegal entries. IDA's model of total illegal entries assumes that non-impactable aliens present themselves to border enforcement agents (and therefore have a 100 percent apprehension rate), and that all impactable aliens are apprehended at the same rate as the RTM population (i.e., at the PAR). Thus, the estimated number of total illegal entries is the product of the number of impactable aliens apprehended times the PAR-derived odds of successful entry. In producing this year's BSMR the Department discovered that the software code provided by IDA and used to produce the 2017 estimates mistakenly calculated the estimated total number of illegal entries as the product of the RTM population and the PAR-derived odds of successful entry. The Department corrected that error for the 2018 report, resulting in an upwards-revision of historical estimates of the number of illegal entries.


In addition to this methodological change, the Department also included updated data in the 2018 report that resulted in an upwards revision of recent historical PAR estimates. First, the Department included the most current removal and return data from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Because recent ICE data includes certain repatriations occurring in previous years, this updated information increases the number of USBP apprehensions identified as re-apprehensions, raising the PAR. Second, the Department also identified certain additional aliens as suspected smugglers. Eliminating these frequent border crossers from the RTM population reduces the number of re-apprehensions and has a modest downward effect on the PAR. Third, the Department included updated EMIF data in calculating the estimated deterrence rate; these updates resulted in modest increases in the estimated deterrence rate and therefore an upward adjustment in the PAR.

In preparing the 2019 BSMR, the Department once again updated ICE removal and return data with the latest available information, a change that produced modest increases in the PAR; and OIS updated IDA's regression model of the 90-day deterrence rate as described above, a change which resulted in slight downward revisions to the PAR (see NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information, At-the-Border Deterrence).

The most noteworthy improvements to this 2019 report are the addition of a confidence interval around the PAR and a sensitivity analysis to estimate how three core assumptions of the RTM model affect the Department's estimates of the model-based apprehension rate and of successful illegal entries.

First, OIS incorporated the uncertainty estimate from the regression model of 90-day deterrence for 2012-2018 into the estimate of the partial apprehension rate (see Figure A2). As the figure indicates, the 95 percent confidence interval around the PAR ranged from a low of plus or minus six percentage points in 2012-2014 and in 2018 to a high of plus or minus 11 percentage points in 2016, the year in which the estimated PAR peaked at 0.76.

Figure A2.
Partial Apprehension Rate, FY 2000-FY 2018



Second, OIS analyzed the sensitivity of the model-based apprehension rate and the model-based estimate of successful illegal entries to the three key IDA model assumptions: 1) that the regression model of deterrence accurately describes rate at which all RTM aliens do not attempt re-entry, 2) that the non-RTM population is apprehended at the same rate as the RTM population, and 3) that the apprehension rate for “non-impactable” aliens (e.g., asylum seekers, Family Unit Aliens (FMUAs), UACs, wet foot/dry foot era Cubans) is 100 percent because these groups always present themselves to authorities.

Table A1 describes the sensitivity of the 2018 model-based apprehension rate reported in Table 1 and the estimated undetected unlawful entries depicted in Figure 2. The first panel relaxes the assumption about RTM deterrence. The middle row of the panel (in gray) depicts the baseline model based on the deterrence rate predicted by the 90-day regression model (.61), and the other rows of the panel allow the deterrence rate to fluctuate by up to ten percentage points in either direction. Given the assumptions of the RTM model, these changes in the deterrence rate have a large impact on the RTM population apprehension rate (i.e., the PAR), which translates into substantial changes in the total model-based apprehension rate and estimated successful illegal entries. Assuming the regression model over-estimates deterrence by ten percentage points causes the total apprehension rate to fall to 58 percent and total successful illegal entries to more than double to 282,000 people; assuming the regression model under-estimates deterrence by ten percentage points causes the total apprehension rate to increase to 86 percent, and for total successful illegal entries to fall more than 60 percent to 63,000 people.

Table A1.**Univariate Sensitivity Analysis of RTM Model Assumptions**

Assumption	Alternative Assumptions	Model-Based Apprehension Rate	Estimated Successful Illegal Entries
RTM aliens deterred as predicted by 90-day regression model	51%	58%	282,455
	56%	64%	227,703
	61%	70%	172,950
	66%	77%	118,197
	71%	86%	63,445
Non-RTM population apprehended at same rate as RTM PAR	45%	66%	202,062
	50%	68%	186,048
	55%	70%	172,950
	60%	71%	162,038
	65%	72%	152,807
All non-impactable aliens present themselves	100%	70%	172,950
	95%	68%	193,823
	90%	67%	217,014
	85%	66%	242,935
	80%	64%	272,095

The second and third panels of the table also highlight the baseline model. The second panel assumes the non-RTM population is apprehended at rates up to ten percentage points above or below the calculated PAR; and the third panel assumes non-impactable aliens are apprehended at rates as low as 80 percent. (A total non-impactable apprehension rate of 80 percent corresponds with about 60 percent of non-impactable aliens presenting themselves to authorities and 40 percent attempting to evade detection and being apprehended at the same rate as the RTM population.) Relaxing these assumptions has a more modest impact on the model's predictions.

Table A2.
Interactive Sensitivity Analysis of RTM Model Assumptions

RTM Deterrence Rate	PAR (RTM)	Non-RTM Apprehension Rate	Non-Impactable Apprehension Rate	Model-Based Apprehension Rate	Estimated Successful Illegal Entries
Low (.56)	0.48	Low (.43)	Low (.80)	58%	303,377
Low (.56)	0.48	Low (.43)	Med (.90)	60%	268,239
Low (.56)	0.48	Low (.43)	High (1.0)	62%	245,291
Low (.56)	0.48	Med (.48)	Low (.80)	59%	285,979
Low (.56)	0.48	Med (.48)	Med (.90)	61%	250,650
Low (.56)	0.48	Med (.48)	High (1.0)	64%	227,703
Low (.56)	0.48	High (.53)	Low (.80)	60%	271,708
Low (.56)	0.48	High (.53)	Med (.90)	63%	236,569
Low (.56)	0.48	High (.53)	High (1.0)	65%	213,621
Med (.61)	0.55	Low (.50)	Low (.80)	63%	244,134
Med (.61)	0.55	Low (.50)	Med (.90)	66%	208,996
Med (.61)	0.55	Low (.50)	High (1.0)	68%	186,048
Med (.61)	0.55	Med (.55)	Low (.80)	64%	231,037
Med (.61)	0.55	Med (.55)	Med (.90)	67%	195,898
Med (.61)	0.55	Med (.55)	High (1.0)	70%	172,950
Med (.61)	0.55	High (.60)	Low (.80)	66%	220,125
Med (.61)	0.55	High (.60)	Med (.90)	68%	184,986
Med (.61)	0.55	High (.60)	High (1.0)	71%	162,038
High (.66)	0.64	Low (.59)	Low (.80)	69%	185,774
High (.66)	0.64	Low (.59)	Med (.90)	73%	150,636
High (.66)	0.64	Low (.59)	High (1.0)	76%	127,688
High (.66)	0.64	Med (.64)	Low (.80)	71%	176,284
High (.66)	0.64	Med (.64)	Med (.90)	74%	141,145
High (.66)	0.64	Med (.64)	High (1.0)	77%	118,197
High (.66)	0.64	High (.69)	Low (.80)	72%	168,168
High (.66)	0.64	High (.69)	Med (.90)	75%	133,029
High (.66)	0.64	High (.69)	High (1.0)	78%	110,081

Finally, Table A2 depicts the interactions among these three assumptions on the model-based apprehension rate and estimated illegal entries. The first column of the table depicts variation in the assumed deterrence rate of five percentage points in either direction, a range slightly larger than the 95 percent confidence interval. Mathematically, changes in deterrence yield variation in the PAR, depicted in the second column. In the interactive analysis, these changes in the PAR have an effect on the non-RTM apprehension rate, which is amplified by the decision to relax the assumption of a common apprehension rate for non-RTM and RTM aliens. Table A2 continues to allow the non-impactable apprehension rate to range from 0.8 to 1.0.

In general, allowing the deterrence to fluctuate continues to have the greatest impact on the model's predictions, yielding an average difference of about seven percentage points in the overall model-based apprehension rates and about 55,000 illegal entries between three panels of Table A2. Allowing for reasonable variation across all three core RTM assumptions, Table A2 describes a range of 20 percentage points in the model-based apprehension rate and a range of just under 200,000 successful illegal entries.

