Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics Report

September 16, 2021

Homeland Security

Message from the Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

The "Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics Report" is submitted pursuant to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which directs that "Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall develop metrics, informed by situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness of security" between ports of entry, at ports of entry, in the maritime environment and to measure the effectiveness of the aviation assets and operations of Air and Marine Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Act further directs the Secretary to annually assess, report, and implement the specified metrics.

The outcome-based performance metrics called for by the Act are the most comprehensive, rigorous set of border security metrics required of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to date. Through previous efforts, DHS has established processes and procedures to collect and analyze essential data to meet most, but not all, of the Act's requirements. This 2020 report (with 2019 data) identifies which metrics are still unavailable; DHS commits to continuing efforts to comply with all the measures of the Act.

Thank you for your continuing support and commitment to strengthening the operating effectiveness of DHS.

Pursuant to congressional requirements, this notification is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security

Inquiries relating to this report may be directed to the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs at (202) 447-5890.

Sincerely,

Robert Silvers
Under Secretary
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

DHS Border Security Metrics Report

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I. LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE

Section 1092 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, signed into law December 23, 2016, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide specific "Metrics for Securing the Border Between Ports of Entry," "Metrics for Securing the Border At Ports of Entry," "Metrics for Securing the Maritime Border," and "Air and Marine Security Metrics in the Land Domain" annually to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. The NDAA further directs that the Secretary, "in accordance with applicable privacy laws, make data related to apprehensions, inadmissible aliens, drug seizures, and other enforcement actions available to the public, law enforcement communities, and academic research communities."[1]

[1] Throughout this report, all references to the NDAA are to the FY 2017 NDAA, unless otherwise noted.

II. INTRODUCTION

Border security is critically important to the national security of the United States. On February 2, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden signed Executive Order 14010 on "Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to Manage Migration Throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Border." The order directed plans to address irregular migration across the Southwest Border by implementing a comprehensive three-part plan for safe, lawful, and orderly migration in the region. The plan will include efforts to address the underlying causes of migration through a strategy to confront the instability, violence, and economic insecurity that currently drives migrants from their homes; collaboration with regional partners to shore up other countries' capacity to provide protection and opportunities to asylum seekers and migrants closer to home; and changes to ensure that Central American refugees and asylum seekers have access to legal avenues to the United States. These changes are not expected to transform the situation at the border overnight, but are intended to keep the country safe, strong, and prosperous in a way that aligns with American values.[2]

As directed by the FY 2017 NDAA, this report describes the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department) to measure its border security inputs, outputs, and outcomes. These metrics are essential to the effective and efficient management of the Department, including management of new and ongoing activities and investments in border enforcement as the administration implements President Biden's comprehensive plan for orderly migration.

Comprehensive and rigorous performance management data provide Departmental leadership with the foundation to support responsible, evidence-based decision-making for resource allocation and investments and for operational and mission management. Further, DHS implementation of this approach provides unifying border security goals under the Department's mission to secure and manage U.S. borders. Ultimately, the border security metrics described in this report are designed to assess the ability of the Department's border security policies and investments to achieve these goals.

For analytic purposes, the metrics included in this report may be divided into three categories:

- Inputs: Resources acquired or expended to secure the border. Examples of border security inputs include the number of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents deployed, border infrastructure, and number of aircraft committed to the border security mission.

- Outputs: Specific actions taken to secure the border. Examples of border security outputs include border crossers apprehended, travelers admitted or denied admission at ports of entry (POEs), asylum seekers identified and referred for protection procedures, and weight of narcotics seized. Outputs may also be defined as rates, such as the rate at which intending unlawful border crossers are apprehended or interdicted, and the accuracy of screening results for travelers and goods at POEs.

- Outcomes: The ultimate impacts of border security policies. The most important border security outcomes are the numbers of successful unlawful entries and quantities of illegal goods entering the United States, and the ease with which lawful travelers and goods pass through POEs.

In general, border security inputs and outputs are directly observable and can be measured with a high degree of reliability. Policymakers have direct control over resource allocation and data on inputs are available in budget and acquisitions documents. Operational agencies also track enforcement activities as part of their case management process. In short, the Department knows exactly how many agents it deploys, how many noncitizens[3] it apprehends, and how

[2] The White House, "FACT SHEET: President Biden Outlines Steps to Reform Our Immigration System by Keeping Families Together, Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration, and Streamlining the Legal Immigration System," February 2, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/02/fact-sheet-president-biden-outlines-steps-to-reform-our-immigration-system-by-keeping-families-together-addressing-the-root-causes-of-irregular-migration-and-streamlining-the-legal-immigration-syst/.

[3] This report uses the word "noncitizen" to refer to individuals described under section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Where "alien" was originally used in a title, statutory language, or name, it has been kept as such.

many travelers it admits. *Input* and *output metrics* tend to provide insight into the level and type of enforcement effort undertaken—what the Department is doing—that are useful for workload management and tactical decision-making; but in and of themselves these metrics typically provide limited insight into the state of border security.

Outcome metrics often provide more insight than inputs and outputs when it comes to evaluating border security and may be powerful tools for policy and program evaluation. Many outcome metrics are difficult to measure directly because intending border crossers actively seek to evade detection, and some flows are undetected and therefore can never be measured directly. This challenge is nearly universal when measuring illegal activities, which is why law enforcement agencies typically rely on crime reports as indicators of total criminal activities, for example. Measuring border security outcomes is also difficult because of the diversity and complexity of the enforcement mission along the United States' 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,000 miles of coastline, and 350 POEs. Moreover, enforcement outcomes only partially depend on border security policies, since immigration flows also reflect numerous factors outside of enforcement agencies' control, including the broader set of U.S. immigration policies and numerous economic, demographic, and other structural factors.

Historically, DHS and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) addressed these measurement challenges by relying on noncitizen apprehensions (an output metric) as a proxy measure of unlawful entries between POEs (an outcome metric). More recently, CBP and DHS have initiated new estimation strategies to better model unknown flows. These efforts have focused primarily on border security between POEs in the land domain (NDAA § 1092(b)), a domain that has been identified by Congress and the last several administrations as a top enforcement priority.

Some of this research continues to be refined, as DHS validates certain modeling assumptions and quantifies the uncertainty around its new estimation techniques. This report marks the second year that the Department has included measures of the statistical uncertainty around metrics of the partial apprehension rate (PAR) and the sensitivity of DHS model-based estimates of unlawful entries. In addition, many of the metrics in this report remain limited to the Southwest Border. The Department's future work on border metrics will continue to refine these new indicators of border security between POEs and expand data collection and methodologies to the Northern Border, while also developing additional indicators of border security, including those still identified as incomplete in this report.

Consistent with previous versions of the Border Security Metrics Report (BSMR), this report includes data running through the end of FY 2019. As such, many of the data related to border apprehensions reflect a notable increase from the previous year, as overall apprehensions more than doubled between FY 2018 and FY 2019 as discussed below. At the same time, although this report is being released in 2021, it does not cover the steep drop in apprehensions and admissions through POEs occurring in FY 2020 as a result of the COVID pandemic; those data will be included in the FY 2021 report.

Pursuant to the NDAA, this report covers a mix of input, output, and outcome metrics between POEs, at POEs, in the maritime domain, and with respect to air and marine security in the land domain for FY 2019. This report includes the following information for each border security metric:

- Definition of the metric and a brief description of how the metric contributes to the Department's understanding of border security;
- Discussion of the Department's current methodology for producing the metric and related methodological limitations; and
- Data for FY 2019, along with up to 10 years' worth of historical data where possible, and brief discussion of implications for the current state of border security.

The following sections of this report provide this information for each metric directed by the NDAA. In addition to the specific metrics identified in NDAA § 1092(b)–(e), this report includes supplemental metrics that inform the Department's assessment of the state of border security between POEs, as directed by NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D).

Throughout the rest of this report, years refer to the federal fiscal year (October 1–September 30), unless otherwise noted. Numbers in the text of this report are rounded to the nearest hundred (for numbers between 1,000 and 10,000) or nearest thousand (for numbers between 10,001 and 1 million); please refer to data tables for precise figures.

III. SEC. 1092 BORDER SECURITY METRICS

§ 1092(b) Metrics for Securing the Border between Ports of Entry

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(i) Attempted unlawful border crosser apprehension rate

Definition

In general, the attempted unlawful border crosser apprehension rate is defined as the proportion of attempted border crossers apprehended by USBP:

$$\textit{Apprehension Rate} = \frac{\textit{Apprehensions}}{\textit{Unlawful Entry Attempts}}$$

While USBP has reliable administrative data on apprehensions, the Department does not have an exact count of unlawful entry attempts since an unknown number of illegal border crossers evade detection. As a result of this so called "denominator problem," the Department must estimate the apprehension rate. Current methodologies allow DHS to produce two apprehension rate estimates:

- *Model-based* apprehension *rate* ($AR_{Model\text{-}based}$) – Based on statistical modeling, the estimated share of all attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs that is apprehended.

- *Observational* apprehension *rate* ($AR_{Observational}$) – Based on direct (unlawful border crossers observed by USBP) and indirect (residual evidence of a border crosser (e.g., footprints)) observations of attempted unlawful border crossers, the estimated share of observed attempted unlawful border crossers that is apprehended.

The apprehension rate is an output metric that describes the difficulty of illegally crossing the border successfully.

A conceptual limitation of apprehension rate data is that they include information about border *apprehensions* but exclude information about *turn backs* (subjects who, after making an illegal entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension or got away) (see further discussion of NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv), below). Turn backs are a key element of USBP's enforcement strategy, with underlying operational implications. In this sense, measures of the apprehension rate understate USBP's overall enforcement success rate. On the other hand, some analysts consider information about turn backs difficult to interpret since an unknown share of turn backs make additional entry attempts.

Methodology and Limitations

Model-based apprehension rate

The model-based apprehension rate is based on the repeated trials model (RTM) methodology. As explained in detail in Appendix A, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossers, which focuses on a relatively small share of attempted unlawful border crossers. This report includes minor updates to the PAR methodology introduced with the 2019 BSMR, including an analysis of the uncertainty surrounding the PAR (Appendix A).

Following the calculation of the PAR, the $AR_{Model\text{-}based}$ methodology consists of four additional steps. First, all attempted unlawful border crossers are divided into two groups, which are labeled *impactable* and *non-impactable* by traditional DHS enforcement policies. Impactable border crossers include adults without children who are not asylum seekers and (prior to 2017) who are not from Cuba. Noncitizens in this group are described as impactable because they are

generally subject to the full range of DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement consequences, and therefore potentially impacted by existing border enforcement. Non-impactable border crossers include unaccompanied children (UC), family units (FM), individuals who request asylum, and (prior to 2017) Cubans. Noncitizens in this group are described as non-impactable because, historically, they have usually been released into the United States with a Notice to Appear in immigration court for removal proceedings on a future date. These noncitizens are assumed generally to be non-impactable by traditional DHS enforcement activities at the border because even if they are apprehended, they are typically unlikely to be immediately removed.[4]

Second, the $AR_{Model\text{-}based}$ methodology assumes an apprehension rate for each of these two groups: 1) all attempted unlawful border crossers in the impactable population are assumed to be apprehended at the PAR generated by the RTM methodology; and 2) all unlawful border crossers in the non-impactable population are assumed to intentionally present themselves to a USBP agent or OFO officer and therefore to have a 100 percent apprehension rate. Notably, these assumptions do not reflect the actual behavior of all border crossers, as noted below, but they serve to construct a probability model.

Third, the PAR is used to calculate the total number of impactable noncitizens making illegal entry attempts. The methodology assumes (in the previous step) that all impactable noncitizens are apprehended at the PAR rate generated by the RTM methodology:

$$PAR = \frac{Apprehensions_{Impactable}}{Attempts_{Impactable}}$$

Mathematically, this equation can be rearranged to define the total number of impactable noncitizens making an illegal entry attempt as follows:

$$Attempts_{Impactable} = \frac{Apprehensions_{Impactable}}{PAR}$$

Since non-impactable noncitizens are assumed to have a 100 percent apprehension rate, the number of entry attempts of non-impactable noncitizens is equal to the number of their apprehensions.

Finally, the total apprehension rate is calculated as a weighted average of the total numbers of impactable and non-impactable noncitizens attempting unlawful entry times their respective apprehension rates:

$$AR_{Model\text{-}based} = \frac{(Attempts_{Impactable} * PAR) + (Attempts_{Non\text{-}impactable} * 100\%)}{Attempts_{Impactable} + Attempts_{Non\text{-}impactable}}$$

The current $AR_{Model\text{-}based}$ methodology makes assumptions that cannot be fully validated. First, the $AR_{Model\text{-}based}$ methodology builds on the RTM's PAR, and so incorporates all the RTM modeling assumptions and associated limitations discussed in Appendix A. In addition, the current $AR_{Model\text{-}based}$ methodology also assumes: that the entire cohort of border crossers can be divided into impactable and non-impactable groups, that the entire impactable group is apprehended at the same rate as RTM noncitizens included in the PAR analysis, and that the entire non-impactable group is apprehended 100 percent of the time. Each of these additional assumptions introduces potential biases into the estimated apprehension rate. Assumptions about non-impactable noncitizens may have an especially large impact on $AR_{Model\text{-}based}$ in recent years as non-impactables have come to represent a larger share of all encounters than has historically been the case; and non-impactable noncitizens may be incentivized to attempt to evade detection due to policy changes implemented

[4] Cubans were considered non-impactable between 1995 and January 2017 because they were routinely granted parole into the United States if they reached U.S. soil, under the "wet foot/dry foot" policy. The wet foot/dry foot policy was the name given to a former interpretation of the 1995 revision of the application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. The Obama Administration terminated the special parole component of the wet foot/dry foot policy in January 2017.

by the Trump administration since 2018.[5] The current version of this report includes a sensitivity analysis at the end of Appendix A that quantifies the potential impact of these assumptions on the model-based apprehension rate.

Observational apprehension rate

The observational apprehension rate is calculated as the ratio of USBP apprehensions to the sum of apprehensions and observed (directly or indirectly) *got aways*:

$$AR_{Observational} = \frac{Apprehensions}{Apprehensions + Got\ Aways}$$

Got aways are defined as subjects at the Southwest Border who, after making an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents.

Since 2014, USBP has implemented a standard, Southwest Border-wide methodology for determining when to report a subject as a got away. Some subjects are observed directly as evading apprehension or turning back; others are acknowledged as got aways or turn backs after agents follow evidence that indicate entries have occurred such as foot sign (i.e., tracks), sensor activations, interviews with apprehended subjects, camera views, and communication between and among stations and sectors. The scope of these data include all areas of the Southwest Border at or below the northernmost law enforcement posture (typically a USBP checkpoint) within a given area of responsibility, and those individuals apprehended less than 30 days after entering the United States.

In an effort to maintain reliable best practices, command staff at all Southwest Border stations ensure all agents are aware of and utilize proper definitions for apprehensions, got aways, and turn backs at their respective stations. They also ensure the necessary communication takes place between and among sectors and stations to minimize double counting when subjects cross more than one station's area of responsibility. In addition to station-level safeguards, designated USBP Headquarters components validate data integrity by utilizing various data quality reports.

The primary limitation to $AR_{Observational}$ is that the denominator excludes an unknown number of unobserved got aways. Over the past several years, DHS has invested millions of dollars in technology that has facilitated the ability to see and detect more at the border. Improvements in situational awareness give DHS an ever-increasing, real-time ability to understand how much illegal activity agents are encountering at the immediate border and their ability to respond. As a result, while overall border entries have generally been substantially lower in recent years, agents are currently interdicting slightly lower percentages of the total known flow. This observation reflects USBP's increased domain awareness—through technological advances, the agency has improved its awareness of illegal entry attempts (known got aways)—rather than experienced a reduction in enforcement effectiveness. Increasing situational awareness narrows the gap between the known and unknown flow and puts DHS in a position to build ever better observational estimates of border security.

An additional methodological limitation is that the estimated count of got aways aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to establish reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Ongoing Modeling Efforts

Other model-based estimation methodologies can supplement the Department's current RTM. USBP has contracted with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to develop a different approach by examining each station along the Southwest Border from an operational perspective. The method utilizes modeling and simulation of operational data and conditions and incorporates terrain and sensor models; resource deployment of infrastructure and agents; and the movement of both USBP Agents and border threats across known trails and patrol routes. Analysis has been completed for all line stations along the Southwest Border for 2019. Ongoing analysis and refinements will continue with 2020

[5] In 2019, 70 percent of those apprehended by USBP at the Southwest Border were non-impactable noncitizens. See Table 35.

data. Additional operational elements are being built into the model to support new border security technologies and geographical areas.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 1 provides the estimated model-based apprehensions rate for 2000 to 2019 and the estimated observational apprehension rate for 2006 to 2019, the years for which these data are available.

Table 1.

Model-Based and Observational Apprehension Rates, FY 2000 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Model-based Apprehension Rate	Observational Apprehension Rate
2000	42.5	NA
2001	41.1	NA
2002	35.7	NA
2003	32.6	NA
2004	36.1	NA
2005	35.8	NA
2006	37.5	63.5
2007	38.6	64.1
2008	41.4	67.7
2009	43.7	70.8
2010	43.2	74.4
2011	42.2	79.4
2012	45.6	77.5
2013	51.0	70.8
2014	65.2	74.8
2015	70.0	76.7
2016	79.4	79.4
2017	75.3	74.5
2018	80.4	75.7
2019	86.3	84.9

Note: Model-based apprehension rate estimates for 2008 to 2018 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A for details.
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of USBP data and OIS Repeated Trials Model.

Overall, both available measures of the apprehension rate indicate that USBP apprehends the majority of intending border crossers, and that the apprehension rate has substantially increased over the last decade.

The model-based apprehension rate went from 43 percent in 2000 and a low point of 33 percent in 2003 to 86 percent in 2019. Increases in the model-based apprehension rate have been sharpest since 2012, reflecting increases during this period in the estimated at-the-border deterrence rate, the estimated apprehension rate for impactable border crossers (i.e., the PAR), and an increase in the share of border crossers who are non-impactable and therefore assumed to be apprehended 100 percent of the time. (See discussion of NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information for the deterrence rate and of non-impactables as a share of border crossers.)

The observational apprehension rate has also shown improvements since 2006. Despite its limitations, the upward trend in $AR_{Observational}$ is noteworthy because it independently reinforces the upward trend observed in the model-based estimate. Moreover, with increasing situational awareness along the border during this period, it is likely that CBP detects an increasing share of total got aways over time, as noted above. As a result, the upward trend in $AR_{Observational}$ likely underestimates the actual increase in the total share of attempted border crossers that are apprehended.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(ii) Detected unlawful entries

Definition

Detected unlawful entries – The total number of attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs who are directly or indirectly observed or detected by USBP.

Detected unlawful entries are an outcome metric that describes the numbers of noncitizens detected crossing or attempting to cross the border unlawfully. Detected unlawful entries are not a comprehensive outcome metric since they exclude undetected unlawful entries, as discussed below. The ratio of detected to undetected unlawful entries, also discussed below, is an output metric that describes the Department's ability to detect unlawful entries.

Methodology and Limitations

The number of detected unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, got aways, and apprehensions. Turn backs are defined as subjects who, after making an illegal entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension or got away. Got aways are defined as subjects who, after making an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents. Apprehensions are defined as inadmissible noncitizens arrested by USBP.

Turn backs and got aways are observational estimates; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of turn backs and got aways based on direct and indirect observations as described above. Apprehensions are calculated based on nationwide DHS administrative data and are not limited to the Southwest Border; USBP apprehension data are considered a reliable count of apprehensions.