Appendix B – Drugs Seizures – All Ports of Entry

Table B1.
OFO Drug Seizures at Ports of Entry (POEs) FY 2013 – FY 2018

DRUG	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Grand Total	342,010.02	311,159.31	401,114.04	367,979.37	305,296.78	250,280.72
COCA PRODUCTS, TEA BAGS OR LIQUOR	112.31	335.66	370.24	210.93	163.27	332.80
COCAINE	20,975.89	20,558.85	17,396.18	23,958.40	28,274.78	23,407.44
CRYSTAL METHAMPHETAMINES	1,526.52	1,742.38	1,627.55	2,129.00	1,925.08	7,512.88
DIHYDROCODEINONE (HYDROCODONE)	4.29	11.24	2.98	14.45	7.84	19.06
ECSTASY	104.26	111.04	104.02	708.11	521.60	514.04
EPHEDRINE	5.10	28.57	42.10	13.50	5.61	15.54
FENETHYLLINE-(CAPTAGON-AMPHETAMINE)	NA	NA	NA	1.22	0.04	1.73
FENTANYL	NA	NA	31.94	270.42	881.73	859.53
GAMMA HYDROXY BUTYRATE	33.09	73.31	48.68	483.76	741.00	789.90
HASH, LIQUID (HASH OIL)	0.13	13.98	0.77	0.45	1.51	46.71
HASHISH	58.10	117.11	82.43	75.24	54.47	64.15
HEROIN	1,821.95	1,963.17	2,732.06	1,915.70	1,757.62	2,360.95
KETAMINE	88.58	77.78	43.69	150.59	144.53	286.74
KHAT (CATHA EDULIS)	84,023.03	67,478.21	66,953.87	70,087.11	61,856.29	26,854.02
KRATOM (MITRAGYNINE OR 7-HYDROXYMITRAGYNINE)	NA	NA	NA	NA	27.18	0.52
LSD	3.00	7.02	3.57	2.41	9.55	50.36
MARIJUANA	215,705.43	198,669.60	273,433.73	233,827.24	166,221.35	135,814.31
MARIJUANA PLANTS	NA	NA	NA	13.15	0.03	NA
MDPV-(METHYLENEDIOXYPYROVALERONE)	336.13	225.68	233.11	41.75	27.31	19.06
MEPHEDRONE	11.82	9.11	5.72	2.66	26.83	1.09
METHAMPHETAMINE	7,985.05	8,896.50	11,564.19	15,008.03	20,959.61	26,054.22
METHYLONE	322.27	829.42	315.71	40.44	13.90	100.98
METHYLPHENIDATE (RITALIN)	20.03	15.14	13.69	12.30	12.62	8.03
MORPHINE	31.52	213.71	19.29	520.21	20.55	31.33
N-BENZYLPIPERAZINE (BZP TABLETS)	87.78	1.61	1.32	0.10	1.03	NA
NEXUS/2 CB	0.09	0.11	1.26	0.06	1.44	0.98
OPIUM	1,289.80	1,637.34	652.98	905.89	1,065.28	1,148.11
OTHER DRUGS, PRESCRIPTIONS, CHEMICALS	4,134.39	5,117.21	22,328.40	12,985.85	11,445.96	11,146.97
OXYCODONE (OXYCONTIN)	13.17	11.14	6.46	21.57	45.05	20.32
PARAMETHOXYAMPHETAMINE	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.03	NA
PEYOTE	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.35	35.70
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS EXCEPT EPHEDRINE	739.27	748.20	1,293.69	3,377.95	648.52	1,443.16
PSILOCYN OR PSILOCYBIN MUSHROOMS	23.38	24.11	16.18	45.78	53.99	58.96
ROHYPNOL	0.74	0.04	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.00
STEROIDS	470.05	554.53	581.16	613.21	1,394.27	1,592.87
SYNTHETIC CANNABINOIDS - ALL TYPES	2,074.37	1,686.67	1,206.82	550.79	6,984.75	8,964.99
YABA	0.47	0.18	NA	2.53	0.03	2.04

Note: Drug seizures in kilograms. Tea bags included in this table are used to carry coca products. This table updates previous versions of this report with more current information.

NA - no data available.

Appendix C - Personal Owned Vehicles (POV) and Commercial Owned Vehicles (COV) Wait Time

Table C1.

OFO POV Wait Time (minutes) and Total Annual Flow, FY 2013 – FY 2018

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY						
POV Wait Times (BorderStat)	3.50	2.96	2.06	1.33	1.00	1.10
POVs (OMR ¹)	673,549	651,511	616,656	590,028	587,319	590,900
ANDRADE, CA						
POV Wait Times	30.74	24.03	24.28	27.64	26.88	31.48
POVs (OMR)	391,430	432,810	507,060	507,775	577,425	581,576
BLAINE, WA						
POV Wait Times	13.66	14.69	10.03	8.97	9.24	12.31
POVs (OMR)	4,943,096	4,922,160	4,428,536	3,958,264	3,780,471	4,130,656
BROWNSVILLE, TX						
POV Wait Times	16.84	16.77	14.83	15.69	14.03	23.67
POVs (OMR)	4,270,287	4,290,311	4,333,905	4,560,557	4,848,508	4,784,458
BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS NY						
POV Wait Times	6.07	6.83	4.05	2.92	2.81	3.59
POVs (OMR)	5,903,904	5,570,269	5,033,036	4,783,004	4,814,967	5,000,166
CALAIS, ME						
POV Wait Times	1.34	1.27	0.76	0.15	0.19	0.18
POVs (OMR)	1,024,748	951,270	837,046	754,443	755,846	674,323
CALEXICO, CA						
POV Wait Times	44.25	51.00	45.06	49.55	53.11	58.50
POVs (OMR)	4,162,467	4,061,872	4,248,230	4,345,665	4,383,164	4,469,030
CALEXICO-EAST						
POV Wait Times	38.00	38.33	31.42	38.98	43.62	44.67
POVs (OMR)	3,099,340	3,317,290	3,585,327	3,765,429	3,883,571	3,688,968
CHAMPLAIN-ROUSES POINT						
POV Wait Times	2.95	2.29	2.67	1.69	1.58	2.05
POVs (OMR)	1,152,220	1,144,152	1,051,232	1,015,105	1,004,351	1,031,529
COLUMBUS, NM						
POV Wait Times	5.21	5.53	4.97	5.11	4.30	5.11
POVs (OMR)	324,216	347,209	398,242	420,004	395,718	353,225
DEL RIO, TX						
POV Wait Times	8.01	7.62	6.83	6.91	6.48	9.67
POVs (OMR)	1,257,513	1,325,289	1,415,109	1,508,476	1,586,009	1,640,034
DERBY LINE, VT						
POV Wait Times	2.26	2.34	1.85	2.01	3.84	2.18
POVs (OMR)	731,031	715,719	633,409	581,261	598,819	493,073

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
DETROIT, MI						
POV Wait Times	3.65	4.77	3.64	4.47	3.66	4.76
POVs (OMR)	4,123,134	4,050,011	4,065,843	4,043,076	4,058,742	3,996,538
DOUGLAS, AZ						
POV Wait Times	11.80	9.27	11.23	12.16	11.70	16.63
POVs (OMR)	1,438,842	1,559,934	1,576,761	1,610,973	1,707,958	1,785,264
EAGLE PASS, TX						
POV Wait Times	14.84	20.12	15.56	18.16	17.79	18.90
POVs (OMR)	2,358,313	2,382,221	2,661,638	2,745,267	2,662,299	2,715,217
EL PASO, TX						
POV Wait Times	22.39	19.75	22.98	27.97	19.39	24.59
POVs (OMR)	10,563,370	11,441,046	12,105,122	12,513,389	12,585,689	12,523,438
HIDALGO, TX						
POV Wait Times	19.91	22.69	23.34	21.21	18.04	17.51
POVs (OMR)	4,801,943	4,616,193	4,555,289	4,709,838	4,539,801	4,343,664
HIGHGATE SPRINGS/ALBURG						
POV Wait Times	3.52	3.96	4.13	4.57	4.22	4.94
POVs (OMR)	508,699	542,595	715,598	703,063	633,903	474,497
HOULTON, ME						
POV Wait Times	2.89	2.46	1.74	1.17	1.22	1.59
POVs (OMR)	353,898	332,670	274,641	228,101	228,663	228,890
INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN						
POV Wait Times	1.47	1.34	2	1.24	1.34	1.30
POVs (OMR)	528,065	520,066	475,435	438,938	413,508	371,358
JACKMAN, ME						
POV Wait Times	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.2	0.46	0.39
POVs (OMR)	170,549	168,871	157,521	162,978	144,428	146,393
LAREDO, TX						
POV Wait Times	15.49	17.59	16.28	17.13	19.95	17.48
POVs (OMR)	4,865,686	5,220,223	5,220,174	5,191,369	4,991,204	5,081,662
LUKEVILLE, AZ						
POV Wait Times	5.52	5.05	7.59	5.30	2.63	4.19
POVs (OMR)	283,790	301,206	345,760	363,712	376,827	409,444
LYNDEN, WA						
POV Wait Times	11.09	9.82	6.86	6.12	6.00	6.33
POVs (OMR)	785,818	770,393	586,913	514,823	491,420	582,792
MADAWASKA, ME						
POV Wait Times	3.03	3.43	1.31	0.74	0.99	0.97
POVs (OMR)	621,258	576,490	509,814	439,970	404,221	382,828
MASSENA, NY						
POV Wait Times	0.58	0.27	0.11	0.09	0.01	0.00
POVs (OMR)	909,705	907,255	856,281	826,625	855,787	875,867
NACO, AZ						
POV Wait Times	2.52	2.21	2.28	2.22	2.54	2.84
POVs (OMR)	280,984	296,828	295,635	302,423	295,296	302,614

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
NOGALES, AZ						
POV Wait Times	16.68	15.65	18.43	24.57	24.53	32.10
POVs (OMR)	3,063,822	3,297,865	3,426,736	3,487,436	3,728,827	3,686,058
NORTON, VT						
POV Wait Times	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.01
POVs (OMR)	81,311	74,512	49,154	32,530	30,574	31,913
OGDENSBURG, NY						
POV Wait Times	0.6	0.84	0.82	0.30	0.34	0.29
POVs (OMR)	387,000	375,022	320,537	287,061	292,808	300,233
OTAY MESA						
POV Wait Times	45.68	43.03	29.39	38.32	38.07	38.32
POVs (OMR)	5,987,273	6,901,172	6,747,483	7,597,903	8,213,614	8,103,641
PEMBINA, ND						
POV Wait Times	1.75	1.86	1.69	1.58	1.56	1.98
POVs (OMR)	375,628	369,328	330,996	289,745	277,247	264,732
POINT ROBERTS, WA						
POV Wait Times	5.69	6.11	5.46	5.13	4.34	6.90
POVs (OMR)	1,190,608	1,201,275	1,071,337	945,103	912,239	1,012,392
PORT HURON, MI						
POV Wait Times	2.3	3.8	3.06	2.31	2.91	3.45
POVs (OMR)	2,032,553	2,002,506	1,745,713	1,548,257	1,565,333	1,553,250
PRESIDIO, TX						
POV Wait Times	6.52	9.36	7.12	10.21	8.24	8.08
POVs (OMR)	594,488	608,805	659,374	663,522	685,190	714,221
PROGRESO, TX						
POV Wait Times	10.71	10.19	8.99	9.97	9.06	11.61
POVs (OMR)	1,050,675	1,160,275	1,120,611	1,231,782	1,244,424	1,240,840
RIO GRANDE CITY, TX						
POV Wait Times	6.68	5.64	4.92	5.12	3.41	4.57
POVs (OMR)	350,796	354,036	371,252	412,908	402,949	413,914
ROMA, TX						
POV Wait Times	5.62	5.24	4.65	4.59	5.32	6.45
POVs (OMR)	682,289	698,610	726,931	796,790	803,877	785,690
SAN LUIS, AZ						
POV Wait Times	31.88	27.58	35.73	45.9	51.13	46.46
POVs (OMR)	2,906,578	2,952,286	3,100,024	3,036,398	3,157,647	3,336,725
SANTA TERESA						
POV Wait Times	11.79	8.19	10.83	14.52	13.78	48.63
POVs (OMR)	403,158	459,875	513,207	595,354	617,641	554,948
SAN YSIDRO						
POV Wait Times	81.41	69.25	32.14	50.14	46.69	18.93
POVs (OMR)	11,292,152	11,299,741	14,357,503	13,959,170	13,569,163	14,588,551
SAULT STE. MARIE, MI						
POV Wait Times	3.03	2	1.34	1.75	1.84	0.95
POVs (OMR)	1,003,253	972,312	830,907	716,718	665,145	713,180

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
SUMAS, WA						
POV Wait Times	9.11	10.08	7.19	6.09	5.60	6.46
POVs (OMR)	1,214,398	1,159,314	962,169	850,004	834,808	918,412
SWEETGRASS, MT						
POV Wait Times	5.08	4.04	4.45	5.66	6	6
POVs (OMR)	310,011	305,537	286,072	268,807	233,922	197,349
TECATE, CA						
POV Wait Times	39.99	32.63	23.2	29.83	31.16	30.77
POVs (OMR)	737,060	789,642	891,068	943,208	1,037,241	1,085,274
TORNILLO-FABENS, TX						
POV Wait Times	5.84	5.54	4.51	4.36	3.97	4.59
POVs (OMR)	300,796	285,988	273,302	300,922	320,121	358,415

¹ Operations Management Report (OMR)

Table C2.

OFO Commercial Wait Time (minutes) and Total Annual Flow, FY 2013 – FY 2018

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
CBP-WELLESLEY ISLAND, POE						
COV Wait Times*	0.83	0.85	1.06	0.97	0.65	0.60
COVs**	179,788	189,229	200,287	207,309	204,264	198,288
BLAINE, BORDER CROSSING, CARS						
COV Wait Times	7.53	7.8	8.63	9.24	8.96	9.45
COVs	349,315	363,622	379,487	366,821	367,121	372,040
CBP-LOS INDIOS, BORDER STATION						
COV Wait Times	3.22	3.18	0.85	0.52	0.91	1.10
COVs	30,398	32,305	25,031	26,971	24,754	33,563
CBP-LOS TOMATES, PASSENGER XING						
COV Wait Times	12.20	16.30	18.00	11.71	12.44	16.37
COVs	178,944	178,303	178,876	188,244	197,127	214,595
BUFFALO, PEACE BRIDGE						
COV Wait Times	6.19	7.54	6.74	6.68	6.41	6.64
COVs	613,651	557,340	578,345	615,681	573,721	557,609
CBP-LEWISTON, QUEENSTON BRIDGE						
COV Wait Times	1.42	3.15	2.28	2.01	3.19	3.86
COVs	319,971	342,855	336,203	344,598	387,059	386,233
CBP-CALAIS, POE PASSENGER						
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
COVs	64,448	61,437	64,576	65,112	62,861	64,737
CBP-CALEXICO, EAST BORDER XING						
COV Wait Times	12.70	8.44	6.72	6.33	8.95	11.45
COVs	322,648	324,855	333,640	349,411	356,368	373,631
CBP-CHAMPLAIN, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	0.45	0.55	0.51	0.39	0.24	1.15
COVs	275,042	280,008	295,032	310,599	309,327	309,757
COLUMBUS, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	1.74	3.3	3.16	3.34	2.75	3.61
COVs	11,192	14,242	13,849	13,842	15,299	16,401
CBP-DEL RIO, INTL BRIDGE POE						
COV Wait Times	1.74	1.54	1.19	1.03	0.81	1.53
COVs	67,282	68,358	69,854	73,163	74,904	76,796
DERBY LINE, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	0.44	0.33	0.3	0.51	1.54	1.14
COVs	91,767	94,862	97,948	100,367	95,469	89,905
CBP-DETROIT, AMBASSADOR BRIDGE						
COV Wait Times	7.78	10.07	7.57	7.73	5.66	7.90
COVs	1,479,931	1,501,712	1,495,532	1,566,289	1,555,472	1,557,632