The primary limitation to detected unlawful entries is that this metric incorporates turn back and got away estimates that aggregate potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 1 depicts available data on estimated detected unlawful entries for 2006 to 2019, the years for which data are available. As the figure indicates, estimated detected unlawful entries (the sum of apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways) fell from 2.0 million in 2006 to a low point of 500,000 in 2017 before rising back to 1.1 million in 2019, an overall decrease of 45 percent between 2006 and 2019.

Figure 1.

Estimated Detected Unlawful Entries Nationwide Between POEs, FY 2006 to 2019



Source: OIS analysis of USBP data.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(iii) Estimated undetected unlawful entries

Definition

Undetected unlawful entries – An estimate of the number of attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs who are not directly or indirectly observed or detected by USBP. By assumption, undetected unlawful entries evade apprehension and enter the United States unlawfully.

Undetected unlawful entries are an outcome metric that describe the numbers of noncitizens who completely evade detection and successfully enter the United States unlawfully. Undetected unlawful entries are not a comprehensive outcome metric since the metric excludes detected unlawful entries, discussed above. The ratio of detected to total unlawful entries (i.e., the probability of detection) is an output metric that describes the Department's ability to detect unlawful entries, as discussed below. At present, this methodology only exists for the Southwest Border between POEs.

Methodology and Limitations

Currently, the Department's best available methodology for estimating undetected unlawful entries builds on the RTM methodology to produce a model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. The estimated number of undetected unlawful entries is calculated as the difference between the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries and USBP's observational estimate of got aways (i.e., *detected* successful unlawful entries):

$$\textit{Undetected Unlawful Entries} = \textit{Total Successful Unlawful Entries} - \textit{Detected Got Aways}$$

As explained in detail in Appendix A, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossers. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps.

First, as in the calculation of the model-based apprehension rate discussed above, all attempted unlawful border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups (also see NDAA §1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information). Second, based on the assumption that impactable noncitizens are apprehended at the same rate as RTM noncitizens included in the PAR analysis, the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry for noncitizens within the impactable

population group.[6] Third, the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the number of impactable noncitizens apprehended multiplied by the odds of successful entry among this group. Because non-impactable noncitizens are assumed to be apprehended 100 percent of the time (i.e., no noncitizen successfully enters without being apprehended) only impactable noncitizens contribute to the estimated count of successful unlawful entries.

$$\textit{Total Successful Unlawful Entries} = \textit{Apprehensions of Impactable Noncitizens} * \textit{Odds of Successful Entry}$$

The estimated number of undetected unlawful entries is derived from the observational estimate of detected unlawful entries (with limitations discussed above) and the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. This latter model-based estimate is in turn derived from the RTM methodology and the model-based apprehension rate, with additional limitations discussed above. (See Appendix A for further discussion of the assumptions involved in the estimate of total successful unlawful entries, including a sensitivity analysis for the most recent estimate.)

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 2 depicts available data on estimated undetected unlawful entries. As the figure indicates, estimated undetected unlawful entries fell from over one million in 2006 to fewer than 400 in 2016 and (technically) to zero since 2017. The Department does not interpret these findings to mean that *zero* noncitizens successfully crossed the border without being detected since 2017, but rather interprets these findings to indicate that the number of undetected entries has fallen sharply since 2016, and that the vast majority of illegal border crossers in recent years have been observed by CBP.[7]

Figure 2.

Estimated Southwest Border Undetected Unlawful Entries, FY 2006 to 2019



Note: Data for 2008 to 2018 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A for details.
Source: OIS analysis of USBP data and OIS Repeated Trials Model.

[6] Mathematically, $\textit{odds of successful entry} = \left(\frac{1\text{-}PAR}{PAR}\right)$.

[7] Several data points in this section of the report include apparently anomalous findings such as the estimate of zero undetected unlawful entries. Here and elsewhere, these findings are made possible by fact that the estimate is derived from two distinct data sources: detected entries is based on CBP's observational estimate of turn backs and got aways (and administrative data on apprehensions); total entries is based on OIS' repeated trials model. Neither estimate is believed to produce an exact count, and their current calibration results in a slightly lower estimate of total illegal attempts (by the repeated trials model) than of total detected entries (by CBP's observational estimate).

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv) Turn backs

Definition

Turn backs – An estimate of the number of subjects who, after making an illegal entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension or got away.

Turn backs are an output metric that USBP uses for tactical decision-making.

Turn backs also contribute to several other border security metrics, including detected unlawful entries, discussed above, and the unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate, discussed below.

Methodology and Limitations

Turn backs are a nationwide observational estimate; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of turn backs based on direct and indirect observations as described above.

The primary limitation to detected turn backs is that the estimate aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above. In addition, some unlawful border crossers might enter the United States to drop off drug loads or to act as decoys to lure agents away from a certain area and then return to Mexico, and therefore may be misidentified as turn backs.[8] However, USBP believes these instances are too infrequent to have a substantial impact on the total number of turn backs.

Available Data and Discussion

The number of turn backs has decreased 33 percent since 2010. This decrease is consistent with numerous between-POE metrics that suggest a decrease in flow over the past 10 years.

Table 2.
Turn Backs between POEs, FY 2010 to 2019

2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
150,005	121,007	121,079	156,433	147,025	105,670	108,601	91,998	111,003	100,400

Source: USBP.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(v) Got aways

Definition

Got aways – An estimate of the number of subjects who, after making an illegal entry, are not turned back or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents.

Total successful unlawful entries – An estimate of the total number of subjects who cross the border unlawfully and who enter the United States without being apprehended.

Methodology and Limitations

Got aways are an observational estimate; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of got aways based on direct and indirect observations as described above. While got aways are recorded by USBP at all borders, got aways in this section refer exclusively to the Southwest Border between POEs.

[8] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs," GAO-13-330T, February 26, 2013, p. 15.

The primary methodological limitation of got aways is that the estimate aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Conceptually, the got aways metric is limited to flows observed (directly or indirectly); the metric is not a comprehensive measure of successful unlawful entries. USBP's recent work to increase situational awareness, including using Geospatial Intelligence, gives the Department growing confidence in its count of got aways. As situational awareness continues to improve, observed got aways will become an increasingly comprehensive measure of successful unlawful entries. USBP and DHS are working to refine USBP's observational methodology and to more precisely describe the gap between observed and unobserved got aways.

The current methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries is based on the RTM methodology. As explained in detail in Appendix A, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossings, which focuses on a relatively small share of attempted unlawful border crossers. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps, as described above: attempted border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups; the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry; and the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the odds of successful entry among this group multiplied by the number of apprehensions of impactable noncitizens.

Each assumption involved in using the PAR to estimate total successful unlawful entries introduces methodological limitations and potential biases. See Appendix A for a discussion of the impact of these assumptions.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 3 depicts detected got aways at the Southwest Border between POEs for 2006 to 2019, as well as the estimated total successful unlawful entries for 2000 to 2019. As the figure illustrates, estimated total successful unlawful entries declined from over 2.1 million to 135,000 between 2000 and 2019, a 94 percent decrease. Estimated got aways declined from 615,000 to 151,000 between 2006 and 2019, a 75 percent decrease.

Figure 3.

Southwest Border Got Aways and Estimated Total Successful Unlawful Entries between POEs, FY 2000 to 2019



Note: Data for estimated total successful unlawful entries for 2012 to 2018 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A for details.
Source: OIS analysis of USBP data and OIS Repeated Trials Model.

Notably, the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries declined at a faster rate than observed got aways, with the model-based estimate falling 92 percent between 2006 and 2019 (the period for which both data series are available) versus a 75 percent decrease for detected got aways during this period. Relatedly, the two series have substantially converged over this time-period, with observed got aways accounting for 35 percent of total estimated successful unlawful entries in 2006 versus over 100 percent in 2019. As noted above, the use of separate methodologies to estimate observed got aways and total successful unlawful entries yields findings that cannot be fully reconciled for recent years, but DHS interprets the overall convergence of these trends to suggest that USBP detects an increasingly comprehensive share of all attempted unlawful border crossers.

§ 1092(b)(1)(B) A measurement of situational awareness achieved in each U.S. Border Patrol sector

Definition

Situational awareness – Knowledge and understanding of current unlawful cross-border activity.

Situational awareness is an output metric that describes the Department's awareness of unlawful cross-border activity.

USBP refines the NDAA definition of situational awareness as its ability to perceive elements within the environment, comprehend their meaning, and project future status. This definition is inclusive of unlawful activity as well as legitimate activity, as both can have an influence on operational performance.

Methodology and Limitations

USBP is refining measures for situational awareness as part of a larger effort to measure performance and success in securing the U.S. border between the ports of entry. This larger effort has led to the development of a comprehensive metric framework with a hierarchical structure and methodology by which USBP can broadly measure several indicators, providing a more comprehensive picture of USBP's performance and operating environment.

The situational awareness element includes measures of operational performance and of technology systems used. To enhance situational awareness, USBP must consistently strive for two enduring states: increased perception of all factors in the operational environment; and the ability to comprehend the impact those factors have on operations, both currently and in the future. Achievement in these areas requires USBP to execute on mission essential tasks, including its abilities to monitor, detect, identify, classify, track, integrate, and predict.

USBP plans to meet the intent of the NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(B) through the metrics developed as part of the metric framework. USBP anticipates being able to report on situational awareness in future versions of the BSMR. In the interim, a number of the Department's existing metrics are informed by the Department's awareness of migrants and other threats in the near border regions and approaches. (See discussion in report's sections for NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(v) and § 1092(b)(1)(D).)

§ 1092(b)(1)(C) Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate

Definition

Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate – The estimated percentage of all attempted unlawful border crossers interdicted by USBP, where interdictions include apprehensions and turn backs.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is an output metric that describes how difficult it is for unlawful border crossers to enter the United States without being interdicted.

Methodology and Limitations

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is calculated by dividing the number of apprehensions and turn backs between land POEs by the sum of the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and total estimated successful unlawful entries.

$$\text{Effectiveness Rate} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn Backs}}{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn Backs} + \text{Successful Unlawful Entries}}$$

The NDAA calls for an effectiveness rate that incorporates USBP's observational estimate of turn backs and DHS's current model-based estimate of total estimated successful unlawful entries. This measure would confront the methodological challenges associated with each of its component parts, as discussed above.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is conceptually similar to the estimated apprehension rate, with the difference being that the effectiveness rate includes data on turn backs and apprehensions while the apprehension rate focuses exclusively on apprehensions. An advantage to examining the effectiveness rate, rather than the apprehension rate, is that the effectiveness rate more completely captures USBP's actual enforcement practices, including both efforts to turn back border crossers and efforts to apprehend them. However, some analysts consider the effectiveness rate (along with the interdiction effectiveness rate, or IER) to be an ambiguous indicator of enforcement success given an unknown share of turn backs make additional entry attempts.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is also conceptually similar to USBP's IER, which USBP reports in its Annual Performance Report pursuant to the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate differs from the IER in that the former includes total estimated successful unlawful entries in its denominator and IER only includes known got aways.

$$\text{Interdiction Effectiveness Rate (IER)} = \frac{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn Backs}}{\text{Apprehensions} + \text{Turn Backs} + \text{Got Away}}$$

A limitation of IER is that changes in the Department's situational awareness make changes in IER somewhat difficult to interpret. In particular, increases in the share of noncitizens apprehended or turned back may be offset by gains in the share of intending border crossers observed by USBP (i.e., in the accuracy of the observational got away estimate).

Despite its shortcomings as an analytic tool, only the IER is currently available for analysis at the sector level. While a Southwest Border-wide estimate has been developed for the model-based apprehension rate, sector-level estimates of unlawful entries and attempts for this metric have not yet been produced and validated by DHS.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 3 summarizes interdiction effectiveness rates by Southwest Border sector for 2014 to 2019.

Table 3.

Interdiction Effectiveness Rate by Southwest Border Sector, FY 2014 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	SW Border Total
2014	72%	76%	85%	92%	74%	80%	89%	75%	91%	80%
2015	77%	73%	83%	90%	74%	82%	88%	80%	95%	81%
2016	70%	79%	81%	89%	78%	83%	89%	82%	96%	83%
2017	67%	72%	81%	91%	72%	80%	87%	71%	96%	79%
2018	54%	73%	83%	91%	69%	81%	85%	75%	97%	80%
2019	61%	85%	86%	93%	70%	89%	81%	76%	99%	86%

Source: OIS analysis of USBP data.

The sectors with more than three percentage points of change in IER between 2018 and 2019 were Big Bend (seven percentage point increase), Del Rio (twelve percentage point increase), Rio Grande Valley (eight percentage point increase), and San Diego (four percentage point decrease). Over the 6 years 2014 to 2019, the sectors of Big Bend, Del Rio, Rio Grande Valley, San Diego, and Yuma saw changes of more than six percentage points. These changes likely reflect increased situational awareness (i.e., a larger share of got aways observed) rather than a drop in the share of

intending crossers being apprehended or turned back. On the Northern Border, the physical security concern does not focus on the apprehension rate of illegal entrants, since the number of such attempted and successful entries is small.

§ 1092(b)(1)(D) Probability of detection rate

Definition

Estimated probability of detection – The estimated probability that DHS detects attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs.

The estimated probability of detection is an output metric that describes the ability of attempted unlawful border crossers to enter without being detected. Because successful unlawful entry estimates are available only for the Southwest Border between POEs, data in this section refer exclusively to this region.

Methodology and Limitations

The estimated probability of detection is defined as the ratio of detected unlawful entries to estimated total unlawful entries:

$$\textit{Probability of Detection} = \frac{\textit{Detected Unlawful Entries}}{\textit{Estimated Total Unlawful Entries}}$$

As described above, the number of detected unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, got aways, and apprehensions, a mix of observational estimates and administrative data. The primary limitation to detected unlawful entries is that this metric incorporates turn back and got away estimates that aggregate potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above.

Estimated total unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, apprehensions, and the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. As described above, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries begins with the RTM methodology's partial apprehension rate, discussed in detail in Appendix A. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps: attempted border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups; the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful unlawful entry; and the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the odds of successful entry among this group multiplied by the apprehension count among impactable noncitizens.

Each additional assumption involved in using the PAR to estimate total successful unlawful entries introduces additional methodological limitations and potential biases. Appendix A discusses the impact of these limitations on the Department's estimate of total successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 4 depicts the estimated probability of detection for 2006 to 2019, the years for which data are available. As the figure indicates, the estimated probability increased from 63 percent in 2006 (when an estimated 2.0 million unlawful border crossers were detected out of an estimated 3.2 million total unlawful border crossers) to a high of 100 percent since 2016. As noted above, the finding of a 100 percent detection rate is made possible by fact that the Department uses separate methodologies to estimate total illegal entries and total detected entries. The Department does not believe these findings mean that all intending border crossers are detected, but interprets the overall trend depicted in Figure 4 to reflect that USBP has detected an increasing share of intending border crossers over these years.

Figure 4.

Southwest Border Between POEs Estimated Probability of Detection, FY 2006 to 2019



Note: Data for Estimated Total Successful Unlawful Entries for 2012 to 2018 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A for details.
Source: OIS analysis of USBP data and OIS Repeated Trials Model.

§ 1092(b)(1)(E) Apprehensions in Each U.S. Border Patrol Sector

Definition

Apprehension – The arrest of an inadmissible noncitizen by USBP.

Apprehensions are an output metric that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal entries, an outcome metric.

For many years, DHS and the legacy INS also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of successful unlawful border crossings, i.e., an outcome metric. Over the long-term and across multiple locations, apprehensions are a problematic indicator of enforcement outcomes given the relationship between apprehensions and successful unlawful entries depends on the apprehension rate, which changes over time and may also differ by location. But in the short term, and in a fixed geographic area, DHS continues to view changes in apprehensions as a useful outcome indicator because short-term changes in apprehensions are more likely to be driven by changes in the number of unlawful border crossing attempts than by changes in the apprehension rate.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. USBP's count of apprehensions is considered reliable.

The apprehensions displayed below are event counts, meaning each apprehension of the same noncitizen in a year is counted separately. In other words, these data do not represent the count of unique noncitizens apprehended.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 4a–4c summarizes Southwest, Northern, and Coastal Border apprehensions by USBP sector.

Table 4a.

Southwest Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2010	5,288	14,694	32,562	12,251	35,287	59,766	68,565	212,202	7,116	**447,731**
2011	4,036	16,144	30,191	10,345	36,053	59,243	42,447	123,285	5,833	**327,577**
2012	3,964	21,720	23,916	9,678	44,872	97,762	28,461	120,000	6,500	**356,873**
2013	3,684	23,510	16,306	11,154	50,749	154,453	27,496	120,939	6,106	**414,397**
2014	4,096	24,255	14,511	12,339	44,049	256,393	29,911	87,915	5,902	**479,371**
2015	5,031	19,013	12,820	14,495	35,888	147,257	26,290	63,397	7,142	**331,333**
2016	6,366	23,078	19,448	25,634	36,562	186,830	31,891	64,891	14,170	**408,970**
2017	6,002	13,476	18,633	25,193	25,460	137,562	26,086	38,657	12,847	**303,916**
2018	8,045	15,833	29,230	31,561	32,641	162,262	38,591	52,172	26,244	**396,579**
2019	9,637	57,269	35,138	182,143	38,378	339,135	58,049	63,490	68,269	**851,508**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Total Southwest Border apprehensions more than doubled between 2018 and 2019, reaching their highest level since 2007. This increase is especially notable given that 2019 is the first time in the past nine years that apprehensions totaled over 500,000 and that apprehensions were up in 2019 across sectors, with each sector reporting increases in 2019 compared to 2018. The largest numeric increase was in the Rio Grande Valley Sector with 177,000 more apprehensions in 2019 than in 2018, while the largest percentage increase was in El Paso, where apprehensions rose nearly six-fold and reached an all-time high for the sector. The Rio Grande Valley and El Paso Sectors together accounted for 61 percent of all apprehensions in 2019. In contrast, Tucson and San Diego—historically major sectors for apprehensions—reported considerably lower numbers than those seen two decades earlier, with Tucson reporting 63,000 apprehensions in 2019, as compared to 568,000 in 2000 (an 89 percent decrease), and San Diego reporting 58,000 apprehensions in 2019, as compared to 152,000 in 2000 (a 62 percent decrease).

Table 4b.

Northern Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2017 to 2019.

Fiscal Year	Blaine, WA	Buffalo, NY	Detroit, MI	Grand Forks, ND	Houlton, ME	Havre, MT	Spokane, WA	Swanton, VT	Total
2017	288	447	1,070	496	30	39	208	449	**3,027**
2018	359	384	1,930	461	52	47	347	736	**4,316**
2019	524	537	1,322	412	52	77	428	1,056	**4,408**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data

Northern Border apprehensions represented about half a percent of total USBP apprehensions in 2019. Detroit was the leading Northern Border sector with 1,300 noncitizens apprehended, closely followed by Swanton, the next leading sector (1,100 apprehensions). Houlton, ME reported the fewest apprehensions in 2019 (52).

Table 4c.

Coastal Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2017 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Miami, FL	New Orleans, LA	Ramey, PR	Total
2017	2,280	920	388	**3,588**
2018	2,169	798	280	**3,247**
2019	1,891	1,132	562	**3,585**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Coastal border apprehensions represented about half a percent of total USBP apprehensions in 2019. Of the 3,600 coastal apprehensions, half occurred in the Miami Sector (1,900). Ramey reported the fewest apprehensions in 2019 (562).