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
DETROIT, WINDSOR TUNNEL						
COV Wait Times	2.82	3.64	2.22	2.32	2.44	3.22
COVs	43,407	39,217	35,188	34,350	26,367	22,336
DOUGLAS, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	2.11	1.65	5.49	3.94	3.27	1.56
COVs	32,053	33,319	32,286	30,896	31,098	28,148
CBP-EAGLE PASS, BRIDGE 2						
COV Wait Times	9.02	10.46	8.07	4.91	4.87	4.08
COVs	116,281	133,050	140,813	154,253	167,503	172,720
CBP-EL PASO, YSLETA PORT ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	10.2	9.05	6.86	16.96	17.15	18.91
COVs	421,523	440,468	315,245	402,902	506,370	529,394
EL PASO, BOTA POE						
COV Wait Times	13.11	12.91	19.52	22.22	16.94	17.33
COVs	312,332	314,394	436,697	353,831	273,013	267,243
PHARR, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	15.59	20.03	18.45	20.58	27.06	32.76
COVs	505,137	523,472	541,352	561,428	591,362	642,706
CBP-HIGHGATE SPRINGS, POE						
COV Wait Times	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.33
COVs	86,583	90,496	90,606	92,173	93,567	95,933
CBP-HOULTON, PASSENGER PROC						
COV Wait Times	0.81	0.9	0.75	0.82	0.94	0.98
COVs	84,035	85,061	82,476	88,443	92,477	92,836
CBP-INTL FALLS, BORDER CROSSNG						
COV Wait Times	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.02
COVs	18,228	17,081	14,793	16,905	18,935	17,678
CBP-JACKMAN, BORDER STATION						
COV Wait Times	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03
COVs	35,592	35,475	37,380	34,182	35,094	33,843
COLUMBIA, LAREDO VEH-PED XING						
COV Wait Times	5.26	4.61	4.97	5.39	3.86	1.05
COVs	368,168	375,511	358,162	352,896	483,020	394,395
INS-LAREDO BRIDGE #4 *HIST*						
COV Wait Times	22.45	20.82	23.34	16.77	14.72	21.97
COVs	1,450,247	1,551,526	1,642,833	1,714,408	1,646,107	1,889,268
LUKEVILLE, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	2.00	11.43	0.00	0.44	0.05	0.00
COVs	26	75	93	152	196	268
LYNDEN, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	4.65	4.11	5.14	5.43	4.95	4.84
COVs	46,100	43,566	43,069	46,651	44,279	42,968
CBP-MADAWASKA, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	2.95	3.43	1.30	0.74	0.95	0.95
COVs	25,250	21,557	16,006	16,609	15,539	3,403

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
CBP-MASSENA, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
COVs	29,024	24,214	22,241	24,552	27,256	26,967
CBP-NACO, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	0.64	0.55	0.59	0.57	0.70	1.80
COVs	3,958	3,661	3,018	3,201	3,579	3,124
NOGALES WEST, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	12.24	19.01	11.88	16.69	17.03	15.93
COVs	312,536	310,239	320,554	328,921	334,661	337,468
NORTON, BORDER CROSSING, POE						
COV Wait Times	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.01
COVs	10,581	10,831	11,390	11,512	12,609	12,219
OGDENSBURG, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.08
COVs	34,912	37,455	37,818	37,918	39,279	41,133
OTAY MESA, EXPORT OUTBOUND						
COV Wait Times	32.92	35.34	31.71	33.75	37.04	34.34
COVs	831,836	800,493	822,691	873,599	927,111	961,736
CBP-PEMBINA, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	4.19	4.05	4.16	4.21	3.93	3.92
COVs	218,493	228,966	218,095	215,866	214,214	222,710
POINT ROBERTS, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	1.41	1.22	1.12	1.49	1.00	1.73
COVs	17,174	17,748	18,286	15,449	13,560	14,608
CBP-PORT HURON, BLUE WATER BRG						
COV Wait Times	2.62	5.03	4.60	3.40	5.97	7.11
COVs	719,204	760,651	797,688	833,276	830,905	818,994
PRESIDIO, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	0.37	0.41	0.29	0.01	0.02	0.03
COVs	9,610	10,194	9,490		8,551	8,807
PROGRESO, INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE						
COV Wait Times	15.8	11.01	8.92	5.86	4.26	2.31
COVs	45,103	39,928	37,965	45,580	53,223	50,065
RIO GRANDE CITY, POE INTL BR						
COV Wait Times	0.18	0.39	0.11	0.67	0.20	1.05
COVs	26,878	31,733	30,673	34,722	37,545	37,608
ROMA, BORDER CROSSING						
COV Wait Times	0.57	0.73	1.16	0.97	1.10	1.11
COVs	7,029	7,778	7,949	7,455	7,638	7,677
SAN LUIS, II POE LAND BORDER						
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.01	0.28	0.59	1.65	1.59
COVs	34,133	31,658	33,699	31,499	32,808	28,105
SANTA TERESA, PASSENGER OPS						
COV Wait Times	8.2	8.3	10.66	14.6	14.32	14.94
COVs	80,692	84,615	95,932	106,708	113,357	116,064

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
CBP-SAULT ST MARIE, POE						
COV Wait Times	3.04	1.97	1.34	1.37	1.79	0.91
COVs	40,827	39,255	37,323	39,636	41,501	40,979
SUMAS, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	3.66	4.32	4.27	5.67	4.70	3.89
COVs	141,337	148,016	152,845	157,690	156,956	159,024
CBP-SWEETGRASS, BORDER LANE						
COV Wait Times	4.71	4.14	3.55	4.45	3.85	3.40
COVs	133,295	143,836	134,786	127,829	127,310	128,527
TECATE, PORT OF ENTRY						
COV Wait Times	9.57	13.74	12.60	16.32	17.14	12.25
COVs	45,625	51,736	51,965	55,414	58,221	61,713

*Wait Times for commercial operated vehicles in regular COV Lanes

**All COVs processed in regular COV and FAST Lanes

Appendix D – Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate at Each Land POE

Table D1.

Number of Vehicles Processed by OFO Field Office per Booth-Hour, FY 2013 – FY 2018

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Boston	BEECHER FALLS, VT	Beecher	21.5	21.7	24.1	27.3	30.5	28
		Canaan	16	16.4	14.8	15.2	15.8	15.8
		Pittsburg	30.2	36.5	38.5	39	46.5	43.5
	BRIDGEWATER, ME	Bridgewater	20.1	19.1	16.1	14.9	14.9	14.7
	CALAIS, ME	Ferry Pt	58.7	54.5	48.6	45.2	46.3	46.7
		Int'l Ave	29.7	28.2	21.8	20.9	21.3	20.4
		Milltown	36.9	35	30.5	24.7	24.9	24.7
	DERBY LINE, VT	Beebe	17.2	17.3	15.3	15	17.1	15.6
		Derby Line	28.5	30.6	28	27.7	29	25.6
		Derby Line 5	37.8	37.6	30.7	26.5	27.4	29.1
		North Troy	18.6	18.7	16.4	15.8	18	16.6
	EASTPORT, ME	Eastport	19.9	14.6	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Lubec	28.1	28.4	27.1	27.2	27.5	27.4
	FORT FAIRFIELD, ME	Easton	55.6	55.8	92.7	NA	NA	NA
		Ft Fairfield	28	26.9	21.3	19.5	19.6	19.3
	FORT KENT, ME	Estcourt	17.9	18.8	20.2	29.4	69.4	NA
		Ft Kent	30.9	29.8	25.7	21.8	21.1	21.5
	HIGHGATE SPRINGS/ALBURG	Alburg	17.6	18.3	16.4	16	16.8	17.3
		Highgate	34.1	34.4	32.8	32.8	32.9	28.0
		Morses Line	16.3	17.9	16.3	16.2	16.2	17.2
	HOULTON, ME	Houlton	37.4	37.6	31.1	29.5	34.8	33.9
		Monticello	75	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Orient	27.2	27.1	24	25.1	43.7	41.6
	JACKMAN, ME	Coburn Gore	16	16.2	14.4	14.6	15.1	15.6
		Jackman	17.1	20	15.7	15.9	17.4	17.6
		St Aurelie	27.8	24.3	22.7	21.5	23.3	21.7
		St Just	70.5	60.1	69.7	63.2	59.4	41.4
		St Pamphile	41.4	36.8	41.8	44.8	53.7	NA
		St Zacharie	28.1	27.5	32.9	31.4	40.4	NA
	LIMESTONE, ME	Limestone	15.2	15.8	18.7	21.6	24.2	24.6
MADAWASKA, ME	Madawaska	55.9	51.7	45.5	41.6	43.8	45.1	
NORTON, VT	Norton	19.4	19.3	16.3	16.8	17.9	18.1	
RICHFORD, VT	E Richford	36.1	36.3	38.2	31.1	37.1	56.8	
	Pinnacle	30	29.1	28.5	30	35.4	32.4	
	Richford	20	20.9	17.1	15.7	14.9	15.1	
	W Berkshire	14.8	16.6	15.4	15.7	15.3	14.7	
VAN BUREN, ME	Hamlin	24.7	24.1	19.1	15.3	15.5	15.7	
	Van Buren	25.7	25.1	21.3	18.5	18.8	18.6	
VANCEBORO, ME	Vanceboro	14	14.3	14.8	17.6	20.2	20.3	

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Buffalo	ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY	1000 Island Br	32.4	33	27.9	28.8	30.7	30.5
	BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS NY	Lewiston	40.8	41.9	38.1	38	40.4	42.0
		Peace Bridge	40.9	41.5	38.3	37.3	36.6	35.9
		Rainbow	39.8	41	35.3	33.7	36.8	38.3
		Whirlpool	59.4	59.5	49.9	45.3	47.2	49.7
	CAPE VINCENT, NY	Cape Vincent	12.1	14.1	13	12.5	13.3	12.8
	CHAMPLAIN-ROUSES POINT	Cannons	16.7	17.3	17	18.3	17.9	17.7
		Champlain	34	35	32.9	31.2	32.4	33.5
		Mooers	17.5	17.4	15.3	15.1	15.1	15.7
		Overtons	20.1	20.3	18.3	17.3	17.7	17.6
		Rouses Pt	21.7	22.2	19.3	18.7	20.1	20.3
	MASSENA, NY	Massena	45.5	47	45.5	42.2	46.2	44.7
	OGDENSBURG, NY	Ogdensburg	40.6	40.3	34.7	34.8	35.9	35.6
	TROUT RIVER, NY	Burke	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Chateaugay	14.4	15.1	14	14.2	14.5	14.3
		Churubusco	18.9	21.3	23.7	27.2	36.6	40.6
		Ft Covington	18.5	19.2	17.4	16.2	16.4	17.3
Trout River		14.5	14.9	14.2	13.8	14.4	14.7	
Chicago	TOLEDO, OH	Sandusky	NA	12.6	NA	NA	NA	NA
Detroit	ALGONAC, MI	Algonac	10.7	15.7	13.4	13.3	NA	NA
	DETROIT, MI	Ambassador	36	36.1	36.6	37.9	39	41.9
		Windsor	36.9	39.5	42.7	43.9	46.9	50.0
	PORT HURON, MI	Marine City	14.1	20.5	16	16.2	NA	NA
		Port Huron	42.8	42.2	38	34.8	38.9	41.5
SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	SSM	41	42	38.6	40.2	40.9	41.6	
El Paso	COLUMBUS, NM	Antelope	5.4	7.5	6.6	7	8.1	8.7
		Columbus	32.7	28.4	29.9	32.6	37.7	41.1
	EL PASO, TX	BOTA	44.2	48.3	50.3	51	54.3	55.5
		PDN	38	39.9	44	43.5	46.5	47.9
		Stanton St	110.1	119.6	114.9	123.2	132	133.0
		Ysleta	45.9	49.7	53.4	56.3	59.7	62.5
	PRESIDIO, TX	Presidio	41.1	40.9	43.5	44.1	45.7	47.5
	SANTA TERESA	St Teresa	30.4	32.5	35.2	36.6	37.4	38.3
	TORNILLO, TX	Ft Hancock	14.9	15	14.5	15.2	15.7	17.1
Tornillo		32.9	29	29.8	33.1	34.3	35.1	

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Laredo	SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	B&M	52.7	57.6	56.8	58	67	67.2
		Gateway	42.7	42.3	41.8	46.1	51.1	50.8
		Los Indios	35.5	36.4	34.1	39.1	42.6	44.5
		Veterans	50.1	51.2	49.5	52.1	58.1	61.0
	DEL RIO, TX	Amistad	25.6	24.6	25.7	21.9	23	29.3
		Del Rio	47.5	48.2	51.8	56.2	62.5	64.1
	EAGLE PASS, TX	Eagle Pass I	51.9	51.5	51.4	52.5	54.5	54.2
		Eagle Pass II	47.2	49.5	49.3	51	52.5	51.0
	HIDALGO, TX	Anzalduas	57.7	55.9	51.5	52.1	52.3	50.1
		Hidalgo	46.3	47.6	49.6	48.2	48.9	47.7
		Pharr	53.1	50.7	47.4	46.8	48.7	47.8
	LAREDO, TX	Col Solidarity	29.2	30.4	29.8	32	34.7	37.2
		Convent	26.2	29.7	34.8	37.3	NA	64.9
		Lincoln-J	41.2	41.6	45.7	46	46.8	44.0
	PROGRESO, TX	Donna	41.2	42.5	42.2	42.8	44.1	46.6
		Progreso	33.7	33.8	33.2	36.6	37.2	38.1
	RIO GRANDE CITY, TX	Los Ebanos	16.2	15.8	14.8	15.4	14.7	14.8
		Rio Grande	32.6	32.5	33.6	37.6	41.5	43.6
	ROMA, TX	Falcon Dam	14.7	15.1	15.4	17.3	18.7	20.0
		Roma	35.3	35.9	37.7	40.7	41.4	43.4
Portland	ALCAN, AK	Alcan	16.3	16.3	13.8	17.5	20.6	20.9
	DALTON CACHE, AK	Dalton	17.2	17.6	16.6	15.7	14.4	14.1
	KETCHIKAN, AK	Ketchikan	12.9	13.6	13.3	13.5	14	14.4
	SKAGWAY, AK	Skagway	23.4	24.6	20.5	20.6	22	24.2
San Diego	ANDRADE, CA	Andrade	32.5	35.6	39.8	42.6	45.8	49.6
	CALEXICO-EAST	Calexico/E	60.8	65.2	71.1	74.9	78.7	74.2
	CALEXICO, CA	Calexico/W	48.9	49.3	53.1	55.1	57.6	57.6
	OTAY MESA	Otay Mesa	63.7	74.3	76.9	81.4	79.2	84.9
	SAN YSIDRO	San Ysidro	52.4	56.9	72.2	69.6	71.1	77.5
	TECATE, CA	Tecate	55.7	57.7	59.5	65.3	73.2	75.8
San Juan	MAYAGUEZ, PR	Mayaguez	NA	33	NA	NA	NA	NA
Seattle	AMBROSE, ND	Ambrose	88	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	ANTLER, ND	Antler	15	17.1	22.2	22.6	27.3	25.9
	BAUDETTE, MN	Baudette	28.8	29.7	28.3	28.3	29.9	30.6
	BLAINE, WA	Pacific Hwy	65.4	68.7	59.7	55.4	59.3	64.2
		Peace Arch	79.3	83.1	70.6	63.5	66.4	64.7
	BOUNDARY, WA	Border Patrol	24.8	23.1	18.1	15.6	15	15.4
	CARBURY, ND	Carbury	12.1	13.2	14.7	16.3	15.4	15.7
	DANVILLE, WA	Danville	17	16.9	15.7	15.3	15.1	14.8
	DEL BONITA, MT	Del Bonita	12.6	15.6	15.6	15.4	15.6	15.7
	DUNSEITH, ND	Dunseith	15	15.5	13.8	13.6	13.8	13.6
	EASTPORT, ID	Eastport ID	20.3	23.7	21.1	23.1	21.9	23.9
	FERRY, WA	Ferry	17.4	17.8	21.3	16.4	17.2	16.7
	FORTUNA, ND	Fortuna	18.5	22.1	18.4	19.9	19.5	16.9
	FRONTIER, WA	Frontier	14.6	15.2	14.2	13.8	13.9	13.9
	GRAND PORTAGE, MN	Grand Portage	38.5	39.6	36.8	34.4	35	35.4