§ 1092(b)(1)(F) Apprehensions of unaccompanied children

Definition

Unaccompanied child (UC) – A child who has no lawful immigration status in the United States; has not attained 18 years of age, and with respect to whom; 1) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or 2) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody (6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)).

UC apprehensions are an output metric that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal entries, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. Since 2008, USBP systems have included a flag for children who are found to meet the legal definition of a UC. USBP's count of apprehensions is considered reliable, but some outside analysts have raised questions about agents' ability to reliably distinguish among older children and young adults (e.g., to distinguish between 17- and 18-year-olds) and to confirm whether children are traveling alone or in family groups.[9]

USBP began collecting data on UCs apprehended between POEs in 2008; data are unavailable for earlier years.

Data and Discussion

Tables 5a–5d provide counts of UC apprehensions at the Southwest Border by citizenship and by USBP sector for 2010 to 2019.

Table 5a.

Total Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2010	197	1,014	448	1,011	1,570	4,977	980	7,998	216	**18,411**
2011	189	1,113	457	697	1,608	5,236	549	5,878	222	**15,949**
2012	168	1,618	498	659	2,658	10,759	524	7,239	280	**24,403**
2013	125	2,135	434	744	3,795	21,553	656	9,070	247	**38,759**
2014	256	3,268	662	1,029	3,800	49,959	954	8,262	351	**68,541**
2015	839	2,285	668	1,662	2,459	23,864	1,084	6,019	1,090	**39,970**
2016	951	2,689	1,379	3,885	2,953	36,714	1,553	6,302	3,266	**59,692**
2017	811	1,349	1,531	3,926	2,033	23,708	1,551	3,659	2,867	**41,435**
2018	989	1,297	2,715	5,461	2,879	23,757	2,491	5,023	5,424	**50,036**
2019	779	3,621	2,688	16,159	2,521	34,523	3,335	5,105	7,289	**76,020**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

[9] OIG-10-12 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. *Age Determination Practices for Unaccompanied Alien Children in ICE Custody*. November 2009

Table 5b.

Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs from Mexico, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2010	180	772	404	947	886	2,787	950	6,485	204	**13,615**
2011	183	801	427	663	1,022	3,009	523	4,893	192	**11,713**
2012	137	911	418	616	1,369	4,361	480	5,405	246	**13,943**
2013	104	1,082	328	654	1,652	6,366	598	6,241	194	**17,219**
2014	102	821	278	698	1,354	7,081	740	4,394	166	**15,634**
2015	73	798	397	823	1,299	3,243	823	3,412	144	**11,012**
2016	118	867	610	1,149	1,515	3,389	851	3,293	134	**11,926**
2017	166	512	688	768	1,112	2,791	702	2,004	134	**8,877**
2018	190	541	1,162	806	1,545	2,466	1,164	2,118	144	**10,136**
2019	224	575	1,021	1,004	1,526	2,530	1,374	2,039	194	**10,487**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 5c.

Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs from Northern Triangle Countries, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2010	16	238	42	58	598	2,057	28	1,326	8	**4,371**
2011	6	307	29	32	528	2,030	25	927	28	**3,912**
2012	29	701	70	40	1,228	6,229	44	1,753	34	**10,128**
2013	18	1,044	104	80	2,028	14,696	48	2,731	36	**20,785**
2014	151	2,422	379	290	2,329	42,020	209	3,727	178	**51,705**
2015	760	1,479	269	824	1,113	20,260	255	2,497	930	**28,387**
2016	824	1,806	641	2,685	1,382	32,935	625	2,904	3,091	**46,893**
2017	633	821	667	3,093	858	20,620	701	1,639	2,722	**31,754**
2018	798	741	1,238	4,563	1,091	20,893	825	2,839	5,201	**38,189**
2019	544	2,857	1,382	14,664	944	30,873	1,666	2,978	6,840	**62,748**

Note: Northern Triangle counties include El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 5d.

Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs from All Other Countries, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2010	1	4	2	6	86	133	2	187	4	**425**
2011	0	5	1	2	58	199	1	58	2	**326**
2012	2	6	10	5	61	169	0	82	0	**335**
2013	3	9	2	10	115	491	10	98	17	**755**
2014	3	25	5	41	117	858	5	141	7	**1,202**
2015	6	8	2	15	47	361	6	110	16	**571**
2016	9	16	128	51	56	390	77	105	41	**873**
2017	12	16	176	65	63	297	148	16	11	**804**
2018	1	15	315	92	243	398	502	66	79	**1,711**
2019	11	189	285	491	51	1,120	295	88	255	**2,785**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Total UC apprehensions at the Southwest Border reached an all-time high in 2019, exceeding the previous "surge" year of 2014 and quadruple the level observed in 2010. As in other recent years, the growth in UC apprehensions was mainly fueled by children from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, who account for 77 percent of UC apprehensions since 2014. Thus, the number of UCs from Mexico (10,000) entering at the Southwest Border was roughly unchanged between 2018 and 2019, and down 27 percent from its 2010 to 2014 average of 14,000. At the same time, apprehensions at the Southwest Border of UCs from the Northern Triangle (63,000) were up 64 percent from 2008 and increased more than 1,300 percent between 2010 and 2019. While apprehensions of UCs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle represent a small portion of total UC Southwest Border apprehensions, their share of the total reached an all-time high of 4 percent in 2019. The leading countries of citizenship of UCs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle were Ecuador (1,106), Nicaragua (717), and India (547).

Most UC apprehensions in 2019 occurred along the Southwest Border, including 45 percent of all UC apprehensions that occurred in the Rio Grande Valley Sector and 21 percent that occurred in the El Paso Sector. Only 49 UCs were apprehended across the Northern Border, while 67 were apprehended along the coastal borders.

§ 1092(b)(1)(G) Apprehensions of family unit aliens

Definition

Family unit member (FM) – A member of a group consisting of a noncitizen minor with his or her adult noncitizen parent or legal guardian. For example, a mother and child apprehended together are counted as two FM noncitizens.

FM apprehensions are output metric that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal entries, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. USBP's count of apprehensions is considered reliable, but agents may not always be able to reliably identify FMs.

USBP began collecting data on FMs apprehended between POEs in 2012; data on FMs are unavailable for earlier years.

Data and Discussion

Tables 6a–6d provide counts of apprehensions by FM status and by USBP sector for 2012 to 2019.

Table 6a.

Total Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs, FY 2012 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	76	349	1,127	265	1,825	2,625	1,373	3,254	222	**11,116**
2013	102	711	365	298	1,688	7,265	1,576	2,630	220	**14,855**
2014	176	4,950	630	562	3,591	52,326	1,723	3,812	675	**68,445**
2015	807	2,141	675	1,220	1,372	27,409	1,550	2,930	1,734	**39,838**
2016	1,051	3,549	1,593	5,664	1,640	52,006	2,863	3,139	6,169	**77,674**
2017	941	2,453	1,798	8,609	865	49,896	2,944	2,042	6,074	**75,622**
2018	741	2,829	3,539	12,312	597	63,278	4,408	4,954	14,554	**107,212**
2019	2,931	32,835	7,873	132,909	1,169	211,631	16,174	16,199	51,961	**473,682**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6b.

Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from Mexico, FY 2012 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	56	218	699	241	1,623	1,555	1,325	2,940	194	**8,851**
2013	90	177	294	267	1,116	1,690	1,343	2,216	163	**7,356**
2014	61	141	260	213	779	1,832	1,213	1,057	83	**5,639**
2015	40	174	196	188	713	1,326	854	696	89	**4,276**
2016	38	229	163	224	518	1,392	346	487	84	**3,481**
2017	37	118	158	213	363	815	257	256	54	**2,271**
2018	56	144	233	167	292	706	373	226	64	**2,261**
2019	41	347	262	1,454	489	1,073	687	1,111	540	**6,004**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6c.

Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from Northern Triangle Countries, FY 2012 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	10	120	12	19	175	989	31	130	3	**1,489**
2013	8	522	40	23	522	5,354	39	254	19	**6,781**
2014	100	4,753	337	291	2,767	49,790	351	2,553	392	**61,334**
2015	764	1,929	470	1,002	602	25,296	617	2,127	1,556	**34,363**
2016	1,005	3,233	1,380	4,634	827	49,919	1,615	2,496	5,298	**70,407**
2017	900	2,290	1,502	7,134	477	48,732	2,414	1,755	5,941	**71,145**
2018	680	2,665	3,243	11,870	295	61,809	3,877	4,712	14,358	**103,509**
2019	2,873	28,554	7,104	111,673	594	201,266	14,157	14,560	49,765	**430,546**

Note: Northern Triangle countries are El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6d.

Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from All Other Countries, FY 2012 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	10	11	416	5	27	81	17	184	25	**776**
2013	4	12	31	8	50	221	194	160	38	**718**
2014	15	56	33	58	45	704	159	202	200	**1,472**
2015	3	38	9	30	57	787	79	107	89	**1,199**
2016	8	87	50	806	295	695	902	156	787	**3,786**
2017	4	45	138	1,262	25	349	273	31	79	**2,206**
2018	5	20	63	275	10	763	158	16	132	**1,442**
2019	17	3,934	507	19,782	86	9,292	1,330	528	1,656	**37,132**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Total FM apprehensions increased six-fold between 2012 (the first year for which data are available) and 2014, fell from 68,000 to 40,000 between 2014 and 2015, almost tripled between 2015 and 2018 (107,000), and then more than quadrupled between 2018 and 2019 (474,000). Growth occurred across all nine Southwest Border sectors, with the largest numbers of apprehensions in the Rio Grande Valley (212,000), El Paso (133,000), and Yuma (52,000) sectors.

As with UC apprehensions, the growth in FM apprehensions was driven almost entirely by families from the Northern Triangle, which accounted for 91 percent of the total. Indeed, while FMs from the Northern Triangle increased year-on-

year in all preceding years except 2015, FMs from Mexico have fallen each year 2012 to 2018, from 8,900 in 2012 to a low of 2,200 in 2018, before rising to 6,000 in 2019. FMs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle reached a previous peak of 3,800 in 2016, fell to 1,400 in 2018, and peaked again at 37,000 in 2019, with the largest numerical increase coming in the El Paso sector (275 apprehensions in 2018 versus 20,000 in 2019). In 2019, the leading countries of citizenship of FMs from countries other than Mexico and the Northern Triangle were Brazil (16,099), Nicaragua (7,408), and Ecuador (6,019).

Northern and coastal border apprehensions represented a small portion of the FM apprehensions in 2019. A total of 440 FMs were apprehended across the Northern Border, while 39 were apprehended along the coastal border.

§ 1092(b)(1)(H) Between the ports illicit drugs seizure rate

Definition

Between the ports illicit drugs seizure rate – For each type of illicit drug seized by USBP between POEs, the ratio of the illicit drugs seized in any year relative to the average amount seized in the immediately preceding 5 years.

The illicit drug seizure rate is an output metric, which compares trends in activity data over time.

Methodology and Limitations

Between the ports drug seizure data are obtained from USBP administrative records. These data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug seizure rate directed by NDAA § 1092 (b)(1)(H), the drug seizure rate describes the ratio of each year's seizures relative to illicit drugs seizures in the preceding 5 years; the metric does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are seized.

Available Data and Discussion

Drug seizure trends varied in 2019 by type of illicit drug. Marijuana seizures continued a 5-year pattern of steep declines, from 872,000 kilograms in 2014 and 209,000 kilograms in 2018 to 121,000 kilograms in 2019, an illicit drug seizure rate of 22 percent. Seizures of cocaine and heroin were up in 2019 from 2018 and from their 5-year averages though still below their respective peaks. Seizures of methamphetamines were up from 2,900 kilograms in 2014 and 5,100 kilograms in 2018 to an all-time high of 6,500 kilograms in 2019, for an illicit drug seizure rate of 179 percent. Seizures of fentanyl declined slightly from 176 kilograms in 2018 to 151 kilograms in 2019.

Table 7.

Illicit Drugs Seized Relative to Preceding 5 Years (Illicit Drug Seizure Rate) between POEs, FY 2012 to 2019

Drug Type	Rate/Amt	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Marijuana	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	45%	29%	22%
	Kg seized	1,043,201	1,102,285	872,052	697,764	586,972	390,648	209,120	120,803
Cocaine	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	123%	93%	157%
	Kg seized	5,516	2,085	2,066	5,089	2,483	4,239	2,971	5,288
Heroin	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	177%	88%	126%
	Kg seized	12.2	16.3	17.2	14.7	16.1	27.0	16.1	22.9
Methamphetamines	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	199%	174%	179%
	Kg seized	1,685	1,624	1,783	2,922	3,730	4,685	5,132	6,534
Fentanyl	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Kg seized	NA	NA	NA	NA	47.4	82.1	176.0	151.4

Note: Seizure data for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines were not available for 2005 to 2011, so DHS is unable to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for years prior to 2017. USBP began tracking fentanyl seizures in July 2016 so it is not possible to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for 2016 to 2019.
Source: OIS analysis of USBP data.

§ 1092(b)(1)(I) Estimates of the impact of the consequence delivery system on recidivism

Definition

Consequence delivery system (CDS) – A process implemented by USBP to uniquely evaluate each apprehended subject, identify the most effective and efficient consequences, and deliver these consequences to impede and deter further illegal activity.

Recidivist rate – The share of subjects apprehended by USBP who are apprehended more than once in the same fiscal year.

The annual recidivist rate is an output metric that offers insight into what share of repatriated noncitizens are deterred from making additional unlawful entry attempts, but does not account for unknown attempts/entries. USBP uses the annual recidivist rate as one of its 13 metrics of the effectiveness of enforcement consequences under the CDS.

Methodology and Limitations

Since 2007, USBP has collected biometric data (including fingerprints and digital photographs) from most unlawful border crossers it apprehends. For the purpose of this report, these data are used to identify subjects apprehended more than once a year. USBP data on re-apprehensions in the same year are considered reliable. The annual recidivist rate is defined as the number of unique subjects apprehended multiple times in a year divided by the total number of unique subjects in the year:

$$\textit{Annual Recidivist Rate} = \frac{\textit{Number of Unique Subjects Apprehended Multiple Times}}{\textit{Total Number of Unique Subjects}}$$

The annual recidivism rate is an indicator of the probability that individuals previously apprehended make subsequent attempts at unlawful re-entry; a drop in the annual recidivism rate very likely reflects a reduction in re-apprehensions. This measure has the further advantages that USBP can calculate annual recidivism based strictly on its own apprehension data and that the rate can be reliably calculated at the end of each year. These features make the annual recidivism rate a useful measure for USBP performance management and an important operational measure.

Nonetheless, as the GAO has argued, if the goal is to accurately describe the share of individuals previously apprehended who make additional unlawful entry attempts, the current measure of recidivism could be strengthened in at least two ways: 1) count re-apprehensions based on the date on which a subject is removed or returned, rather than that the date of apprehension; 2) count re-apprehensions that occur within a fixed period of time defined by the subject's repatriation date, rather than by the year.[10] When based on a 1-year window, these refinements yield a more expansive definition of the recidivism rate that DHS refers to as the "Total One-Year Recidivism Rate;" DHS anticipates that the next version of this report will include estimates of the impact of CDS on both the annual recidivism rate and a longer-term recidivism rate.

Interpreting recidivism rates must be done with caution. While declines in recidivism may suggest greater deterrence and/or improvements by USBP, changes in the overall flow may be the result of more first-attempt border crossers, thus driving down the recidivism rate. Therefore, changes to the recidivism rate should be examined alongside the overall flow. Furthermore, changes to push factors over time may also play a role in decreasing subsequent entry attempts.

Additionally, the impact of CDS on recidivism within a given year is not solely a measure of USBP or DHS consequences and operations. All enforcement actions that occur after apprehension and processing subjects into a consequence are controlled and timed by other components and government agencies. Some subjects are never returned and therefore would not be represented in the metric. For example, a subject who remains in the United States, pending the conclusion of immigration court proceedings for several years, has been successfully prevented from re-entry—but that success results from the failure to complete a repatriation. Thus, recidivism, calculated as described here, is influenced by court schedules and the operational ability of other immigration components as well as USBP consequences.

[10] GAO, "Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Post-Apprehension Consequences," GAO-17-66, January 2017, pp. 13-17.

Available Data and Discussion

Since the implementation of CDS in 2012, eight out of nine Southwest Border sectors have seen decreases in annual recidivism rates, including drops of five or more percentage points in the El Centro, El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, San Diego, Tucson, and Yuma Sectors. The largest percentage point decreases in recidivism were observed in the sectors of El Centro (from 38 percent in 2012 to 21 percent in 2019) and Yuma (from 18 percent in 2012 to 2 percent in 2019). No sector saw changes of more than four percentage points in its recidivism rate between 2018 and 2019. While eight out of nine sectors saw very modest drops in recidivism between 2018 and 2019, the Laredo Sector saw a modest increase (from 14 to 15 percent).

Table 8.

CDS Recidivism Rate by Sector, FY 2012 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2012	6.90%	6.80%	38.28%	8.12%	13.35%	12.73%	30.49%	19.32%	18.20%	**16.60%**
2013	7.58%	7.28%	35.94%	10.22%	12.27%	11.62%	32.34%	21.24%	17.01%	**15.73%**
2014	6.74%	5.22%	32.63%	11.16%	11.59%	11.81%	32.46%	18.59%	13.26%	**14.06%**
2015	4.95%	6.14%	31.70%	8.63%	11.82%	12.66%	31.35%	15.71%	11.32%	**14.02%**
2016	5.59%	6.73%	24.52%	8.32%	13.01%	9.93%	27.34%	15.73%	5.37%	**12.27%**
2017	4.73%	5.51%	22.73%	6.22%	13.29%	8.27%	21.76%	12.46%	3.77%	**10.48%**
2018	7.65%	5.05%	22.70%	4.37%	14.03%	8.25%	21.36%	14.05%	2.68%	**10.81%**
2019	5.84%	3.26%	20.84%	3.04%	15.43%	4.87%	17.55%	11.45%	1.88%	**6.65%**

Source: USBP.

Recidivism data are not available to calculate the impact of CDS at the Northern Border or coastal boundaries.

§ 1092(b)(1)(J) Examination of each consequence under the CDS

Definition

Consequence – An administrative, programmatic, or criminal justice process imposed on a subject following the subject's apprehension. CDS is designed to identify, for any given subject, the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity.

Methodology and Limitations

USBP's current methodology for assessing the CDS involves analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of each enforcement consequence. One of the key effectiveness metrics is the annual recidivism rate, which is calculated separately for each enforcement consequence.

Under the CDS, USBP specifically targets noncitizens with more extensive records of unlawful border crossing behaviors for consequences that are designed to have a greater deterrent impact. As a result, differences in recidivism rates by enforcement consequence may reflect differences in the propensity of the targeted population to make further re-entry attempts, in addition to the possible impact of each consequence on recidivism.

An additional limitation of currently available data is that they are based on apprehension data for a given year, not repatriation data. Depending on the consequence and the timing of the apprehension, some individuals may not be repatriated to their country of origin during the fiscal year of their apprehension, and therefore may not have an opportunity to attempt re-entry. For example, long waits to appear in immigration courts for non-detained noncitizens mean very few noncitizens issued warrants of arrest and notices to appear (WA/NTA) are removed in the same year as their apprehension, which results in artificially low recidivism rates for noncitizens subject to that consequence. DHS and CBP are working to refine their analysis of CDS and will seek to address these limitations in subsequent version of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 9 summarizes recidivism rates by consequence for 2012 to 2019.

Table 9.

Annual Recidivism Rate by Consequence, FY 2012 to 2019

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Voluntary Return	27.06	28.61	30.5	27.03	24.55	24.65	25.31	29.19
Warrant of Arrest/Notice to Appear	3.83	1.44	0.6	0.89	0.41	0.36	0.47	1.33
Expedited Removal	16.44	16.66	17.54	18.08	15.46	13.5	14.1	12.96
Reinstatement of Removal	15.88	16.42	15.8	15.41	16.62	15.02	15.64	13.39
Alien Transfer Exit Program	23.82	25.48	28.63	27.17	28.8	27.89	31.68	16.67
Criminal Consequence Initiative	10.3	9.26	8.24	6.67	8.36	6.17	9.25	9.0
Standard Prosecution	9.09	10.17	9.18	8.79	8.16	6.98	9.05	11.15
Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security	10.24	18.04	18.25	22.97	30.93	NA	NA	NA

Note: The Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security program was discontinued after 2016.
Source: USBP.

While these data should be interpreted with caution for the reasons identified above, some trends are noteworthy. For example, with the exception of WA/NTA for the reasons noted above, the more punitive consequence programs such as the criminal consequence initiative[11] and standard prosecution[12] generally showed lower recidivism rates (9.0 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively) than less punitive programs like voluntary return (29.2 percent). Recidivism rates by consequence changed by less than four percentage points in 2019 compared to 2018, except for the Alien Transfer Exit Program,[13] which dropped fifteen percentage points from 31.7 percent in 2018 to 16.7 percent in 2019.[14]

[11] The Criminal Consequence Initiative (formerly known as Operation Streamline) is a criminal prosecutions program through which noncitizens are charged with illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. §1326 or illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. §1327 in an expedited criminal proceeding before a magistrate judge.

[12] Standard prosecution refers to CBP's referral of a noncitizen to the DOJ to face criminal charges for illegal entry, illegal re-entry, and/or another criminal offense through standard criminal proceedings.

[13] The Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP) repatriates certain noncitizens into regions different from their entry locations to disrupt future coordination with smugglers.

[14] This discussion of recidivism rates by consequence does not account for how new border enforcement policies introduced since 2018, such as "metering" at POEs and the Migrant Protection Protocols, the latter of which required some noncitizens to remain in Mexico during the pendency of their immigration proceedings, may affect CBP's Consequence Delivery Programs or the probability that noncitizens who are repatriated will attempt re-entry.

§ 1092(c) Metrics for Securing the Border at Ports of Entry

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(i) Total inadmissible travelers at ports of entry

Definition

Inadmissible noncitizen– A noncitizen seeking admission at a POE who is ineligible for admission pursuant to INA § 212(a).

Known inadmissible noncitizens – Noncitizens seeking admission at a POE who are found by OFO to be inadmissible.

Total attempted inadmissible noncitizens – The estimated number of inadmissible noncitizens who attempt to enter the United States. Total attempted inadmissible noncitizens include known inadmissible noncitizens and successful improper entries at POEs.

Inadmissible noncitizens and known inadmissible noncitizens are output metrics that describe OFO officer workload. Known inadmissible noncitizens may also be used as a proxy indicator of total attempted inadmissible noncitizens, which is an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Known inadmissible noncitizens are recorded in OFO administrative records with a unique identifier created for each inadmissibility determination. OFO's count of known inadmissible noncitizens is considered reliable.

The Department continues to improve the Compliance Examination (COMPEX) program to be capable of estimating successful unlawful entries at POEs, which is necessary to estimate total inadmissible travelers. As of 2019, the program is capable of estimating undetected major infractions, but CBP is still working to validate the reliability of COMPEX's estimate of successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion

An average of 240,000 noncitizens were identified as inadmissible at POEs between 2010 and 2019, with the highest numbers observed in 2016 (293,000) and 2019 (289,000).

Table 10.

Known Inadmissible Noncitizens at POEs, FY 2010 to 2019

2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
231,306	216,355	197,362	205,920	224,927	254,637	292,614	216,157	279,009	288,523

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(ii) Refusal and interdiction rates at ports of entry

Definition

Refusal rate – The share of all travelers seeking admission at a POE found inadmissible. Refusal rate is an output metric that describes OFO officer workload.

POE interdiction rate – The share of attempted inadmissible noncitizens found inadmissible. POE interdiction rate is an output metric that describes the difficulty of entering the United States unlawfully through a POE.

Methodology and Limitations

The refusal rate is calculated by dividing known inadmissible noncitizens (i.e., noncitizens found inadmissible by OFO officers at POEs) by the total number of travelers (i.e., all persons seeking entry at POEs):

$$\text{Refusal Rate} = \frac{\text{Inadmissibility Determinations}}{\text{Travelers}}$$

Data on inadmissibility determinations and total travelers are obtained from OFO administrative records; these data are considered reliable.

The Department continues to improve the COMPEX program's estimate of successful unlawful entries at POEs, which is necessary to estimate the interdiction rate. As of 2019, the program was capable of estimating undetected major infractions, but CBP is still working to validate the reliability of COMPEX's estimate of successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion

The number of travelers at POEs continuously increased from 2011 to 2018 (from 340 million to 414 million) before declining slightly in 2019 (410 million). The number of known inadmissible noncitizens has consistently been small compared to travelers coming through POEs, with the refusal rate hovering within a range of 0.5-0.7 percent throughout this period.

Table 11.

Inadmissible Noncitizens and Refusal Rate at POEs, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Passengers	Inadmissibles	Refusal Rate
2010	352,980,607	231,306	0.07%
2011	340,364,884	216,355	0.06%
2012	351,551,007	197,362	0.06%
2013	362,333,988	205,920	0.06%
2014	374,974,750	224,927	0.06%
2015	383,200,225	254,637	0.07%
2016	390,592,745	292,614	0.07%
2017	397,407,840	216,157	0.05%
2018	413,878,570	279,009	0.07%
2019	410,287,338	288,523	0.07%

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(iii) Unlawful entries at ports of entry

Definition

Successful unlawful entries – The estimated number of inadmissible noncitizens who improperly enter the United States through POEs.

Successful unlawful entries are an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

The Department continues to improve the COMPEX program to be capable of estimating successful unlawful entries at POEs. As of 2020, the program is capable of estimating undetected major infractions, but CBP is still working to validate the reliability of COMPEX's estimate of successful unlawful entries.

§ 1092(c)(1)(B) Illicit drugs seized at ports of entry

Definition

Drug seizures – Seizures of illicit drugs by CBP officers at POEs.

Drug seizures are an output metric. Drug seizures may also be interpreted as a proxy indicator of illicit drug inflows through POEs, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Drugs seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records, measured in kilograms. These data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

Detailed drug seizure data at POEs are contained in Appendix B. Total seizures fell from 401,000 kilograms in 2015 and 368,000 kilograms in 2016 to a recent low of 250,000 kilograms in 2018 and then rising to 274,000 kilograms in 2019. The overall reduction is mainly explained by the reduction in marijuana seizures, which account for an average of 60 percent of all drug seizures (by weight) during this period.

§ 1092(c)(1)(C) Port of entry illicit drug seizure rate

Definition

POE illicit drug seizure rate – For each type of illicit drug seized by OFO at POEs, the ratio of the amount of illicit drugs seized in any year to the average of the amount seized in the immediately preceding 5 years.

Methodology and Limitations

POE drug seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug seizure rate directed by NDAA § 1092(c)(1)(C), the drug seizure rate describes recent seizure trends (i.e., current year compared to the previous 5 years); the measure does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are seized.

The drug seizure rate is an output metric, which compares trends in activity data over time. Drug seizures may be interpreted as a proxy indicator of illicit drug inflows through POEs, an outcome metric.

Available Data and Discussion

Marijuana seizures at POEs declined from a recent high of 273,000 kilograms in 2015 to 131,000 kilograms in 2019, a drop of 52 percent. Cocaine seizures surpassed the previous record high level observed in 2017, totaling 40,000 kilograms in 2019, which is 76 percent above the average level of 23,000 kilograms for all years 2010 to 2018. Heroin seizures saw continued increases into 2019, increasing 86 percent since 2010 (from 1,300 to 2,500 kilograms). Methamphetamine seizures were down slightly in 2019 but still up more than nine-fold compared to 2010 (from nearly 3,400 to over 31,000 kilograms). Fentanyl seizures more than quadrupled from 270 kilograms in 2016, the first full year in which data are available, to 1,200 kilograms in 2019.

Table 12.

POE Illicit Drug Seizure Rate, FY 2010 to 2019

Drug Type	Rate/Amt	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Marijuana	Rate	93%	96%	87%	82%	78%	119%	99%	72%	62%	65%
	Kg seized	246,567	255,216	237,085	215,705	198,670	273,434	233,827	166,221	135,814	131,328
Cocaine	Rate	112%	88%	77%	88%	85%	76%	116%	137%	105%	178%
	Kg seized	28,099	23,551	20,531	20,976	20,559	17,396	23,958	28,275	23,407	40,464
Heroin	Rate	139%	160%	154%	143%	134%	162%	97%	87%	116%	115%
	Kg seized	1,323	1,615	1,718	1,822	1,963	2,732	1,916	1,758	2,361	2,461
Methamphetamines	Rate	188%	222%	244%	260%	201%	190%	193%	201%	229%	160%
	Kg seized	3,445	4,700	6,460	9,512	10,639	13,192	17,137	22,885	33,567	31,110
Fentanyl	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Kg seized	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	32	270	882	860	1,154

Note: OFO began tracking fentanyl seizures partway through 2015 so it is not possible to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for 2015 to 2019.
Source: OIS analysis of OFO data.

§ 1092(c)(1)(D) Major infractions at ports of entry

Definition

Major infractions – OFO defines major infractions to include all offenses subject to criminal arrest, including arrests related to terrorism, drugs, immigration crimes (including zero tolerance arrests), currency, merchandise, and agriculture products. These major infractions are not equivalent to arrests of individuals, as each individual may be charged with multiple infractions and not all infractions may ultimately lead to an arrest. In addition, OFO includes National Crime Information Center (NCIC) hits and Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) hits, among others, as major infractions.

Known major infractions – The number of major infractions interdicted by OFO. Known major infractions are an output metric.

Undetected major infractions – The estimated number of major infractions not interdicted by OFO. Undetected major infractions are an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Known major infractions are recorded in OFO administrative records and are considered reliable. For the purpose of this report, OFO has updated its reporting methodology to limit data to passenger-related infractions, excluding infractions involving mailed goods and other non-passenger-related events.

Undetected major infractions are estimated through COMPEX, which conducts comprehensive audits on a statistical sample of travelers who were processed by CBP without secondary inspection and admitted into the United States. The randomly selected travelers undergo a systematic series of checks to reveal any admissibility, customs, or agriculture infractions. The rate of infractions found within the sample is applied to the population of travelers processed by CBP without secondary inspections. The program to develop these estimates operates at 19 airports and all privately owned vehicle (POV) crossings and is being expanded to pedestrian operations. Numbers reported below are for the airports and POV crossings within the program. Estimates are limited to the assumption that CBP secondary inspections and comprehensive audits find all infractions. This assumption is likely more valid for customs-related screenings at airports than passenger screening given the 100 percent search of all baggage. Additionally, true random sampling is more likely at POV lanes where automated systems select vehicles for additional screening–these automated systems do not yet exist for airports.

CBP implemented major enhancements to COMPEX in 2015 and 2016, but some reviewers still recommend that the program expand its audit sample size to produce more reliable findings.[15] Nonetheless, COMPEX provides the best available estimate of undetected major infractions.

Available Data and Discussion

OFO officers made 209,000 seizures based on major infractions at POEs in 2019, nearly quadruple the number in 2018 and the largest number of seizures in at least a decade.

Table 13.

Known Major Infractions at POEs, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Passengers	Seizure Counts	Infraction Rate
2010	352,980,607	61,146	0.02%
2011	340,364,884	54,548	0.02%
2012	351,551,007	47,521	0.01%
2013	362,333,988	51,391	0.01%
2014	374,974,750	42,190	0.01%
2015	383,200,225	44,380	0.01%
2016	390,592,745	53,545	0.01%
2017	397,407,840	45,601	0.01%
2018	413,878,570	54,420	0.01%
2019	410,287,338	208,711	0.05%

Note: This table updates previous versions of this report to align reported values with passenger-related known major infractions (i.e., excluding non-passenger-related incidents).

Source: OFO.

The estimated number of undetected major infractions at airports rose to 13,000 in 2019, up 46 percent from 2018 and down 21 percent from a recent high of 16,000 in 2016. Undetected major infractions in passenger vehicle lanes were roughly unchanged during the same period at 29,000–30,000 all 3 years.

Table 14.

Estimated Undetected Major Infractions at POEs, FY 2011 to 2019

Fiscal Year	Air	POV
2011	12,506	36,149
2012	14,970	32,499
2013	16,114	28,659
2014	13,334	12,376
2015	14,852	27,432
2016	16,158	29,251
2017	12,386	30,295
2018	8,736	29,879
2019	12,755	29,163

Source: OFO.

[15] Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute, "Compliance Measurement Examination (COMPEX) Refinement Recommendations: A Statistical Analysis," June 30, 2017.

§ 1092(c)(1)(E) Cocaine seizure effectiveness rate

Definition

Cocaine seizure effectiveness rate – The amount of cocaine seized by OFO at land POEs compared to the total estimated flow of cocaine through land POEs.

Cocaine seizures are an output metric. Some analysts also treat seizures as a proxy indicator of total attempts to import cocaine, an outcome metric. Seizure effectiveness rate (i.e., cocaine seized as compared to the total estimated cocaine flow) is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records and is considered reliable. Estimates of the total cocaine flow are provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).[16] The U.S. Government does not have an estimate of the share of the total cocaine flow that passes through land POEs, but the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency's National Drug Threat Assessment states that the Southwest Border remains the key entry point for the majority of the cocaine entering the United States.

The DIA estimate is based on a U.S. Government estimate of cocaine departing South America towards the United States, and additionally incorporates estimates of cocaine movement, cocaine production, and U.S. consumption derived from various U.S. Government agencies. The estimated amount of cocaine available to enter the United States (estimated flow in Table 15) is derived by subtracting seizures, high-confidence losses, and consumption in transit zone countries as well as documented departures from the transit zone towards non-U.S. destinations from the total estimate of cocaine departing South America towards the United States.

Available Data and Discussion

Total seizures rose to 41,000 kilograms in 2019, up 56 percent from the 2016 to 2018 average of 26,000 kilograms. Land seizures dropped to 9,000 kilograms in 2019, down 10 percent from the 2016 to 2018 average of 10,000 kilograms. Estimated flow dropped to 945,000 kilograms, down 21 percent from the 2016 to 2018 average of 1.2 million kilograms. The rise in total seizures and drop in estimated flows resulted in the seizure effectiveness rate almost doubling in 2019 to 4.3 percent.

Table 15.

Cocaine Seizures and Estimated Flows at Land POEs, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total Seizures	24,017	28,299	25,800	40,500
Land Seizures	9,100	10,800	10,000	9,000
Estimated Flow	1,274,000	1,136,000	1,187,000	945,000
Seizure Effectiveness Rate	1.89%	2.49%	2.17%	4.29%

Notes: Seizures and estimated flows in kilograms. DIA data on estimated flow do not provide a breakout for land flows, and seizure effectiveness rate is calculated as the ratio of total seizures to total estimated flow.
Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(i) Average wait times and traffic volume

Definition

Average wait time – Average minute wait time for vehicles to pass through a land POE.

[16] Previous versions of this report included estimates of total cocaine flow provided by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).

Private vehicle volume – The number of private vehicles passing through a land POE per year.

Commercial vehicle volume – The number of commercial vehicles passing through a land POE per year.

Average wait time is an outcome metric describing the ease of crossing the border. Vehicle volume is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

OFO uses two primary methodologies for calculating vehicle wait times at the border: line-of-sight and automated technology such as Bluetooth and Radio Frequency Identification. Ports using line-of-site methodology manually record wait times once per hour at the top of each hour using the Border Wait Time Administrative Tool. For ports using automated technology, wait times are recorded automatically in 5–10-minute increments every hour, which OFO averages prior to reporting out. OFO records wait times for 72 land border crossings, excluding small border POEs with negligible wait times. In March 2018, OFO leadership updated CBP's policy guidance for measuring and recording wait times at CBP land border POEs. The updated policy consolidates all previously issued policy regarding manual and automated wait time reporting and further clarifies Active Land Management as a means to more effectively manage traffic flow, primary inspections, and associated resource allocations.

OFO records counts of Privately Owned Vehicles (POV) and Commercially Owned Vehicles (COV) as administrative data in its Operations Management Report (OMR); these data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

Data on average wait times and counts of private and commercial vehicles for each land POE for which data are available are contained in Appendix C. Comparisons should be made with caution given the differences in flow and type of traffic at each port.

The most notable improvement in passenger vehicle wait times occurred in the Calexico, CA POE, where the average wait time fell to 51 minutes in 2019, down from 59 minutes in 2018. Average passenger wait times increased in Rio Grande City, TX (15 minutes in 2019, up from 5 minutes in 2018) and San Luis, AZ (78 minutes in 2019, up from 46 minutes in 2018).

COV wait times are consistently lower and vary more from year to year for each station when compared to POV wait times. The most notable change in 2019 was the increase in COV wait time at Pharr, TX, from 16 minutes in 2013 to 43 minutes in 2019—an average well beyond the average COV wait time, though it has been overtaken as the POE with the highest COV wait time by Otay Mesa, CA, which had a COV wait time of 55 minutes in 2019.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(ii) Infrastructure capacity utilization rate

Definition

Infrastructure capacity utilization rate – Average number of vehicles processed per booth, per hour at each land POE.

The infrastructure capacity utilization rate is an output metric that describes OFO's ability to process traffic relative to the physical and staffing capacity.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from OFO administrative records. The data come from CBP systems with booth hours and throughput as calculated fields. The hours serve as a proxy metric for the number of CBP officer hours spent processing and are measured on a one-for-one basis. Throughput is then calculated by summing all vehicles that passed through a site in a year and then dividing it by total booth hours.

Available Data and Discussion

Detailed infrastructure capacity utilization rate data are contained in Appendix D.

Each OFO land POE is unique in terms of staffing authorizations and physical layouts. Land POEs may be physically constrained by the available space around them and so unable to expand to yield greater capacity. Land POEs in the United States are also impacted by the adjoining Canadian and Mexican land POE management decisions on staffing and physical layouts. Both the OFO Mission Support Facilities Division and the CBP Office of Facilities and Asset Management are working on establishing methods to determine resourcing decisions for land POEs.

Table 16.

Average Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate, FY 2012 to 2019

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
OFO National Average	43.1	43.5	45.3	46.6	47.4	49.6	51.1	50.6
Northern Border	36.2	38.2	39.0	35.7	34.6	36.3	37.2	37.0
Southern Border	47.7	46.8	49.1	53.0	54.4	56.6	58.6	58.2

Note: Table depicts average vehicles processed per lane, per hour.
Source: OFO.

In general, the Southwest Border reports higher utilization rates because of higher flows through the POEs. The overall utilization rate was essentially unchanged between 2018 and 2019. Overall, CBP processed an average of 50.6 vehicles per lane, per hour in 2019 (37.0 on the Northern Border; 58.2 on the Southwest Border). Stanton Street in the El Paso Field Office averaged 149 vehicles per hour, per lane in 2019—once again the highest in the country by a sizeable margin. However, Stanton Street only processes travelers eligible for the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) trusted traveler program, which are faster to process than other classes of travelers.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(iii) Secondary examination rate

Definition

Secondary examination rate – Percentage of passengers subject to secondary inspection at each land POE.