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Seattle	HANSBORO, ND	Hansboro	21.4	25.9	32.2	29.3	31.5	26.3
	INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN	Int'l Falls	38.3	41.1	39.5	38.4	40.6	38.7
	LANCASTER, MN	Lancaster	14.2	14.1	13.1	12.7	13	12.5
	LAURIER, WA	Laurier	16.2	16.3	16.5	15.5	14.9	15.5
	LYNDEN, WA	Lynden	51.7	53.1	43.4	40.8	42.2	47.3
	MAIDA, ND	Maida	17.3	18.4	20.7	23	27.8	23.7
	METALINE FALLS	Metaline	12.1	12.7	12.7	12.8	13.1	13.3
	MORGAN, MT	Morgan	16.6	18.3	19.9	22.8	21.9	21.7
	NECHE, ND	Neché	16.5	16.4	14.9	14.8	14.6	14.6
	NIGHTHAWK, WA	Nighthawk	15.2	17.3	22.1	22.5	24.7	26.4
	NOONAN, ND	Noonan	13.1	13.3	12.8	12.9	13.7	13.9
	NORTHGATE, ND	Northgate	12.4	12.8	13.1	14.1	15.3	15.5
	OPHEIM, MT	Opheim	60.4	54.7	60.5	68.9	63.7	65.2
	OROVILLE, WA	Oroville	24.9	23.8	20.6	20.9	20.5	20.0
	PEMBINA, ND	Pembina	28	29.9	26.8	26.9	27.9	28.6
	PIEGAN, MT	Piegan	19.9	22	19.9	21.1	20	20.6
	PINECREEK, MN	Pine Creek	29.7	34.1	43.3	48.1	65.2	69.7
	POINT ROBERTS, WA	Pt Roberts	78.4	82.6	84.2	78.7	77.4	83.9
	PORTAL, ND	Portal	17	17.4	15.3	14.5	14.7	14.8
	PORTHILL, ID	Porthill	35.1	35.4	30.1	26.2	25.9	28.5
	RAYMOND, MT	Raymond	13.1	14.3	14.3	13.7	14	14.0
	ROOSVILLE, MT	Roosville	28.6	30.1	26.8	24.9	25.7	26.5
	ROSEAU, MN	Roseau	12.6	12.9	12.2	12.3	12.7	12.6
	SARLES, ND	Sarles	39.8	51.8	53.8	41.4	44.8	33.3
	SCOBAY, MT	Scobey	29	26.6	33.8	42.4	42.2	40.0
	SHERWOOD, ND	Sherwood	13.6	14.7	14.6	15.2	15.9	15.4
	ST JOHN, ND	St. John	13.3	14.1	16.1	17.7	18.8	19.8
	SUMAS, WA	Sumas	51.8	53.7	49.5	46.1	47.7	49.2
	SWEETGRASS, MT	Sweetgrass	27.9	30.3	27.1	27.4	28.6	28.5
	TURNER, MT	Turner	13.4	15	17.2	18.8	19.9	21.0
	WALHALLA, ND	Walhalla	13.8	14.4	13.2	13.1	13.1	13.0
	WARROAD, MN	OARS	NA	13.8	24.5	NA	NA	NA
		Warroad	17.5	17.8	17.6	17.7	19.2	19.2
WESTHOPE, ND	Westhope	14.2	15.9	16.9	19.5	21.6	22.2	
WHITLASH, MT	Whitlash	59.6	NA	55.4	72.3	NA	55.2	
WILDHORSE, MT	Wildhorse	12.3	13.2	12.6	12.9	13	13.1	
WILLOW CREEK, MT	Willow Creek	17.1	19.1	35.5	41.1	49	39.2	
Tucson	DOUGLAS, AZ	Douglas	42.9	40.6	40.2	40.2	42.3	43.2
	LUKEVILLE, AZ	Lukeville	28	29.6	30.5	33.6	37.4	38.9
	NACO, AZ	Naco	33.6	37	38.7	37.9	37.8	40.0
	NOGALES, AZ	Deconcini	44.4	46.1	48.7	51.7	52.3	54.6
		Mariposa	36.6	39.2	39.9	40.4	41.7	44.4
	SAN LUIS, AZ	San Luis	40.2	43.3	45.4	48.2	48.6	51.8
	SASABE, AZ	Sasabe	18	16.8	15.3	15.1	16	15.6

Appendix E – Frequency of Secondary Inspections at Each Land POE

Table E1.

OFO Northern Land Border Passenger Inspection Rate, FY 2013 – FY 2018

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Northern Border	7.70%	7.67%	7.50%	7.30%	7.23%	3.44%
Alcan, AK	0.95%	0.87%	5.20%	5.48%	6.69%	2.67%
Alexandria Bay, NY	6.94%	7.09%	7.74%	8.36%	4.81%	4.43%
Ambrose, ND	3.54%	4.15%	2.49%	2.73%	3.07%	1.69%
Anacortes, WA	2.15%	2.32%	2.36%	2.12%	NA	2.38%
Antler, ND	3.54%	3.38%	2.42%	2.36%	2.74%	25.99%
Bar Harbor, ME	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.73%
Baudette, MN	5.84%	5.69%	6.04%	7.08%	3.83%	4.38%
Beecher Falls, VT	10.04%	11.14%	11.23%	10.80%	3.55%	1.90%
Blaine, WA	10.66%	10.05%	9.42%	8.08%	7.85%	3.35%
Boundary, WA	9.86%	9.03%	11.76%	8.82%	3.64%	3.30%
Bridgewater, ME	1.93%	2.20%	2.21%	2.08%	2.12%	2.00%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY	5.99%	5.96%	6.08%	6.87%	5.72%	2.78%
Calais, ME	3.28%	3.22%	3.50%	4.00%	3.79%	2.60%
Cape Vincent, NY	2.21%	2.47%	2.25%	1.46%	1.94%	0.56%
Carbury, ND	25.12%	24.77%	25.61%	25.92%	4.67%	3.76%
Champlain-Rouses Point, NY	20.04%	21.37%	21.94%	15.43%	7.50%	4.42%
Dalton Cache, AK	2.86%	1.65%	2.91%	1.39%	3.83%	1.14%
Darville, WA	2.92%	5.85%	1.37%	1.69%	2.24%	1.36%
Del Bonita, MT	3.07%	2.49%	2.47%	2.60%	3.79%	2.17%
Derby Line, VT	3.43%	3.67%	3.89%	4.23%	4.67%	2.40%
Detroit, MI	8.27%	8.76%	7.61%	6.56%	3.80%	3.01%
Dunseith, ND	4.77%	3.65%	2.62%	3.32%	4.76%	5.51%
Eastport, ID	7.03%	15.04%	6.85%	10.83%	8.58%	5.57%
Eastport, ME	1.15%	1.87%	2.70%	3.31%	2.95%	1.36%
Ferry, WA	7.44%	12.96%	4.20%	5.01%	4.47%	2.29%
Fort Fairfield, ME	1.33%	1.14%	1.64%	1.67%	1.88%	1.15%
Fort Kent, ME	3.64%	3.07%	3.64%	3.94%	3.49%	2.07%
Fortuna, ND	9.24%	9.29%	7.37%	7.12%	4.31%	3.90%
Friday Harbor, WA	9.64%	11.14%	10.09%	8.41%	0.61%	30.49%
Frontier, WA	5.84%	4.93%	7.74%	3.34%	4.52%	3.21%
Grand Portage, MN	2.69%	1.70%	1.45%	1.41%	3.13%	3.02%
Hannah, ND	10.01%	8.09%	15.12%	8.35%	13.51%	9.74%
Hansboro, ND	5.71%	6.11%	3.43%	2.99%	5.28%	4.75%
Highgate Springs-Alburg, VT	2.82%	4.82%	5.31%	4.06%	7.94%	4.88%
Houlton, ME	3.39%	3.13%	3.25%	3.89%	3.90%	2.38%