Secondary examination rate is an output metric that describes OFO workload and practices.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from OFO administrative records. Secondary examination rate is determined by the recorded number of passengers sent for secondary inspection versus the total number of recorded passengers.

Available Data and Discussion

Frequency of secondary inspections data is contained in Appendix E.

Among the Northern Border POEs, the average secondary inspection rate was 3.5 percent in 2019, down from an average of 6.8 percent from 2013 to 2018. The Southern Border Secondary Inspection Rate averaged 3.1 percent in 2019, down from 10.7 percent between 2013 to 2018. The highest secondary inspection rates were reported at Northern Border POEs, including Friday Harbor, WA (21 percent), Portal, ND (22 percent), and Morgan, MT (37 percent). Certain smaller land POEs have high secondary examination rates due to a low volume of traffic that allows officers increased time to thoroughly examine a larger share of passengers.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(iv) Secondary examinations effectiveness rate

OFO conducts traveler and cargo-related secondary examinations for a variety of discretionary and mandatory investigative and enforcement reasons, including but not limited to CBP Officer enforcement referrals, alerts, subject complexity, Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Program inspection, and compliance examinations spanning a broad range of laws, rules, and regulations from multiple government agencies. Not all referred examinations are expected to result in significant enforcement results, such as disposals, fines and penalties, seizures, or arrests. Secondary examinations are often fully effective when they find no violations of any kind, as with compliance examinations or referrals due to subject complexity; and public awareness of CBP secondary inspection capabilities also serves as a deterrent to illegal activity. For these reasons, CBP is unable to categorize a given secondary examination as "effective" or "ineffective" and does not calculate a secondary examinations effectiveness rate.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(i) Number of potentially "high-risk" cargo containers

Definition

Potentially high-risk cargo containers – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using National Targeting Center (NTC) CBP national security criteria.

Potentially high-risk cargo containers are an output metric that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

All international cargo shipments coming to the United States via the sea, land, and air modes of transportation are screened by CBP using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to identify those shipments that may be considered potentially high-risk according to CBP national security criteria. Any cargo container traveling via the maritime environment carrying a shipment identified as potentially high-risk is identified for immediate review and assessed or scanned prior to lading at a Container Security Initiative member foreign port of origin or at arrival at a U.S. POE. Assessing, resolving, and when required, scanning and physically inspecting cargo found to be potentially high-risk, ensures the safety of the public and minimizes the impact to the trade through the effective use of risk-focused targeting.

CBP's NTC continuously refines, improves, and revises the security criteria applied by the ATS, which in turn improves the focus and currency of the risk assessment applied.

Available Data and Discussion

The NTC's process of continual review and refinement of the security criteria applied and ATS methodology has led to realignment in the total number of maritime cargo containers identified as potentially high-risk since 2013. As a result, even as the amount of cargo arriving at U.S. POEs increased in 2016 to 2019, the number of containers identified as potentially high-risk dropped from 72,000 in 2016 to 36,000 in 2018 to 7,000 in 2019, a decrease of 92 percent in 3 years.

Table 17.

Potentially High-Risk Cargo Containers at Seaports, FY 2013 to 2019

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
89,598	74,509	72,974	71,815	36,209	18,625	6,967

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(ii) Ratio of potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned relative to high-risk containers entering in previous fiscal year

Definition

Ratio of potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned – The ratio of potentially high-risk containers scanned relative to the number of potentially high-risk containers entering in the previous year.

The ratio of potentially high-risk containers scanned is an output metric, which compares trends in activity data over time. Ratio of high-risk containers scanned may also be interpreted as a proxy indicator of high-risk containers successfully scanned and entering through POEs, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ratio compares potentially high-risk containers in one year to the number entering in the previous year and should not be confused with the percentage of potentially high-risk containers scanned relative to the number entering in the current year.

A container is considered "high-risk" if even one shipment within it is designated high-risk. One container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it, which could cause the same container to be reviewed or scanned multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

The ratio of potentially high-risk containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned relative to the previous year's entries is contained in Appendix F.

With respect to the percentage scanned, all sea POEs reported 100 percent scanning of high-risk cargo containers in 2019 or indicated that no high-risk containers passed through the POE.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(iii) Potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE

Definition

Potentially high-risk containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using NTC security criteria that are reviewed, assessed, or scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE.

The number of potentially high-risk containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE is an output metric that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ATS targeting system provides an assessment of the security of shipments, as defined by bills of lading, not individual containers. A large shipment may span several containers or conversely one container may contain many individual shipments. A container is considered potentially "high-risk" if even one shipment within it is designated as high-risk. A single container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it, which could cause the same container to be flagged for review or scanning multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

In 2018, a total of 14,757 potentially high-risk shipments arrived at U.S. POEs. One hundred percent of these shipments were reviewed, assessed, or scanned, including 4,602 shipments reviewed for NTC national security criteria upon arrival at the U.S. port, and 10,155 processed at the designated foreign ports of origin through the Container Security Initiative (CSI) agreement with host governments. Updated data were not available for this edition of this report.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(iv) Potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE

Definition

Potentially high-risk containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using NTC security criteria that are reviewed, assessed, or scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE.

The number of potentially high-risk containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE is an output metric that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. In OFO/CSI's unique scope of operations, officers target, mitigate, and examine high-risk Bills of Lading (BOLs). Subsequently, CSI collects data and reports key performance metrics in terms of BOLs, not containers. Current data sources that report on BOLs scanned also include records of BOLs reviewed or assessed.

Available Data and Discussion

In 2019, 104,000 high-risk BOLs were scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE, an increase of 27 percent from 2018 but 6 percent below the 2013 to 2018 average of 110,000.

Table 18.

High-Risk Bills of Lading Scanned Before Arrival at U.S. POE

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
103,999	117,453	126,223	113,326	117,453	81,397	103,670

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(d) Metrics for Securing the Maritime Border

§ 1092(d)(1)(A) Situational awareness in the maritime environment

Definition

Situational awareness – The NDAA calls for DHS to develop a metric for situational awareness based on "knowledge and understanding of current unlawful cross-border activity," including "(A) Threats and trends concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful crossings; (B) The ability to forecast future shifts in such threats and trends; (C) The ability to evaluate such threats and trends at a level sufficient to create actionable plans; and (D) The operational capability to conduct persistent and integrated surveillance of the international borders of the United States."[17]

Situational awareness is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

To improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of DHS aviation programs, the Department is developing the ability to analyze and report flight hour data consistently across components and assess the contribution of aviation activity to DHS missions. In 2019, DHS Headquarters conducted a "Flight Hour Study" of historical U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) data in accordance with the DHS Agency Reform Plan, a response to Executive Order 13781.[18] This is an ongoing and multi-year effort that the Department will continue to report on in future versions of this report.

In the interim, the Department reports on the following operational activity metrics contributing to maritime domain situational awareness:

- CBP Aircraft Hours Flown for Situational Awareness or Interdiction Support
- USCG Aircraft Hours Flown for Situational Awareness or Interdiction Support
- USCG Cutter Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- CBP Boat Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- USCG Boat Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- CBP Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) Radar Operating Hours
- Number of Vessel Manifests Screened by Coastwatch

From the onset of reporting flight hour metrics in the Border Security Metrics Report, AMO's methodology for reporting mission hours inside/outside the transit zone is as follows:

- Inside Transit Zone – CBP: All mission hours flown by maritime patrol aircraft (B350; DHC-8; P-3) in coordination with Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)
- Outside Transit Zone – CBP: All mission hours flown by maritime patrol aircraft (B350; DHC-8; P-3) in coordination with agencies other than JIATF-S

USCG revised its methodology for reporting mission hours inside/outside the transit zone in 2020.

Mission hours inside the transit zone are defined to include:

- All mission hours for JIATF-S;
- Drug interdiction hours for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 11, and Sector San Juan; and

[17] National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 § 1092(a)(7).

[18] Executive Order 13781 of March 13, 2017, Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch

- Migrant interdiction hours for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 8, District 11, Sector Jacksonville, Sector Key West, Sector Miami, Sector San Juan, Sector St. Petersburg, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, Sector San Diego, and Sector Corpus Christi.

Mission hours outside the transit zone are defined to include:

- All drug interdiction hours *other* than Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 11, and Sector San Juan; and
- Migrant Interdiction hours *other* than Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 8, District 11, Sector Jacksonville, Sector Key West, Sector Miami, Sector San Juan, Sector St. Petersburg, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, Sector San Diego, and Sector Corpus Christi.

Available Data and Discussion

In comparison to 2018, CBP aircraft hours in 2019 increased by 55 hours (1 percent) inside the transit zone and decreased by 5,900 hours (43 percent) outside the transit zone.

Table 19a.

CBP Aircraft Flight Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inside Transit Zone – CBP	6,420	6,273	6,528	6,583
Outside Transit Zone – CBP	13,188	12,422	17,576	11,711

Source: AMO.

The USCG reported 10,000 aircraft flight hours inside the transit zone in 2019 and 3,000 aircraft flight hours outside the transit zone. The breakdown of hours flown inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to previous years because of USCG's change to its reporting methodology.

Table 19b.

USCG Aircraft Flight Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2012 to 2019

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inside Transit Zone – USCG	15,623	14,358	14,150	15,086	13,891	12,398	11,288	10,290
Outside Transit Zone – USCG	2,591	2,135	2,754	3,719	3,409	2,117	2,322	2,658

Note: In 2020, USCG changed their methodology for reporting missions inside/outside the transit zone; see accompanying text.
Source: USCG.

The USCG reported 116,000 cutter underway hours inside the transit zone and 3,000 cutter underway hours outside the transit zone. The breakdown of hours inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to earlier years due to the changes in USCG's reporting methodology.

Table 20.

USCG Cutter Underway Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2012 to 2019

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inside Transit Zone	122,513	104,095	115,287	128,208	121,456	126,306	108,173	115,826
Outside Transit Zone	4,294	2,999	1,931	3,474	11,189	9,057	7,178	2,611

Source: USCG.

In 2019, CBP recorded 28 boat underway hours within the transit zone, up from zero the previous year. CBP's boat underway hours outside the transit zone totaled 33,000 hours in 2019, down 8 percent from 2018.

Table 21a.

CBP Boat Underway Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inside Transit Zone	0	9	0	28
Outside Transit Zone	40,241	34,451	36,110	33,287

Note: CBP maritime hours include AMO underway hours.
Source: AMO

The USCG reported 11,000 boat underway hours inside the transit zone in 2019 and 1,500 boat hours outside the transit zone. The breakdown of hours inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to earlier years due to the changes in USCG's reporting methodology.

Table 21b.

USCG Boat Underway Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2012 to 2019

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inside Transit Zone	10,977	16,599	11,116	12,631	11,008	9,557	8,928	11,472
Outside Transit Zone	6,014	6,617	4,551	3,520	3,137	2,949	2,884	1,549

Source: USCG.

CBP's AMO uses TARS to provide long-range detection of low-altitude aircraft and maritime traffic at the radar's maximum range. The elevated sensor mitigates curvature of the earth and terrain-masking limitations. Following hurricane damage in 2017, TARS hours remained lower than previous years, with about 3,200 surveillance hours from Cudjoe Key, FL in 2019 (up 32 percent from 2018 and down 45 percent from the 2012 to 2017 average) and about 5,400 hours from Lajas, PR in 2019 (up 159 percent from 2018 and down 16 percent from the 2014 to 2017 average).

Table 22.

Total Operational Hours for TARS Radars, FY 2012 to 2019

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Cudjoe Key, FL	5,752	6,289	6,165	6,306	4,886	5,728	2,448	3,239
Lajas, PR	0	0	12,301	5,049	4,559	3,922	2,105	5,449

Note: TARS site at Lajas, Puerto Rico crashed in 2011; CBP re-established operations in May 2014.
Source: CBP administrative records.

USCG Coastwatch screened about 114,000 vessel manifests for National Security Concerns in 2019, down 3 percent from 2018 and down 5 percent from the 2012 to 2018 average.

Table 23.

Vessel Manifests Screened by Coastwatch for National Security Concerns Prior to Arrival at U.S. POEs, FY 2012 to 2019

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
118,098	126,112	124,661	122,133	117,736	115,006	117,575	114,088

Source: USCG.

§ 1092(d)(1)(B) Known maritime migrant flow rate

Definition

Known maritime migrant flow – Total maritime migrant flow interdicted, identified directly or indirectly but not interdicted, or otherwise believed to have unlawfully entered the United States

Known maritime migrant interdiction rate – Total migrant interdictions in the maritime domain as a share of the known migrant flow.

Known maritime migrant flow is an outcome metric. Known maritime migrant interdiction rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Migrant flow data are obtained from USCG and CBP administrative records. The USCG maintains a robust accounting of USCG, international partner, and domestic partner interdictions and sightings of undocumented maritime migrants. The USCG relies upon its partners to report their interdictions to the USCG for compilation in the database. At times, undocumented maritime migrants are counted by both USCG and CBP (or other partners) when interdicted as agencies often cooperate during these operations. In certain limited cases undocumented maritime migrant interdictions by partners are not reported to the USCG, and these cases are not accounted for in the tables below. Additionally, while partners report cases to the USCG when undocumented maritime migrants are apprehended on shore or evidence is found of their arrival on shore, some migrants arrive without being apprehended and leave no evidence. These cases are never reported and are also excluded from the known maritime migrant flow figures below.

Total migrant interdiction data (i.e., interdictions by DHS and its international partners) are only available beginning in 2014; as a result, the known migrant interdiction rate is also limited to the years since 2014.

To improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of DHS aviation and marine programs, the Department will provide de-conflicted data when interdictions involve assets from multiple components in future versions of this report. The Department will also report metrics on coordinated operations. This may be coordinated through a working group already convened to validate maritime CBP seizure data.

Available Data and Discussion

Total interdictions and the known maritime flow increased in 2019, with interdictions rising 55 percent compared to the previous year to about 6,600 interdictions and the known flow increasing 20 percent to about 7,000 interdictions. At 86 percent, the interdiction effectiveness rate was above its previous 5-year average of 76 percent.

Table 24.

Migrants Interdictions in the Maritime Domain by DHS Component, Known Maritime Migrant Flow, and Known Maritime Migrant Interdiction Rate, FY 2010 to 2019

Fiscal Year	USCG	CBP	DHS and Partners	Known Migrant Flow	Interdiction Rate
2010	2,121	NA	NA	4,443	NA
2011	2,458	NA	NA	4,566	NA
2012	2,732	NA	NA	5,298	NA
2013	2,093	NA	NA	7,631	NA
2014	3,587	NA	7,752	10,631	72.9%
2015	3,825	NA	6,028	8,057	74.8%
2016	6,326	2,683	8,167	10,319	79.3%
2017	2,512	1,229	3,952	4,760	83.0%
2018	1,671	1,224	3,603	5,007	72.0%
2019	2,369	1,518	6,634	7,082	86.1%

Note: Some interdictions may be counted by both USCG and CBP as some migrant interdictions involve assets from both agencies. Interdictions by DHS and partners include international partners.
Source: USCG and CBP.

§ 1092(d)(1)(C) Illicit drugs removal rate

Definition

Illicit drugs removal rate – The ratio of illicit drugs removed by DHS maritime security in any year, including drugs abandoned at sea, relative to the average amount removed or abandoned in the immediately preceding 5 years.

The illicit drug removal rate is an output metric which compares trends in activity data over time.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug removals are obtained from USCG administrative records; these data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug removal rate directed by NDAA § 1092(d)(1)(C), the illicit drug removal rate describes recent trends in drugs removed or abandoned at sea (i.e., current year compared to previous 5 years); the metric does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are removed.

Non-commercial maritime drug removals include those seized by the USCG, CBP, other law enforcement agencies, and international partners as well as those disrupted or abandoned by drug trafficking organizations. At present, only USCG data are reported, but the Department has convened a work group to validate maritime CBP seizure data, which will be included in future versions of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

The illicit drug removal rate varies significantly by year and drug type. After four straight years of decreasing seizure totals, marijuana removals rose in 2019 to 29,000 kilograms, up 150 percent from 2018 but down 1 percent compared to the 2010 to 2018 average. Methamphetamine seizures rose to a record 274 kilograms, just exceeding the high of 273 kilograms in 2016. USCG removed 3.6 kilograms of heroin in 2018, down 91 percent from 2018 and down 78 percent from the 2010 to 2018 average.

Table 25.

Ratio of Drugs Removed or Abandoned at Sea Relative to Previous Five Fiscal Years (Illicit Drug Removal Rate), FY 2010 to 2019

Drug Type	Rate/Amt	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Marijuana	Rate	141%	127%	337%	137%	154%	100%	61%	32%	36%	108%
	Kg removed	16,662	17,799	56,511	36,745	49,231	35,499	23,865	12,743	11,434	28,704
Methamphetamine	Rate	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	75%	8,110%	291%	0%	300%
	Kg removed	0	0	0	0	14.6	2.2	272.5	168.5	0.04	274.4
Heroin	Rate	0%	72%	381%	157%	0%	578%	225%	351%	209%	14%
	Kg removed	0	1.8	10.9	7.9	0	23.8	20.0	44.0	40.0	3.6

Note: Data only include removals by USCG. OIS defines the methamphetamine illicit drug removal rate for 2014 to be 100 percent on the basis of average seizures equaling zero for the previous 5 years.
Source: OIS analysis of USCG data.

§ 1092(d)(1)(D) Cocaine removal effectiveness rate

Definition

Cocaine removal effectiveness rate – The amount of cocaine removed by DHS inside and outside the maritime transit zone compared to total estimated flow of cocaine through the maritime domain.

Cocaine removals is an output metric. Removals may also be used as a proxy indicator of total attempts to import cocaine, an outcome metric. Cocaine removal effectiveness rate (i.e., cocaine seized as compared to the total estimated cocaine flow) is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug removal data obtained from the JIATF-S and USCG administrative records through the Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB) are considered reliable. Flow quantities provided by the DIA are considered the best estimates available based on intelligence reporting and case data.[19] Additionally, while other government estimates for production in major cocaine-producing countries in South America and consumption of cocaine within the United States do not align with the estimated non-commercial maritime flow figures inside the transit zone derived from the CCDB, this metric was derived based upon the non-commercial maritime flow estimates.

For the purposes of this metric, based upon where the data were gathered, the transit zone is defined by the JIATF-S area of responsibility. Non-commercial maritime drug removals include those seized by USCG and other law enforcement agencies, and international partners, as well as those disrupted by anti-drug trafficking operations. The cocaine removal rate is based on estimates of non-commercial maritime cocaine flow from the CCDB. Outside the transit zone data are not considered as robust about intelligence on flow. As a result, the interdiction rate for cocaine outside the transit zone is not considered reliable.

The Department has convened a work group to validate maritime CBP seizure data, which will be included in future versions of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 26 summarizes available data on cocaine removed by DHS for 2012 to 2019.

Table 26.