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
International Falls-Ranier, MN	7.56%	5.55%	6.41%	5.44%	2.77%	2.71%
Jackman, ME	4.11%	4.21%	4.44%	5.37%	4.95%	3.42%
Ketchikan, AK	2.99%	1.41%	1.44%	3.40%	1.11%	1.73%
Lancaster, MN	8.90%	9.40%	11.07%	11.10%	6.56%	3.32%
Laurier, WA	1.80%	1.83%	2.59%	7.76%	4.03%	2.10%
Limestone L, ME	1.99%	1.61%	2.41%	2.03%	2.25%	1.67%
Lynden, WA, WA	3.19%	3.44%	5.48%	4.37%	6.31%	5.94%
Madawaska, ME	1.75%	1.80%	2.22%	1.85%	2.51%	1.47%
Maida, ND	12.52%	16.94%	18.00%	16.46%	7.59%	5.07%
Massena, NY	2.62%	2.89%	2.63%	2.88%	1.89%	2.92%
Metaline Falls, WA, WA	12.42%	10.32%	6.81%	6.29%	6.19%	4.22%
Morgan, MT	11.48%	7.77%	10.73%	7.69%	16.87%	44.84%
Neche, ND	6.12%	8.92%	12.34%	13.06%	6.78%	5.52%
Nighthawk, WA	1.26%	1.57%	0.77%	1.13%	4.08%	2.33%
Noonan, ND	9.02%	6.92%	9.19%	10.13%	3.21%	2.51%
Northgate, ND	2.14%	3.25%	3.21%	2.79%	3.72%	2.92%
Norton, VT	13.02%	13.79%	17.08%	23.18%	2.84%	1.51%
Ogdensburg, NY	7.78%	8.32%	8.48%	9.18%	4.07%	5.56%
Opheim, MT	0.49%	1.08%	5.52%	5.04%	11.40%	8.66%
Oroville, WA	16.28%	18.86%	18.65%	15.66%	11.46%	15.41%
Pembina, ND	13.98%	7.50%	6.95%	7.12%	7.55%	7.16%
Piegan, MT	10.64%	13.46%	6.25%	5.94%	6.34%	2.18%
Pinecreek, MN	9.50%	9.96%	12.98%	13.06%	7.25%	6.83%
Point Roberts, WA	9.32%	9.26%	6.63%	4.95%	3.98%	1.95%
Port Angeles, WA	1.88%	2.48%	2.42%	2.68%		28.09%
Port Huron, MI	7.45%	7.34%	7.85%	11.41%	3.94%	12.48%
Portal, ND	12.82%	15.85%	12.02%	12.67%	10.87%	3.22%
Porthill, ID	14.77%	14.56%	14.24%	15.04%	3.92%	3.18%
Portland, ME	N/A	4.08%	3.95%	2.06%	1.49%	1.71%
Raymond, MT	5.77%	4.10%	6.60%	16.67%	15.44%	5.61%
Richford, VT	13.12%	3.08%	5.79%	5.96%	5.31%	2.81%
Roosville, MT	3.35%	3.08%	3.41%	4.08%	6.11%	3.58%
Roseau, MN	9.64%	10.39%	9.38%	8.10%	7.15%	6.60%
Sarles, ND	17.57%	17.15%	20.64%	15.77%	9.80%	5.54%
Sault Sainte Marie, MI	3.95%	2.70%	3.22%	2.74%	2.32%	2.06%
Scobey, MT	1.75%	1.79%	1.98%	3.89%	11.65%	9.19%
Sherwood, ND	1.70%	2.82%	1.88%	2.24%	1.69%	1.38%
Skagway, AK	2.08%	1.70%	4.10%	4.03%	8.10%	3.03%
St. John, ND	32.22%	32.29%	32.22%	32.30%	3.07%	5.17%
Sumas, WA	7.03%	8.06%	8.70%	10.20%	4.76%	2.38%
Sweetgrass, MT	10.27%	5.80%	2.71%	2.40%	9.32%	5.09%
Trout River, NY	1.73%	1.53%	1.52%	1.46%	2.13%	1.30%
Turner, MT	5.93%	4.83%	5.92%	7.76%	4.87%	3.60%
Van Buren, ME	3.17%	2.67%	3.15%	3.82%	3.11%	2.19%
Vanceboro, ME	3.79%	7.06%	15.86%	29.83%	12.29%	3.13%

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Walhalla, ND	12.29%	15.35%	15.99%	12.56%	6.66%	4.52%
Warroad, MN	10.15%	8.73%	5.94%	4.27%	3.35%	3.42%
Westhope, ND	12.98%	7.97%	6.70%	10.77%	2.39%	3.75%
Whitlash, MT	1.07%	1.34%	1.25%	1.93%	3.25%	3.59%
Wildhorse, MT	1.34%	1.38%	2.36%	2.47%	5.51%	3.52%
Willow Creek, MT	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.21%	12.36%

Table E2.

OFO Southwest Land Border Passenger Secondary Examination Rate FY 2013 – FY 2018

SW POEs Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Southwest Land	12.60%	11.82%	12.06%	11.88%	12.20%	3.38%
Andrade, CA	4.71%	6.71%	7.14%	4.03%	3.59%	2.55%
Boquillas, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.09%	0.67%
Brownsville, TX	15.61%	14.89%	15.45%	15.96%	5.33%	4.72%
Calexico East, CA	5.70%	5.26%	4.23%	3.68%	2.77%	2.49%
Calexico, CA	16.49%	15.20%	16.32%	12.78%	3.28%	3.10%
Columbus, NM	28.38%	28.06%	22.89%	27.41%	5.93%	6.41%
Del Rio, TX	6.46%	6.49%	4.55%	4.38%	2.46%	5.47%
Douglas, AZ	6.26%	5.68%	5.74%	6.68%	3.93%	3.79%
Eagle Pass, TX	10.84%	11.69%	12.11%	13.84%	3.48%	3.73%
El Paso, TX	13.18%	14.34%	17.99%	16.83%	2.87%	2.55%
Hidalgo, TX	19.08%	16.25%	16.79%	16.84%	5.30%	4.99%
Laredo, TX	34.31%	30.82%	28.18%	28.15%	3.00%	3.35%
Lukeville, AZ	2.62%	2.17%	1.87%	2.08%	6.00%	4.19%
Naco, AZ	4.20%	5.34%	4.91%	4.28%	4.42%	4.00%
Nogales, AZ	9.66%	9.67%	9.82%	9.76%	3.66%	3.10%
Otay Mesa, CA	6.05%	4.58%	4.74%	4.57%	3.86%	3.43%
Otay-Cross Border, TX (UFA)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.48%
Presidio, TX	9.61%	11.89%	9.58%	8.32%	3.50%	3.06%
Progreso, TX	8.00%	8.72%	9.18%	7.99%	3.56%	3.13%
Rio Grande City, TX	12.67%	10.89%	8.63%	8.69%	4.46%	4.81%
Roma, TX	18.94%	17.40%	16.24%	15.12%	4.63%	3.28%
San Luis, AZ	15.07%	14.26%	16.06%	16.65%	3.12%	2.75%
San Ysidro, CA	2.37%	2.13%	1.99%	2.75%	4.48%	5.92%
Santa Teresa, NM	15.55%	9.80%	8.03%	7.71%	3.99%	3.19%
Sasabe, AZ	6.05%	5.69%	5.41%	5.53%	6.05%	6.73%
Tecate, CA	6.59%	6.66%	6.43%	5.43%	4.41%	3.08%
Tornillo, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	8.83%	7.46%
Valley International Airport, TX (UFA)	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.98%	NA

UFA - User Fee Airport

Appendix F – Ratio of Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned - Maritime POE

Table F1.

Ratio of Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned, FY 2016 - FY 2018 (and Ratio of FY 2018 to FY 2017)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers			Ratio of 2018-2017
	2016	2017	2018	
1401 - NORFOLK, VA	2,411	1,313	687	0.52
1404 - RICHMOND-PETERSBURG, VA	0	0	0	0.00
1409 - CHARLESTON, WV	2	1	0	0.00
1501 - WILMINGTON, NC	111	76	19	0.25
1511 - BEAUFORT-MOREHEAD CTY, NC	0	0	0	0.00
1512 - CHARLOTTE, NC	2	0	4	0.00
1601 - CHARLESTON, SC	2,563	1,734	1,095	0.63
1604 - COLUMBIA, SC	0	0	0	0.00
1701 - BRUNSWICK, GA	0	1,619	0	0.00
1703 - SAVANNAH, GA	2,910	0	933	0.00
1704 - ATLANTA, GA	15	947	0	0.00
1101 - PHILADELPHIA, PA	333	25	248	9.92
1102 - CHESTER, PA	22	47	16	0.34
1103 - WILMINGTON, DE	23	0	0	0.00
1104 - PITTSBURGH, PA	0	0	0	0.00
1105 - PAULSBORO, NJ	0	0	0	0.00
1107 - CAMDEN, NJ	0	0	0	0.00
1108 - PHIL. INTERNATIONAL AIR	0	0	0	0.00
1195 - UPS HUB, PHILADELPHIA, PA	0	930	0	0.00
1303 - BALTIMORE, MD	1,673	0	333	0.00
1305 - BWI AIRPORT	2	13	0	0.00
0101 - PORTLAND, ME	31	0	19	0.00
0103 - EASTPORT, ME	0	0	0	0.00
0105 - VANCEBORO, ME	0	0	0	0.00
0107 - FORT FAIRFIELD, ME	0	0	0	0.00
0131 - PORTSMOUTH, NH	0	0	0	0.00
0132 - BELFAST, ME	0	0	0	0.00
0152 - SEARSPORT, ME	0	681	0	0.00
0401 - BOSTON, MA	551	0	105	0.00
0403 - WORCESTER, MA	0	24	0	0.00
0405 - NEW BEDFORD, MA	0	0	0	0.00
0406 - PLYMOUTH	0	1	0	0.00
0407 - FALL RIVER, MA	1	0	0	0.00

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers			Ratio of 2018-2017
	2016	2017	2018	
0408 - SALEM, MA	0	0	0	0.00
0410 - BRIDGEPORT, CT	0	0	0	0.00
0412 - NEW HAVEN, CT	0	0	0	0.00
0413 - NEW LONDON, CT	0	0	0	0.00
0501 - NEWPORT, RI	0	0	0	0.00
0502 - PROVIDENCE, RI	6	0	0	0.00
0701 - OGDENSBURG, NY	0	0	0	0.00
0715 - TROUT RIVER, NY	0	0	0	0.00
0901 - BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS	0	0	0	0.00
0903 - ROCHESTER, NY	0	0	0	0.00
0904 - OSWEGO, NY	0	0	0	0.00
1002 - ALBANY, NY	0	0	0	0.00
3327 - VANCOUVER, BC, CANADA	0	0	0	0.00
3501 - MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, MN	3	0	0	0.00
3510 - DULUTH, MN	0	0	0	0.00
3701 - MILWAUKEE, WI	0	0	0	0.00
3702 - MARINETTE, WI	0	0	0	0.00
3703 - GREEN BAY, WI	0	1	0	0.00
3901 - CHICAGO, IL	64	2	3	1.50
4101 - CLEVELAND, OH	0	0	0	0.00
4102 - CINCINNATI, OH	1	0	0	0.00
4103 - COLUMBUS, OH	1	0	0	0.00
4105 - TOLEDO, OH	0	0	0	0.00
4106 - ERIE, PA	0	0	0	0.00
4110 - INDIANAPOLIS, IN	2	0	0	0.00
4115 - LOUISVILLE, KY	1	0	0	0.00
4122 - ASTABULA/CONNEAUT	0	0	0	0.00
4501 - KANSAS CITY, MO	1	0	0	0.00
3801 - DETROIT, MI	1	0	0	0.00
3802 - PORT HURON, MI	0	0	0	0.00
3803 - SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	0	0	0	0.00
3804 - SAGINAW/BAY CITY, MI	0	0	0	0.00
3806 - GRAND RAPIDS, MI	0	0	0	0.00
3808 - ESCANABA, MI	0	0	0	0.00
3809 - MARQUETTE, MI	0	0	0	0.00
3815 - MUSKEGON, MI	0	0	0	0.00
2101 - PORT ARTHUR, TX	0	0	0	0.00
2102 - SABINE, TX	0	0	0	0.00
2103 - ORANGE, TX	0	0	0	0.00
2104 - BEAUMONT, TX	0	4,224	0	0.00
5301 - HOUSTON, TX	7,003	0	2,539	0.00
5306 - TEXAS CITY, TX	0	0	0	0.00
5310 - GALVESTON, TX	0	1	0	0.00

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers			Ratio of 2018-2017
	2016	2017	2018	
5311 - FREEPORT, TX	9	0	4	0.00
5312 - CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	0	0	0	0.00
5313 - PORT LAVACA, TX	0	0	0	0.00
5501 - DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX	2	0	0	0.00
5504 - OKLAHOMA CITY, OK	1	0	0	0.00
2301 - BROWNSVILLE, TX	0	3,308	0	0.00
2704 - LOS ANGELES, CA	10,673	3,658	1,751	0.48
2709 - LONG BEACH, CA	7,631	0	1,598	0.00
2711 - EL SEGUNDO, CA		130	0	0.00
2713 - PORT HUENEME, CA	16	0	55	0.00
2720 - LOS ANGELES INT AIRPORT	2	0	0	0.00
2722 - LAS VEGAS, NV	1	3,838	0	0.00
5201 - MIAMI, FL	5,649	2,327	1,590	0.68
5203 - PORT EVERGLADES, FL	3,200	147	1,277	8.69
5204 - WEST PALM BEACH, FL	303	0	17	0.00
5205 - FORT PIERCE, FL	0	0	0	0.00
5210 - FT LAUDERDALE INTL AIRPORT	0	56	0	0.00
1901 - MOBILE, AL	85	4	18	4.50
1902 - GULFPORT, MS	22	0	0	0.00
1903 - PASCAGOULA, MS	0	0	0	0.00
2001 - MORGAN CITY, LA	27	295	0	0.00
2002 - NEW ORLEANS, LA	350	0	145	0.00
2004 - BATON ROUGE, LA	0	0	0	0.00
2006 - MEMPHIS, TN	2	0	0	0.00
2007 - NASHVILLE, TN	2	0	0	0.00
2010 - GRAMERCY, LA	0	0	0	0.00
2017 - LAKE CHARLES, LA	0	0	0	0.00
2097 - NASHVILLE, TN CARTAGE-CON	0	450	0	0.00
1001 - NEW YORK, NY	6,069	5,562	389	0.07
4601 - NEW YORK/NEWARK AREA	10,773	0	3,749	0.00
4602 - PERTH AMBOY, NJ	0	0	0	0.00
2901 - ASTORIA, OR	0	0	0	0.00
2902 - NEWPORT, OR	0	0	0	0.00
2903 - COOS BAY, OR	0	0	0	0.00
2904 - PORTLAND, OR	4	0	0	0.00
2905 - LONGVIEW, WA	0	0	0	0.00
2908 - VANCOUVER, WA	9	0	0	0.00
3101 - JUNEAU, AK	0	0	0	0.00
3102 - KETCHIKAN, AK	0	0	0	0.00
3103 - SKAGWAY, AK	0	0	0	0.00
3106 - DALTON CIRCLE, AK	0	0	0	0.00
3115 - SITKA, AK	0	12	0	0.00
3126 - ANCHORAGE, AK	21	4	0	0.00

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers			Ratio of 2018-2017
	2016	2017	2018	
3127 - KODIAK, AK	0	0	0	0.00
3307 - DENVER, CO	1	0	0	0.00
2501 - SAN DIEGO, CA	56	0	0	0.00
2805 - MONTEREY, CA	0	0	0	0.00
2809 - SAN FRANCISCO, CA	6	0	0	0.00
2810 - STOCKTON, CA	0	1,816	0	0.00
2811 - OAKLAND, CA	3,235	0	782	0.00
2812 - RICHMOND, CA	0	0	0	0.00
2820 - MARTINEZ, CA	0	0	0	0.00
2830 - CAQUINEZ STRAIT, CA	0	0	0	0.00
2835 - SACRAMENTO INTL AIRPORT	0	219	0	0.00
3201 - HONOLULU, HI	352	0	71	0.00
3202 - HILO, HI	0	0	0	0.00
3203 - KAHULUI, HI	0	0	0	0.00
3303 - SALT LAKE CITY, UT	3	2	0	0.00
4904 - FAJARDO, PR	1	0	0	0.00
4907 - MAYAGUEZ, PR	0	0	0	0.00
4908 - PONCE, PR	0	685	0	0.00
4909 - SAN JUAN, PR	1,560	0	193	0.00
5101 - CHARLOTTE AMALIE, VI	0	0	0	0.00
5104 - CHRISTIANSTED, VI	0	819	0	0.00
3001 - SEATTLE, WA	1,934	783	502	0.64
3002 - TACOMA, WA	2,015	0	407	0.00
3003 - ABERDEEN, WA	0	0	0	0.00
3004 - BLAINE, WA	0	0	0	0.00
3005 - BELLINGHAM, WA	0	19	0	0.00
3006 - EVERETT, WA	10	0	7	0.00
3007 - PORT ANGELES, WA	0	0	0	0.00
3008 - PORT TOWNSEND, WA	0	0	0	0.00
3010 - ANACORTES, WA	0	0	0	0.00
3029 - SEATTLE-TACOMA INTL AIRPORT	1	0	0	0.00
3604 - INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN	0	44	0	0.00
1801 - TAMPA, FL	136	143	18	0.13
1803 - JACKSONVILLE, FL	375	1	37	37.00
1805 - FERNANDINA BEACH, FL	7	14	7	0.50
1816 - PORT CANAVERAL, FL	37	6	0	0.00
1818 - PANAMA CITY, FL	22	0	0	0.00
1819 - PENSACOLA, FL	0	235	0	0.00
1821 - PORT MANATEE, FL	7	0	7	0.00
1822 - FORT MYERS	3	0	0	0.00
2605 - PHOENIX, AZ	3	0	0	0.00

Notes: Potentially high-risk containers are identified based on the maximum (highest) score within the Best Arrival Date and Best Arrival Date +1 day. The container counts are for the containerized shipments only (non-containerized data is excluded). The report provides a distinct count of containers at individual port level. The rolled-up totals across the ports or field office(s) may include duplicate container counts.