Cocaine Removed by DHS Relative to the Total Estimated Flow in the Maritime Transit Zone, FY 2012 to 2019

Location	Type	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inside Transit Zone	Rate	23%	14%	14%	20%	14%	14%	12%	16%
	Kg removed	207,300	182,100	154,600	266,200	409,300	417,200	363,800	361,400
	Estimated Flow	893,600	1,334,500	1,081,900	1,358,700	2,940,700	2,882,100	3,036,100	2,238,600
Outside Transit Zone	Rate	49%	19%	50%	73%	28%	NA	NA	NA
	Kg removed	21,300	15,100	13,200	39,000	17,700	NA	NA	NA
	Estimated Flow	43,800	81,500	26,200	53,200	62,300	NA	NA	NA

Note: Derived from Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB). Estimated flow (primary cocaine movement) in the transit zone is measured in kilograms, and includes commercial and non-commercial air, land, and maritime (all certainties). Data are limited to USCG removals and data are not available for removals or estimate flow outside the transit zone after 2016.
Source: The Interdiction Committee (TIC) via CCDB.

Documented non-commercial maritime cocaine flow in the transit zone increased significantly in 2016 to over 2.9 million kilograms, more than double the 1.4 million kilograms in 2015. Peace talks between the Government of Colombia and various insurgent groups in 2016 resulted in reductions or cessations of coca eradication efforts in Colombia. The reduced eradication efforts enabled a surge in cocaine production and subsequent maritime flow throughout the transit zone. Documented cocaine flow remained at heightened levels through 2019 through there was a relative decrease in documented non-commercial maritime cocaine flow to 2.2 million kilograms in 2019. The decrease was due in part to a reduction in awareness coupled with increased interagency collaboration and intelligence fusion successes that decreased the risk of inadvertently double counting events.

[19] Previous versions of this report included estimates of total cocaine flow provided by ONDCP.

Figure 5.

Flow and Removal of Cocaine in the Maritime Transit Zone, FY 2012 to 2019



Note: Partner nation cocaine removals are partner-nation-only seizures and losses in the transit zone (primary and subsequent movement).
Source: TIC via CCDB.

§ 1092(d)(1)(E) DHS maritime threat response rate

Definition

DHS maritime threat response rate – The ability of DHS maritime security components to respond to and resolve known maritime threats, whether inside or outside a transit zone, by placing assets on-scene, relative to the total number of known threats.

Methodology and Limitations

Currently, these data only exist for threats associated with cocaine response activity. Further, DHS data are part of a larger set of interagency data and may not be able to be separated from the larger interagency dataset, which is currently assessed and reconciled on a cycle and process outside of DHS that does not support submission at this time. DHS, in cooperation with interagency partners, is exploring options to collect response data for non-cocaine response events, as well as options to provide the response rate measures data to meet the intent of the NDAA. This working group plans to have a metric available for subsequent versions of this report.

§ 1092(d)(1)(F) Intergovernmental maritime threat response rate

Definition

Intergovernmental maritime threat response rate – The ability of DHS maritime security components or other U.S. Government entities to respond to and resolve known maritime threats, whether inside or outside a transit zone, relative to the total number of known threats.

Methodology and Limitations

Currently, these data only exist for threats associated with cocaine response activity. Further, DHS data are part of a larger set of interagency data and may not be able to be separated from the larger interagency dataset, which is currently

assessed and reconciled on a cycle and process outside of DHS that does not support submission at this time. In cooperation with interagency partners, DHS is exploring options to collect response data for non-cocaine response events, as well as options to provide the response rate measures data to meet the intent of the NDAA. This working group plans to have a metric available for subsequent versions of this report.

§ 1092(e) Air and Marine Security Metrics in the Land Domain

§ 1092(e)(1)(A) Flight hour effectiveness rate

Definition

Flight hour effectiveness rate in the land domain – Number of flight hours flown by CBP AMO in the land domain as a percentage of AMO's unconstrained flight hour requirements.

Flight hour effectiveness rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

The flight hour effectiveness rate is determined by dividing the total hours flown by the number of flight hour requirements determined during the annual collection process. The flight hour requirements for the subsequent year are collected by CBP AMO operating locations based on unconstrained requirements collected from USBP, ICE, and other partner agencies, as well as internal CBP AMO requirements.

The AMO unconstrained flight hour requirement is not a validated DHS metric.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO flew about 75,000 hours in the land domain in 2019, a drop of 3,700 hours from the 2016 to 2018 average. This figure represented a drop of one percentage point in the flight hour effectiveness rate from 2018.

Table 27.

Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Unconstrained Flight Hour Requirement	295,225	242,185	284,644	284,644
Hours Flown	79,872	78,066	78,226	74,552
Unconstrained Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate	27%	32%	27%	26%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(B) Funded flight hour effectiveness rate

Definition

Funded flight hour effectiveness rate – Number of flight hours flown by AMO as a percentage of the number of flight hours funded by Congress.

Funded flight hour effectiveness rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Flight hour data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The funded flight hour effectiveness rate is determined by dividing the total hours flown by the number of flight hours funded by Congress.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO's funded flight hour effectiveness rate was slightly over 100 percent for each year 2016 to 2019.

Table 28.

Funded Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Hours flown	79,872	78,066	78,226	74,552
Hours funded	79,774	77,769	77,111	74,174
Effectiveness rate	100%	100%	101%	101%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(C) AMO readiness rate

Definition

AMO readiness rate – The percentage of mission requests that AMO was able to fulfill, excluding those requests that could not be fulfilled for reasons beyond AMO's control.

AMO readiness rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Mission data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The rate is determined by dividing the missions flown by the total number of mission requests minus missions cancelled for weather-related reasons and other factors beyond AMO control.

AMO's readiness rate was 83 percent in 2019, with about 6,300 out of 37,000 in-scope missions cancelled due to causes within AMO control. The 2019 rate was equal to the 2018 rate.

Table 29.

AMO Missions Cancelled and Readiness Rate, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total missions requested by partner agencies	42,761	41,944	45,684	42,933
Missions not cancelled for reasons beyond AMO control	38,081	37,626	41,701	36,632
Missions cancelled within AMO control	6,716	7,308	7,029	6,301
Missions cancelled – asset availability	4,978	4,496	3,757	2,942
Missions cancelled – crew availability	1,738	2,812	3,272	3,359
Readiness rate due to causes within AMO control	82%	81%	83%	83%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(D) AMO weather-related cancellation rate

Definition

AMO weather-related cancelation rate – The number of missions cancelled by AMO due to weather as a percentage of total planned AMO missions.

AMO weather-related cancelation rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Mission data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The weather-related cancelation rate is calculated by dividing the number of missions cancelled due to weather by the total number of missions requested by AMO's partner agencies.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO was forced to cancel about 2,900 missions in 2019 due to weather out of about 43,000 total missions requested by partner agencies. This resulted in a weather-related cancellation rate of 7 percent, up one percentage point from the 2018 rate and equal to the 2016 and 2017 rates.

Table 30.

AMO Weather-Related Cancellation Rate, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total missions requested by partner agencies	42,761	41,944	45,684	42,933
Missions cancelled – weather	3,083	3,122	2,930	2,892
Cancellation rate due to weather	7%	7%	6%	7%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(E) AMO individuals detected

Definition

AMO individuals detected – Number of individuals detected by CBP AMO with unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO individuals detected is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The Department's currently available data on detections by unmanned aircraft are limited to the number of Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) detections, and current data on detections from manned aircraft are limited to detections leading to apprehensions and arrests.

These data exclude certain detections because AMO does not presently track data from all sensors on unmanned and manned aircraft. For this reason, the Department considers the current AMO individuals detected metric to be a work in progress and expects to provide more comprehensive data on AMO detections as part of subsequent reports.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO detected about 51,000 individuals via manned aircraft and 18,000 individuals via unmanned aircraft in 2019. Total detections in 2019 were up 11 percent compared to the years 2016 to 2018, while the unmanned aircraft accounted for a much larger share of total detections (26 percent in 2019 versus 13 percent in 2016).

Table 31.

Individuals Detected by AMO by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 to 2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Manned	54,879	35,374	41,061	51,219
Unmanned	7,908	10,711	18,081	18,169
Total	62,787	46,085	59,142	69,388

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(F) AMO apprehensions assisted

Definition

AMO apprehensions assisted – USBP apprehensions assisted by AMO using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO apprehensions assisted is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The metric consists of AMO enforcement flight hours and arrests that are attributed to manned and unmanned aircraft operations. These data are based on Aircraft Enforcement Hours (non-maritime), therefore excluding DHC-8, P-3, and Maritime Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) operations occurring in the maritime domain.

Available Data and Discussion

In 2019, AMO flew 54,000 manned enforcement flight hours that assisted in the apprehension of about 44,000 individuals, and 7,200 unmanned enforcement flight hours that assisted in the apprehension of 6,000 individuals. The number of flight hours were roughly unchanged from 2018, while the number of apprehensions were up 11 percent in the case of the manned flights and down 4 percent in the case of the unmanned flights.

Table 32.

AMO Enforcement Flight Hours and Apprehensions Assisted by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 to 2019

Description	2016		2017		2018		2019	
	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions
Manned	64,639	50,646	55,572	32,872	55,541	39,548	53,591	44,022
Unmanned	4,857	1,729	6,771	2,362	6,852	6,314	7,178	6,030
Total	69,496	50,646	62,343	35,234	62,393	45,862	60,769	50,052

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(G) Illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO

Definition

Illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO – The number and quantity of illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

Illegal drug seizures assisted is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug seizure data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The metric consists of the total number of events and quantity in pounds of drug seizures using manned and unmanned systems. A "drug event" is defined as a single law enforcement action resulting in a drug seizure(s). These data are based on non-maritime enforcement flight hours and therefore exclude DHC-8, P-3, and MEA operations occurring in the maritime domain.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO flew about 54,000 manned enforcement flight hours and 7,200 unmanned hours in 2019, similar to the hours flown in 2018. The manned flight hours resulted in less than half the number of drug events in 2019 as those observed in 2018 (700 in 2019 versus 1,600 in 2018) and less than half the number of drug seizures (103,000 kilograms in 2019

versus 221,000 kilograms in 2018). The unmanned flight hours resulted in less than a third of the number of drug events in 2019 than in 2018 (26 in 2019 versus 85 in 2018), and a reduction in drug seizures (2,000 kilograms, down from the 2016 to 2018 average of 16,000 kilograms).

Table 33.

AMO Enforcement Flight Hours, Illicit Drug Events, and Drug Seizures by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 to 2019

Description	2016			2017			2018			2019		
	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)
Manned	64,639	3,834	295,633	55,572	1,649	143,737	55,541	1,612	204,645	53,591	723	100,879
Unmanned	4,857	78	13,623	6,771	108	18,874	6,852	85	16,375	7,178	26	1,978
Total	69,496	3,912	309,256	62,343	1,757	162,611	62,393	1,697	221,021	60,769	748	102,857

Note: Data are limited to non-maritime enforcement flight hours.
Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(H) AMO actionable intelligence

Definition

AMO actionable intelligence – The number of times that actionable intelligence related to border security was obtained using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO is in the process of creating a dashboard of historic data on sensor surveillance to help inform measure development.

§ 1092(g)(3)(D) Other appropriate information

Pursuant to NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D), this section provides three additional metrics of border security between POEs: 1) selected characteristics of USBP apprehensions; 2) the estimated at-the-border deterrence rate; and 3) estimated border crossing costs.

Selected Characteristics of Recent USBP Apprehensions

Definition

Historically, most individuals apprehended between POEs along the Southwest Border have been Mexican adults, and very few of them have sought asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief from removal. In recent years, the profile of USBP apprehensions has changed in important ways, as growing shares of individuals apprehended are: 1) from countries other than Mexico (primarily the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), 2) UCs or children and adults traveling together as FMs, and/or 3) seeking asylum or other forms of protection from removal by claiming fear of removal to their countries of citizenship.

These shifting characteristics have an important impact on border security and USBP border enforcement because existing enforcement policies were largely designed with the more traditional noncitizen profile in mind. For example, many consequences under CBP's Consequence Delivery Program such as the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program are only applicable to Mexican nationals. And UCs, FMs, and noncitizens found to have a credible fear generally cannot be expeditiously removed and have been considered "not impactable" by traditional USBP enforcement efforts because upon apprehension they have typically been released into the United States with a Notice to Appear in immigration court on a future date. More generally, the drivers of migration from countries other than Mexico and for noncitizens who may seek humanitarian relief or protection from removal may be different from those that motivated earlier generations of unlawful border crossers, potentially causing U.S. policymakers to rethink their policy response.

To monitor these changing dynamics, the Department tracks two main sets of characteristics:

- *Apprehensions by citizenship* – The share of noncitizens apprehended by USBP from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and all other countries.

- *Apprehensions by "non-impactable noncitizens"* – The share of noncitizens who are UCs from countries other than Mexico or Canada, FMs, express a fear of being returned to their home countries (asylum seekers), or are Cubans arriving by land prior to January 2017 under the wet foot/dry foot policy. These groups of noncitizens are considered non-impactable for purposes of the Department's model-based estimate of illegal entries because they have generally been exempted from many of the policy responses CBP undertakes at the border to prevent illegal entries and deter repeat migration attempts, including most administrative forms of removal.[20] (Appendix A.)

Apprehensions is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. Apprehensions by citizenship, UC status, and FM status are generally considered reliable, though agents may not always be able to accurately identify UCs or FMs.

Available Data and Discussion

In recent years, the demographics of apprehensions have started to shift from consisting overwhelmingly of Mexican nationals to a growing share of border crossers from other areas, mostly Northern Triangle countries. As recently as 2009, Mexicans accounted for 92 percent of Southwest Border apprehensions. Their share fell below 50 percent for the first time ever in 2014, remained below 50 percent in each of the 4 years 2016 to 2019, and fell to an all-time low of 20 percent in 2019. This shift has been driven both by a sharp drop in Mexican apprehensions, which fell to a more than 50-year low in 2017 (128,000) before rebounding to 152,000 in 2018—still down 69 percent over the last decade—and by large increases in apprehensions of Salvadorans (up 700 percent since 2009), Guatemalans (up 1,770 percent since 2009), Hondurans (up 1,800 percent since 2009), and all other nationals (up 1,065 percent since 2009).

Table 34.

USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by Citizenship, FY 2010 to 2019

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Mexico	396,819	280,580	262,341	265,409	226,771	186,017	190,760	127,938	152,257	166,458
El Salvador	13,123	10,368	21,903	36,957	66,419	43,392	71,848	49,760	31,369	89,811
Guatemala	16,831	17,582	34,453	54,143	80,473	56,691	74,601	65,871	115,722	264,168
Honduras	12,231	11,270	30,349	46,448	90,968	33,445	52,952	47,260	76,513	253,795
All Other	8,727	7,777	7,827	11,440	14,740	11,788	18,709	13,087	20,718	77,276
Total	**447,731**	**327,577**	**356,873**	**414,397**	**479,371**	**331,333**	**408,870**	**303,916**	**396,579**	**851,508**

Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

Along with the shift from Mexico to Northern Triangle countries, the other noteworthy trend in Southwest Border apprehensions has been the rising share of noncitizens with potential humanitarian claims who are therefore considered non-impactable by traditional border enforcement policies. Specifically, the number of noncitizens apprehended by USBP

[20] The Trump administration took a number of steps broadly designed to deter the three main groups of "non-impactable" noncitizens, including by imposing limits on when and where noncitizens arriving at the Southwest Border may apply for asylum, expanding family detention, adopting "zero tolerance" policies to increase border prosecutions (at one point resulting in a large number of family separations), imposing limits on UCs' ability to be reunified with family members in the United States, and requiring certain noncitizens to remain in Mexico during the pendency of their asylum proceedings. Despite these policies, OIS has found that majorities of asylum seekers, FMs, and UCs apprehended at the Southwest Border in 2017 to 2019 remained in the United States in unresolved status as of March 31, 2020. See Marc Rosenblum and Hongwei Zhang, "FY 2020 Enforcement Lifecycle Report," DHS, December 2020.

and eventually making fear claims (i.e., initiating the credible fear process or filing an asylum application) increased from 36,000 in 2013 (9 percent of that year's apprehensions) to 90,000 in 2019 (11 percent of apprehensions, and an increase of 153 percent in 6 years). The number of UCs increased 96 percent from 2013 to 2019, while their share of all apprehensions grew from 9 percent to a peak of 15 percent in 2016 before falling to 9 percent in 2019. The number of FMs increased 3,560 percent between 2013 (the first year for which data are available) and 2019, while their share of apprehensions grew from 3 to 56 percent.

Table 35.

USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by Non-Impactable Status, FY 2013 to 2019

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Non-Impactables	60,511	149,944	92,284	163,222	137,876	188,412	597,551
Fear Claims	35,662	47,607	39,237	79,554	56,356	78,668	90,272
UC	38,759	68,541	39,970	59,692	41,435	50,036	76,020
FM	12,940	67,060	39,838	77,674	75,622	107,212	473,682
Cuban	73	98	106	78	32	NA	NA
Total Apprehensions	**414,397**	**479,371**	**331,333**	**408,870**	**303,916**	**396,579**	**851,508**

Note: Table rows are not mutually exclusive categories; individuals may be counted as FM/UC as well as Cuban and/or fear claimants.
Source: OIS Statistical Immigration Data.

At-the-Border Deterrence

Definition

Deterrence – The estimated share of noncitizens who, following a failed unlawful entry attempt, are deterred from making a subsequent reentry and decide instead to return home or otherwise remain in Mexico.

The deterrence rate is an output metric associated with the difficulty of crossing the border unlawfully because it reflects decisions by people who had already decided to migrate illegally to abandon their effort.

Methodology and Limitations

As with the apprehension or interdiction rate, deterrence cannot be observed directly.

DHS currently estimates deterrence based on migrant surveys; the Department believes surveys or interviews are one of the only ways to directly measure deportees' intentions to make a further illegal entry attempt. The most important survey data on deterrence comes from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte International Border Survey (EMIF, by its Spanish acronym), which interviews deportees immediately at repatriation facilities upon their removal to Mexico and asks them about their intentions to return to the United States. The EMIF survey has asked deportees about their intention to attempt another trip to the United States within the next 7 days each year since 1993 and began asking migrants about their intention to attempt another trip within the next 90 days in 2012.

While the EMIF survey is well respected, the survey is not weighted to match the actual population of Mexican deportees or to account for the enforcement consequences they are subjected to. Thus, in its work for DHS to develop a model-based apprehension rate and estimate of successful illegal entries, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Corporation used a combination of EMIF and CBP data to build a regression model of 90-day deterrence for all USBP apprehensions since 2000 that accounts for relevant characteristics of Mexican deportees.[21] IDA's model for the years 2000–2007 (i.e., before CBP's implementation of the CDS) focuses exclusively on deportees' demographic characteristics, and its model for 2008 forward also incorporates data on noncitizens' enforcement histories and anticipated future consequences.

[21] John W. Bailey et al., "Assessing Southern Border Security," Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper NS P-5304, May 2016.

In addition to the standard concerns about the validity of survey samples and survey instruments, questions about deterrence are especially hard to measure accurately given the ever-evolving enforcement environment. In particular, the survey measures deportees' intention to make a further entry attempt or not at the time of their repatriation, but an unknown portion of those who indicate that they will try again may in fact be deterred before making another entry attempt (and vice versa). A further limitation is that the EMIF data are restricted to Mexican Northern Border deportees and cannot be assumed to apply to migrants from other regions/countries because they face different trade-offs and geographic barriers when considering a re-entry attempt.

Available Data and Discussion

The EMIF survey data describe relatively limited deterrence levels prior to 2007 (20-40 percent in responses to the 7-day survey question), and substantial growth in the deterrence rate since that time. According to EMIF's survey results, more than 75 percent of respondents in each year since 2012 have indicated they will not attempt to re-enter within 7 days, and more than 50 percent have indicated they will not attempt re-entry within 90 days, including all-time high proportions of 81 percent in 2018 and 82 percent in 2019 (Figure 6).

Figure 6.

EMIF Survey Data on at-the-Border-Deterrence for Mexican Deportees, 1993 to 2019



Note: Data are for calendar years.

Source: OIS analysis of Colegio de la Frontera Norte EMIF data.

Figure 7 depicts IDA's regression model of deterrence that accounts for migrant characteristics and enforcement consequences. OIS updated the IDA regression model for the years 2012 to 2019 to incorporate EMIF 90-day survey data. Starting in the 2019 version of this report, OIS used the upper and lower bounds of the regression model's predicted values to construct a 95 percent confidence interval around the estimated deterrence rate for the years for which an updated regression model is available (i.e., for 2012 to 2019). Overall, regression model predicts 90-day deterrence rates of 11–25 percent for the years 2000 to 2010, climbing to a high of 68 percent in 2018 and 67 percent in 2019. The 95 percent confidence interval consistently describes a range of three to five percentage points (i.e., plus or minus 1.5–2.5 percent on either side of the estimated deterrence rate).

Figure 7.

Model-Based 90-Day Deterrence Model, FY 2000 to 2019



Source: OIS analysis of DHS Repeated Trials Model.

Border Crossing Costs

Definition

Percent hiring smuggler – The share of migrants who hire a smuggler.

Border crossing costs – The average fees that smugglers charge.

Smuggling usage and average smuggling fees are output metrics associated with the difficulty of crossing the border unlawfully. It is likely that migrants will only tolerate higher fees to the extent that smugglers provide an essential and successful service. Smugglers often also compete to attract customers by offering their services at the lowest profitable rate, so higher fees typically indicate rising costs to smugglers. Rising smuggling fees also often reflect an increased risk to smugglers of a criminal conviction; smugglers usually pass this risk along to customers in the form of higher fees.

Methodology and Limitations

The only available data on smuggling fees come from migrant surveys and USBP custodial interviews. These data may be subject to response bias if migrants are reluctant to admit to hiring a smuggler, but such bias is likely to be broadly consistent over time, so changes in survey/interview data should reflect changes in the difficulty of crossing the border.

Available Data and Discussion

One finding across multiple surveys is that smuggler usage rates have increased steadily over the last 5 decades. Previous research by OIS found that smuggler usage rates climbed from 40-50 percent during the 1970s, to 59 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 70-80 percent in the 1980s to 1990s, 80 to 93 percent in the 1990s to 2000s, and 95 percent for first-time crossers surveyed in 2006. Similarly, USBP interviews indicate that 80-95 percent of illegal border crossers hired a smuggler in recent years, a pattern partly driven by transnational criminal organizations' (TCOs) control of crossing points along the Mexican side of the border.

Figure 8.

Border Crossing Cost Estimates, FY 2000 to 2019



Note: EMIF discontinued its question on smuggler fees in the "from North" and "from South" survey module in 2018. There are slight methodology differences between the four categories, but all categories have been inflation-adjusted to FY 2019 dollars. Estimates for 2000 to 2018 update previously reported estimates due to a recent re-running of the EMIF model with this inflation adjustment.

Source: USBP apprehension records, EMIF.

Survey results also indicate steady increases in fees paid to migrant smugglers. Averaging across the available sources depicted in Figure 8 and additional data from the Mexican Migration Project,[22] smuggling fees increased by 5 percent per year during the 1980s, 1 percent per year during the 1990s, 5 percent per year during the 2000s, and 12 percent per year during the 2010s—though USBP data indicate a 15 percent drop between 2018 and 2019.

These numeric trends may understate the actual increase in border crossing costs during the 2010s. Custodial interviews conducted by subject matter experts within CBP have found that smuggling fees are often paid in stages. The range of smuggling fees also differs greatly depending on tactics and procedures utilized by TCOs in various border crossing locations. Initial fees required to approach staging locations along the border were often lower than $100 prior to the late 2000s, and an additional $1,000-$3,000 in fees were charged upon delivery to the destination. More recently, smuggling fees for Mexicans and Central Americans reportedly have increased partially due to enhanced security measures in Mexico; fees have been as high as $1,300 for the initial staging payment and up to $12,000 at the destination. Custodial interviews also find evidence of an increase in alternative forms of payment in exchange for passage, including migrants being required to participate in smuggling controlled substances or other illicit items across the border or to work off debts upon arrival in the United States, as well as reports of harsh negotiations concerning payment plans with family members.

[22] The Mexican Migration Project, mmp.opr.princeton.edu

IV. CONCLUSION

DHS recognizes that its ability to accurately measure its border security outcomes, outputs, activities, and inputs is essential to the effective and efficient management of the Department. The metrics contained in this report are the baseline that DHS uses to measure its progress towards meeting the border security mission. As such, the Department will continue to refine these metrics through internal and external engagement and collaboration, including with Congress. DHS looks forward to updating Congress on this progress through periodic briefings and formally with the submission of future BSMRs.

Appendix A – Repeated Trials Model Methodology

The Department's current model-based estimates of the apprehension rate, total number of successful unlawful entries, and related metrics such as undetected unlawful entries, build on research conducted for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) based on long-standing social science research on the Repeated Trials Methodology (RTM).[23] The Department views some of IDA's assumptions as problematic and continues to work to validate and refine the modeling methodology, as discussed below.

The Institute for Defense Analyses RTM Methodology

Based on IDA's work for DHS, the primary building block for the model-based apprehension rate and total estimated successful unlawful entries is an estimated apprehension rate for a particular subset of border crossers that DHS refers to as a partial apprehension rate (PAR). The approach focuses on illegal border crossers who are apprehended and removed to the Mexican border and who make a subsequent re-entry attempt. The logic of the PAR is to use Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol's (USBP) biometric data to assess what share of migrants who make repeated entry attempts is subsequently re-apprehended.

The PAR methodology consists of three main steps (Figure A1). First, the model identifies a subset of illegal border crossers who are candidates to attempt re-entry, the RTM population. Under IDA's methodology, this group excludes all non-Mexicans, those removed to the Mexican interior or remotely through the Alien Transfer Exit Program, noncitizens who have ever requested asylum, those facing criminal charges, and children under 18 years old.

Figure A1.

Partial Apprehension Rate Methodology



Source: OIS adaptation of Bailey et al. 2016.

[23] For a full discussion of IDA's model-based estimate, see John W. Bailey et al., "Assessing Southern Border Security," Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper NS P-5304, May 2016. Also see Thomas J. Espenshade, "Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Frontier," *International Migration Review* (1995): 545-565; Joseph Chang, "CBP Apprehensions at the Border," Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, 2006.

The second step in calculating the PAR is to distinguish between deportees who return home or otherwise remain in Mexico versus those who attempt to re-enter the United States. IDA estimates this share based on the survey of recent deportees in the Colegio de la Frontera Norte International Border Survey (EMIF, by its Spanish acronym), as discussed above (see NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information, At-the-Border Deterrence).

Third, by definition, the RTM model assumes deportees who are not deterred following an apprehension always make a subsequent reentry attempt. Thus, by observing in DHS administrative records how many migrants from the RTM population are re-apprehended, the model infers the number that successfully re-enters. The ratio of re-apprehensions to successful re-entries is used to estimate the PAR.

The PAR model confronts important limitations at each point in the modeling process. The most notable and challenging to overcome is the assumption of the RTM that subjects who are not deterred will always attempt re-entry until successful. One problem with this assumption is the lack of reliable data on who is deterred. IDA relies primarily on the EMIF survey (modified to better reflect the demographic characteristics and enforcement histories of the actual RTM population) to estimate the deterrence rate. While the EMIF is widely recognized as one of the best migrant surveys available, its results are still dependent on the characteristics of the sample, the quality of the survey instrument, and the honesty of the respondents. More fundamentally, the EMIF survey asks recent deportees about their *intentions* to re-enter the United States, and it therefore does not take account of shifting border enforcement efforts, potential changes in behavior by individuals who have been exposed to consequence programs, or other deterrent factors along the border. The structure of the RTM model means that any resulting undercount in the estimate of the deterred population results in a downward bias in the PAR.

Second, the RTM population represents a shrinking share of Southwest Border apprehensions. Mexican adults quickly deported to the nearest border accounted for about 95 percent of apprehensions when the RTM methodology was developed in the 1990s. But changes in the composition of border flows (i.e., rising numbers of Central Americans and asylum seekers); changes in CBP's enforcement strategy to emphasize criminal charges, lateral repatriation, and other enforcement consequences; and IDA's restrictive modeling choices mean that only about 20 percent of Southwest Border apprehensions are used to estimate the PAR in recent years. In addition, because the RTM sample excludes noncitizens who are more likely to surrender to USBP (i.e., noncitizens with a higher apprehension rate), the PAR is biased downwards as an indicator of the overall apprehension rate; this bias may be substantial given the number of noncitizens excluded from the RTM sample.

Third, IDA makes somewhat restrictive assumptions about which re-apprehensions to include in the final stage of the PAR calculation. In particular, IDA excludes apprehensions occurring at check points and other remote locations and those occurring more than 4 days after an illegal entry. Given USBP's defense-in-depth strategy, which places resources at and across the border, these assumptions result in a slight further downward bias in the PAR.

Refinements to IDA's Model-Based Estimate and Impacts on Reported Metrics

Despite these limitations, the Department views the RTM methodology as a promising approach to estimating an apprehension rate that takes great advantage of USBP's collection of biometric data since 2000. In implementing the RTM methodology to produce reportable metrics, the Department made refinements to IDA's approach in each of the three Border Security Metrics Reports (BSMRs) for 2017 to 2019. These refinements had modest impacts on certain reported metrics, and certain metrics were further affected by the inclusion of updated historical data. No substantive updates were made to the RTM methodology for the 2020 BSMR, but the Department continues to update historic removal and return data, which results in modest changes to previous estimates of the PAR and of the number of illegal entries as explained below.

DHS made two refinements to IDA's approach to estimating the PAR when preparing metrics for the 2017 BSMR. First, the Department included a broader set of Mexican deportees in its definition of the RTM sample included in the calculation of the PAR: IDA's sample was defined to include Mexicans 18 and older repatriated to the border who had not been detained in the United States, who had never claimed asylum, and who had not been identified as suspected smugglers; the Department expanded the definition of the RTM sample by excluding only those noncitizens who claimed asylum with USBP and by including Cubans apprehended after January 2017, at which point the wet foot/dry foot policy

was terminated. Second, while IDA only counted apprehensions occurring in the immediate border region within 4 days of a migrant's illegal entry in its calculation of the re-apprehension rate, the Department also included apprehensions at CBP checkpoints and elsewhere in the border region occurring within 30 days of an illegal entry. As a result of the changes to the RTM sample, the deterrence rate shifted for most years, leading to adjustments in the PAR for all prior years as well. Depending on the year, these adjustments may have increased or decreased the PAR, largely depending on the change in deterrence.

The Department made one additional change to IDA's approach when preparing the 2018 BSMR, in this case by refining the methodology for using the PAR to estimate total illegal entries. IDA's model of total illegal entries assumes that non-impactable noncitizens present themselves to border enforcement agents (and therefore have a 100 percent apprehension rate), and that all impactable noncitizens are apprehended at the same rate as the RTM population (i.e., at the PAR). Thus, the estimated number of total illegal entries is the product of the number of impactable noncitizens apprehended times the PAR-derived odds of successful entry. In producing the 2018 BSMR, the Department discovered that the software code provided by IDA and used to produce the 2017 estimates mistakenly calculated the estimated total number of illegal entries as the product of the *RTM population* and the PAR-derived odds of successful entry. The Department corrected that error for the 2018 report, resulting in an upwards-revision of historical estimates of the number of illegal entries.

In addition to this methodological change, the Department also included updated data in the 2018 BSMR that resulted in an upwards revision of recent historical PAR estimates. First, the Department included the most current removal and return data from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Because recent ICE data include certain repatriations occurring in previous years, this updated information increases the number of USBP apprehensions identified as re-apprehensions, raising the PAR. Second, the Department also identified certain additional noncitizens as suspected smugglers. Eliminating these frequent border crossers from the RTM population reduces the number of re-apprehensions and has a modest downward effect on the PAR. Third, the Department included updated EMIF data in calculating the estimated deterrence rate; these updates resulted in modest increases in the estimated deterrence rate and therefore an upward adjustment in the PAR.

In preparing the 2019 BSMR, OIS updated IDA's regression model of the 90-day deterrence rate as described above, a change which resulted in slight downward revisions to the PAR (see NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other appropriate information, At-the-Border Deterrence).

The most noteworthy improvements to the 2019 BSMR were the addition of a confidence interval around the PAR and a sensitivity analysis to estimate how three core assumptions of the RTM model affect the Department's estimates of the model-based apprehension rate and of successful illegal entries. These improvements were maintained in this 2020 report.

As Figure A2 indicates, the 95 percent confidence interval around the PAR ranged from a low of plus or minus three percentage points in 2012 to 2014 and in 2018 to a high of plus or minus six percentage points in 2016, the year in which the estimated PAR peaked at 0.70.

Figure A2.

Partial Apprehension Rate, FY 2000 to 2019



Note: Estimates for 2000 to 2018 update previously reported estimates due to both updating the PAR model and ICE removal and return data lag. In preparing this report, OIS once again updated ICE removal and return data with the latest available information.
Source: OIS Repeated Trials Model.

Table A1 describes the sensitivity of the 2019 model-based apprehension rate reported in Table 1 and the estimated undetected unlawful entries depicted in Figure 2. The first panel relaxes the assumption about RTM deterrence. The middle row of the panel (in gray) depicts the baseline model based on the deterrence rate predicted by the 90-day regression model (.67), and the other rows of the panel allow the deterrence rate to fluctuate by up to four percentage points in either direction. Given the assumptions of the RTM model, these changes in the deterrence rate have a large impact on the RTM population apprehension rate (i.e., the PAR), which translates into substantial changes in the total model-based apprehension rate and estimated successful illegal entries. Assuming the regression model overestimates deterrence by four percentage points causes the total apprehension rate to fall to 82 percent and total successful illegal entries to increase by 39 percent to 188,000 people; assuming the regression model under-estimates deterrence by four percentage points causes the total apprehension rate to increase to 91 percent and total successful illegal entries to fall 39 percent to 82,000 people.

Table A1.

Univariate Sensitivity Analysis of RTM Model Assumptions

Assumption	Alternative Assumptions	Model-Based Apprehension Rate	Estimated Successful Illegal Entries
RTM noncitizens deterred as predicted by 90-day regression model	0.63	82%	187,625
	0.65	84%	161,205
	0.67	86%	134,786
	0.69	89%	108,367
	0.71	91%	81,947
Non-RTM population apprehended at same rate as RTM PAR	0.55	84%	164,065
	0.60	85%	148,212
	0.65	86%	134,786
	0.70	87%	123,269
	0.75	88%	113,281
All non-impactable noncitizens present themselves	1.00	86%	134,786
	0.95	84%	166,236
	0.90	81%	201,181
	0.85	78%	240,236
	0.80	75%	284,174

Source: OIS.

The second and third panels of the table also highlight the baseline model. The second panel assumes the non-RTM population is apprehended at rates up to ten percentage points above or below the calculated PAR; and the third panel assumes non-impactable noncitizens are apprehended at rates as low as 80 percent. (A total non-impactable apprehension rate of 80 percent corresponds with about 43 percent of non-impactable noncitizens presenting themselves to authorities and 57 percent attempting to evade detection and being apprehended at the same 65 percent rate as the RTM population.) Relaxing these assumptions has a more modest impact on the model's predictions.

Table A2 depicts the interactions among these three assumptions on the model-based apprehension rate and estimated illegal entries. The first column of the table depicts variation in the assumed deterrence rate of four percentage points in either direction, a range slightly larger than the 95 percent confidence interval. Mathematically, changes in deterrence yield variation in the PAR, depicted in the second column. In the interactive analysis, these changes in the PAR affect the non-RTM apprehension rate, which is amplified by the decision to relax the assumption of a common apprehension rate for non-RTM and RTM noncitizens. Table A2 continues to allow the non-impactable apprehension rate to range from 0.8 to 1.0.

Table A2.

Interactive Sensitivity Analysis of RTM Model Assumptions

RTM Deterrence Rate	PAR (RTM)	Non-RTM Apprehension Rate	Non-Impactable Apprehension Rate	Model-Based Apprehension Rate	Estimated Successful Illegal Entries
Low (.63)	0.58	Low (.53)	Low (.80)	71%	354,534
Low (.63)	0.58	Low (.53)	Med (.90)	76%	271,541
Low (.63)	0.58	Low (.53)	High (1.0)	81%	205,147
Low (.63)	0.58	Med (.58)	Low (.80)	72%	337,013
Low (.63)	0.58	Med (.58)	Med (.90)	77%	254,020
Low (.63)	0.58	Med (.58)	High (1.0)	82%	187,625
Low (.63)	0.58	High (.63)	Low (.80)	73%	322,294
Low (.63)	0.58	High (.63)	Med (.90)	78%	239,301
Low (.63)	0.58	High (.63)	High (1.0)	83%	172,906
Med (.67)	0.65	Low (.60)	Low (.80)	74%	297,600
Med (.67)	0.65	Low (.60)	Med (.90)	80%	214,607
Med (.67)	0.65	Low (.60)	High (1.0)	85%	148,212
Med (.67)	0.65	Med (.65)	Low (.80)	75%	284,174
Med (.67)	0.65	Med (.65)	Med (.90)	81%	201,181
Med (.67)	0.65	Med (.65)	High (1.0)	86%	134,786
Med (.67)	0.65	High (.70)	Low (.80)	76%	272,657
Med (.67)	0.65	High (.70)	Med (.90)	82%	189,663
Med (.67)	0.65	High (.70)	High (1.0)	87%	123,269
High (.71)	0.76	Low (.71)	Low (.80)	78%	241,248
High (.71)	0.76	Low (.71)	Med (.90)	84%	158,255
High (.71)	0.76	Low (.71)	High (1.0)	90%	91,860
High (.71)	0.76	Med (.76)	Low (.80)	79%	231,335
High (.71)	0.76	Med (.76)	Med (.90)	85%	148,342
High (.71)	0.76	Med (.76)	High (1.0)	91%	81,947
High (.71)	0.76	High (.81)	Low (.80)	79%	222,652
High (.71)	0.76	High (.81)	Med (.90)	86%	139,659
High (.71)	0.76	High (.81)	High (1.0)	92%	73,264

Source: OIS.

In general, allowing the deterrence to fluctuate continues to have the greatest impact on the model's predictions, yielding an average difference of five percentage points in the overall model-based apprehension rates and about 53,000 illegal entries between three panels of Table A2. Allowing for reasonable variation across all three core RTM assumptions, Table A2 describes a range of twenty-one percentage points in the model-based apprehension rate and a range of 281,000 successful illegal entries.

Appendix B – Drugs Seizures – All Ports of Entry

Table B1.

OFO Drug Seizures at Ports of Entry (POEs), FY 2013 to 2019

DRUG	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Grand Total	342,010.02	311,159.31	401,114.04	367,979.37	305,296.78	250,280.72	273,730.62
COCA PRODUCTS, TEA BAGS OR LIQUOR	112.31	335.66	370.24	210.93	163.27	332.80	540.69
COCAINE	20,975.89	20,558.85	17,396.18	23,958.40	28,274.78	23,407.44	40,463.76
CRYSTAL METHAMPHETAMINES	1,526.52	1,742.38	1,627.55	2,129.00	1,925.08	7,512.88	26,735.29
DIHYDROCODEINONE (HYDROCODONE)	4.29	11.24	2.98	14.45	7.84	19.06	14.91
ECSTASY	104.26	111.04	104.02	708.11	521.60	514.04	1,005.85
EPHEDRINE	5.10	28.57	42.10	13.50	5.61	15.54	240.99
FENETHYLLINE-(CAPTAGON-AMPHETAMINE)	NA	NA	NA	1.22	0.04	1.73	1.84
FENTANYL	NA	NA	31.94	270.42	881.73	859.53	1,154.25
GAMMA HYDROXY BUTYRATE	33.09	73.31	48.68	483.76	741.00	789.90	383.36
HASH,LIQUID (HASH OIL)	0.13	13.98	0.77	0.45	1.51	46.71	1,136.48
HASHISH	58.10	117.11	82.43	75.24	54.47	64.15	58.03
HEROIN	1,821.95	1,963.17	2,732.06	1,915.70	1,757.62	2,360.95	2,461.48
KETAMINE	88.58	77.78	43.69	150.59	144.53	286.74	432.09
KHAT (CATHA EDULIS)	84,023.03	67,478.21	66,953.87	70,087.11	61,856.29	26,854.02	15,451.77
KRATOM (MITRAGYNINE OR 7-HYDROXYMITRAGYNINE)	NA	NA	NA	NA	27.18	0.52	2,675.22
LSD	3.00	7.02	3.57	2.41	9.55	50.36	254.01
MARIJUANA	215,705.43	198,669.60	273,433.73	233,827.24	166,221.35	135,814.31	131,328.19
MARIJUANA PLANTS	7.97	0.66	0.25	1.64	1.81	721.21	3.04
MDPV-(METHYLENEDIOXYPYROVALERONE)	336.13	225.68	233.11	41.75	27.31	19.06	23.40
MEPHEDRONE	11.82	9.11	5.72	2.66	26.83	1.09	2.45
METHAMPHETAMINE	7,985.05	8,896.50	11,564.19	15,008.03	20,959.61	26,054.22	31,109.70
METHYLONE	322.27	829.42	315.71	40.44	13.90	100.98	19.12
METHYLPHENIDATE (RITALIN)	20.03	15.14	13.69	12.30	12.62	8.03	4.15
MORPHINE	31.52	213.71	19.29	520.21	20.55	31.33	137.15
N-BENZYLPIPERAZINE (BZP TABLETS)	87.78	1.61	1.32	0.10	1.03	NA	0.00
NEXUS/2 CB	0.09	0.11	1.26	0.06	1.44	0.98	1.81
OPIUM	1,289.80	1,637.34	652.98	905.89	1,065.28	1,148.11	1,111.44
OTHER DRUGS, PRESCRIPTIONS, CHEMICALS	4,134.39	5,117.21	22,328.40	12,985.85	11,445.96	11,146.97	14,039.40
OXYCODONE (OXYCONTIN)	13.17	11.14	6.46	21.57	45.05	20.32	66.41
PARAMETHOXYAMPHETAMINE	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.03	NA	0.05
PEYOTE	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.35	35.70	58.08
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS EXCEPT EPHEDRINE	739.27	748.20	1,293.69	3,377.95	648.52	1,443.16	1,168.64
PSILOCYN OR PSILOCYBIN MUSHROOMS	23.38	24.11	16.18	45.78	53.99	58.96	169.15
ROHYPNOL	0.74	0.04	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.01
STEROIDS	470.05	554.53	581.16	613.21	1,394.27	1,592.87	1,255.01
SYNTHETIC CANNABINOIDS - ALL TYPES	2,074.37	1,686.67	1,206.82	550.79	6,984.75	8,964.99	222.94
YABA	0.47	0.18	NA	2.53	0.03	2.04	0.45

Note: Drug seizures in kilograms. Tea bags included in this table are used to carry coca products. This table updates previous versions of this report with more current information.
NA – no data available
Source: OFO.

Appendix C – Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) and Commercially Owned Vehicle (COV) Wait Times

Table C1.

OFO POV Wait Times (minutes) and Total Annual Flow, FY 2013 to 2019

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY							
POV Wait Times[1]	3.50	2.96	2.06	1.33	1.00	1.10	2.14
POVs[2]	673,549	651,511	616,656	590,028	587,319	590,900	589,270
ANDRADE, CA							
POV Wait Times	30.74	24.03	24.28	27.64	26.88	31.48	40.61
POVs	391,430	432,810	507,060	507,775	577,425	581,576	579,707
BLAINE, WA							
POV Wait Times	13.66	14.69	10.03	8.97	9.24	12.31	12.97
POVs	4,943,096	4,922,160	4,428,536	3,958,264	3,780,471	4,130,656	3,957,432
BROWNSVILLE, TX							
POV Wait Times	16.84	16.77	14.83	15.69	14.03	23.67	35.98
POVs	4,270,287	4,290,311	4,333,905	4,560,557	4,848,508	4,784,458	4,520,679
BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS NY							
POV Wait Times	6.07	6.83	4.05	2.92	2.81	3.59	4.44
POVs	5,903,904	5,570,269	5,033,036	4,783,004	4,814,967	5,000,166	4,860,255
CALAIS, ME							
POV Wait Times	1.34	1.27	0.76	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.22
POVs	1,024,748	951,270	837,046	754,443	755,846	674,323	661,808
CALEXICO, CA							
POV Wait Times	44.25	51.00	45.06	49.55	53.11	58.50	51.26
POVs	4,162,467	4,061,872	4,248,230	4,345,665	4,383,164	4,469,030	4,876,600
CALEXICO-EAST							
POV Wait Times	38.00	38.33	31.42	38.98	43.62	44.67	42.72
POVs	3,099,340	3,317,290	3,585,327	3,765,429	3,883,571	3,688,968	3,278,842
CHAMPLAIN-ROUSES POINT							
POV Wait Times	2.95	2.29	2.67	1.69	1.58	2.05	3.31
POVs	1,152,220	1,144,152	1,051,232	1,015,105	1,004,351	1,031,529	1,011,173
COLUMBUS, NM							
POV Wait Times	5.21	5.53	4.97	5.11	4.30	5.11	9.21
POVs	324,216	347,209	398,242	420,004	395,718	353,225	358,294
DEL RIO, TX							
POV Wait Times	8.01	7.62	6.83	6.91	6.48	9.67	22.06
POVs	1,257,513	1,325,289	1,415,109	1,508,476	1,586,009	1,640,034	1,517,965
DERBY LINE, VT							
POV Wait Times	2.26	2.34	1.85	2.01	3.84	2.18	1.79
POVs	731,031	715,719	633,409	581,261	598,819	493,073	479,985
DETROIT, MI							
POV Wait Times	3.65	4.77	3.64	4.47	3.66	4.76	4.79
POVs	4,123,134	4,050,011	4,065,843	4,043,076	4,058,742	3,996,538	4,091,085

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C1 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
DOUGLAS, AZ							
POV Wait Times	11.80	9.27	11.23	12.16	11.70	16.63	23.87
POVs	1,438,842	1,559,934	1,576,761	1,610,973	1,707,958	1,785,264	1,599,791
EAGLE PASS, TX							
POV Wait Times	14.84	20.12	15.56	18.16	17.79	18.90	21.10
POVs	2,358,313	2,382,221	2,661,638	2,745,267	2,662,299	2,715,217	2,871,922
EL PASO, TX							
POV Wait Times	22.39	19.75	22.98	27.97	19.39	24.59	33.56
POVs	7,110,330	7,505,652	7,883,264	7,886,013	7,766,464	8,549,738	7,060,731
EL PASO, TX (Ysleta Only)[3]							
POV Wait Times	21.57	18.70	23.11	25.46	23.89	23.05	44.10
POVs	3,453,040	3,935,394	4,221,858	4,627,376	4,819,225	3,972,228	3,705,814
HIDALGO,TX							
POV Wait Times	19.91	22.69	23.34	21.21	18.04	17.51	31.36
POVs	4,801,943	4,616,193	4,555,289	4,709,838	4,539,801	4,343,664	4,125,596
HIGHGATE SPRINGS/ALBURG							
POV Wait Times	3.52	3.96	4.13	4.57	4.22	4.94	3.16
POVs	508,699	542,595	715,598	703,063	633,903	474,497	476,599
HOULTON, ME							
POV Wait Times	2.89	2.46	1.74	1.17	1.22	1.59	1.40
POVs	353,898	332,670	274,641	228,101	228,663	228,890	219,014
INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN							
POV Wait Times	1.47	1.34	2	1.24	1.34	1.30	1.26
POVs	528,065	520,066	475,435	438,938	413,508	371,358	366,644
JACKMAN, ME							
POV Wait Times	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.2	0.46	0.39	0.29
POVs	170,549	168,871	157,521	162,978	144,428	146,393	147,938
LAREDO, TX							
POV Wait Times	15.49	17.59	16.28	17.13	19.95	17.48	21.04
POVs	4,865,686	5,220,223	5,220,174	5,191,369	4,991,204	5,081,662	5,183,480
LUKEVILLE, AZ							
POV Wait Times	5.52	5.05	7.59	5.30	2.63	4.19	5.22
POVs	283,790	301,206	345,760	363,712	376,827	409,444	425,046
LYNDEN, WA							
POV Wait Times	11.09	9.82	6.86	6.12	6.00	6.33	7.23
POVs	785,818	770,393	586,913	514,823	491,420	582,792	575,240
MADAWASKA, ME							
POV Wait Times	3.03	3.43	1.31	0.74	0.99	0.97	0.70
POVs	621,258	576,490	509,814	439,970	404,221	382,828	367,403
MASSENA, NY							
POV Wait Times	0.58	0.27	0.11	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.01
POVs	909,705	907,255	856,281	826,625	855,787	875,867	874,503
NACO, AZ							
POV Wait Times	2.52	2.21	2.28	2.22	2.54	2.84	4.96
POVs	280,984	296,828	295,635	302,423	295,296	302,614	337,228
NOGALES, AZ							
POV Wait Times	16.68	15.65	18.43	24.57	24.53	32.10	47.39
POVs	3,063,822	3,297,865	3,426,736	3,487,436	3,728,827	3,686,058	3,401,852

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C1 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
NORTON, VT							
POV Wait Times	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.01	0.01
POVs	81,311	74,512	49,154	32,530	30,574	31,913	26,030
OGDENSBURG, NY							
POV Wait Times	0.6	0.84	0.82	0.30	0.34	0.29	0.52
POVs	387,000	375,022	320,537	287,061	292,808	300,233	292,973
OTAY MESA							
POV Wait Times	45.68	43.03	29.39	38.32	38.07	38.32	52.54
POVs	5,987,273	6,901,172	6,747,483	7,597,903	8,213,614	8,103,641	6,760,388
PEMBINA, ND							
POV Wait Times	1.75	1.86	1.69	1.58	1.56	1.98	2.41
POVs	375,628	369,328	330,996	289,745	277,247	264,732	253,682
POINT ROBERTS, WA							
POV Wait Times	5.69	6.11	5.46	5.13	4.34	6.90	4.66
POVs	1,190,608	1,201,275	1,071,337	945,103	912,239	1,012,392	973,659
PORT HURON, MI							
POV Wait Times	2.3	3.8	3.06	2.31	2.91	3.45	6.73
POVs	2,032,553	2,002,506	1,745,713	1,548,257	1,565,333	1,553,250	1,474,568
PRESIDIO, TX							
POV Wait Times	6.52	9.36	7.12	10.21	8.24	8.08	12.63
POVs	594,488	608,805	659,374	663,522	685,190	714,221	700,806
PROGRESO, TX							
POV Wait Times	10.71	10.19	8.99	9.97	9.06	11.61	29.69
POVs	1,050,675	1,160,275	1,120,611	1,231,782	1,244,424	1,240,840	1,250,485
RIO GRANDE CITY, TX							
POV Wait Times	6.68	5.64	4.92	5.12	3.41	4.57	14.77
POVs	350,796	354,036	371,252	412,908	402,949	413,914	427,898
ROMA, TX							
POV Wait Times	5.62	5.24	4.65	4.59	5.32	6.45	14.16
POVs	682,289	698,610	726,931	796,790	803,877	785,690	713,422
SAN LUIS, AZ							
POV Wait Times	31.88	27.58	35.73	45.9	51.13	46.46	78.20
POVs	2,906,578	2,952,286	3,100,024	3,036,398	3,157,647	3,336,725	2,894,655
SANTA TERESA							
POV Wait Times	11.79	8.19	10.83	14.52	13.78	18.93	36.33
POVs	403,158	459,875	513,207	595,354	617,641	554,948	573,975
SAN YSIDRO							
POV Wait Times	81.41	69.25	32.14	50.14	46.69	48.63	64.49
POVs	11,292,152	11,299,741	14,357,503	13,959,170	13,569,163	14,588,551	14,485,331
SAULT STE. MARIE, MI							
POV Wait Times	3.03	2	1.34	1.75	1.84	0.95	1.12
POVs	1,003,253	972,312	830,907	716,718	665,145	713,180	665,497
SUMAS, WA							
POV Wait Times	9.11	10.08	7.19	6.09	5.60	6.46	6.30
POVs	1,214,398	1,159,314	962,169	850,004	834,808	918,412	882,912
SWEETGRASS, MT							
POV Wait Times	5.08	4.04	4.45	5.66	6	6	6.42
POVs	310,011	305,537	286,072	268,807	233,922	197,349	188,327

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C1 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
TECATE, CA							
POV Wait Times	39.99	32.63	23.2	29.83	31.16	30.77	39.75
POVs	737,060	789,642	891,068	943,208	1,037,241	1,085,274	1,014,570
TORNILLO-FABENS,TX							
POV Wait Times	5.84	5.54	4.51	4.36	3.97	4.59	10.57
POVs	300,796	285,988	273,302	300,922	320,121	358,415	442,325

[1] BorderStat.

[2] Operations Management Report (OMR).

[3] Ysleta was categorized as its own port distinct from El Paso, TX starting in 2019. Data for prior years have been updated to reflect this split out.

Source: OFO.

Table C2.

OFO COV Wait Times (minutes) and Total Annual Flow, FY 2013 to 2019

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
CBP-WELLESLEY ISLAND, POE							
COV Wait Times[1]	0.83	0.85	1.06	0.97	0.65	0.60	0.77
COVs[2]	179,788	189,229	200,287	207,309	204,264	198,288	192,050
BLAINE, BORDER CROSSING, CARS							
COV Wait Times	7.53	7.8	8.63	9.24	8.96	9.45	8.65
COVs	349,315	363,622	379,487	366,821	367,121	372,040	373,326
CBP-LOS INDIOS, BORDER STATION							
COV Wait Times	3.22	3.18	0.85	0.52	0.91	1.10	6.73
COVs	30,398	32,305	25,031	26,971	24,754	33,563	59,552
CBP-LOS TOMATES, PASENGER XING							
COV Wait Times	12.20	16.30	18.00	11.71	12.44	16.37	17.18
COVs	178,944	178,303	178,876	188,244	197,127	214,595	225,147
BUFFALO, PEACE BRIDGE							
COV Wait Times	6.19	7.54	6.74	6.68	6.41	6.64	6.75
COVs	613,651	557,340	578,345	615,681	573,721	557,609	522,691
CBP-LEWISTON, QUEENSTON BRIDGE							
COV Wait Times	1.42	3.15	2.28	2.01	3.19	3.86	4.56
COVs	319,971	342,855	336,203	344,598	387,059	386,233	393,703
CBP-CALAIS, POE PASSENGER							
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.12
COVs	64,448	61,437	64,576	65,112	62,861	64,737	64,529
CBP-CALEXICO, EAST BORDER XING							
COV Wait Times	12.70	8.44	6.72	6.33	8.95	11.45	13.78
COVs	322,648	324,855	333,640	349,411	356,368	373,631	386,324
CBP-CHAMPLAIN, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	0.45	0.55	0.51	0.39	0.24	1.15	1.89
COVs	275,042	280,008	295,032	310,599	309,327	309,757	300,857
COLUMBUS, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	1.74	3.3	3.16	3.34	2.75	3.61	7.73
COVs	11,192	14,242	13,849	13,842	15,299	16,401	17,577
CBP-DEL RIO, INTL BRIDGE POE							
COV Wait Times	1.74	1.54	1.19	1.03	0.81	1.53	7.27
COVs	67,282	68,358	69,854	73,163	74,904	76,796	73,300
DERBY LINE, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	0.44	0.33	0.3	0.51	1.54	1.14	0.14
COVs	91,767	94,862	97,948	100,367	95,469	89,905	88,719
CBP-DETROIT, AMBASSADOR BRIDGE							
COV Wait Times	7.78	10.07	7.57	7.73	5.66	7.90	7.91
COVs	1,479,931	1,501,712	1,495,532	1,566,289	1,555,472	1,557,632	1,520,248
DETROIT, WINDSOR TUNNEL							
COV Wait Times	2.82	3.64	2.22	2.32	2.44	3.22	3.81
COVs	43,407	39,217	35,188	34,350	26,367	22,336	19,855
DOUGLAS, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	2.11	1.65	5.49	3.94	3.27	1.56	2.25
COVs	32,053	33,319	32,286	30,896	31,098	28,148	26,917
CBP-EAGLE PASS, BRIDGE 2							
COV Wait Times	9.02	10.46	8.07	4.91	4.87	4.08	2.19
COVs	116,281	133,050	140,813	154,253	167,503	172,720	179,323

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C2 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
CBP-EL PASO, YSLETA PORT ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	10.2	9.05	6.86	16.96	17.15	18.91	27.12
COVs	421,523	440,468	315,245	402,902	506,370	529,394	561,437
EL PASO, BOTA POE							
COV Wait Times	13.11	12.91	19.52	22.22	16.94	17.33	25.90
COVs	312,332	314,394	436,697	353,831	273,013	267,243	241,291
PHARR, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	15.59	20.03	18.45	20.58	27.06	32.76	43.11
COVs	505,137	523,472	541,352	561,428	591,362	642,706	649,300
CBP-HIGHGATE SPRINGS, POE							
COV Wait Times	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.33	0.15
COVs	86,583	90,496	90,606	92,173	35,094	95,933	94,583
CBP-HOULTON, PASSENGER PROC							
COV Wait Times	0.81	0.9	0.75	0.82	0.94	0.98	0.86
COVs	84,035	85,061	82,476	88,443	92,477	92,836	89,267
CBP-INTL FALLS, BORDER CROSSNG							
COV Wait Times	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05
COVs	18,228	17,081	14,793	16,905	18,935	17,678	17,025
CBP-JACKMAN, BORDER STATION							
COV Wait Times	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01
COVs	35,592	35,475	37,380	34,182	35,094	33,843	31,986
COLUMBIA, LAREDO VEH-PED XING							
COV Wait Times	5.26	4.61	4.97	5.39	3.86	1.05	9.44
COVs	368,168	375,511	358,162	352,896	483,020	394,395	420,803
INS-LAREDO BRIDGE #4 *HIST*							
COV Wait Times	22.45	20.82	23.34	16.77	14.72	21.97	26.19
COVs	1,450,247	1,551,526	1,642,833	1,714,408	1,646,107	1,889,268	1,947,314
LUKEVILLE, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	2.00	11.43	0.00	0.44	0.05	0.00	0.02
COVs	26	75	93	152	196	268	301
LYNDEN, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	4.65	4.11	5.14	5.43	4.95	4.84	5.02
COVs	46,100	43,566	43,069	46,651	44,279	42,968	43,418
CBP-MADAWASKA, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	2.95	3.43	1.30	0.74	0.95	0.95	0.70
COVs	25,250	21,557	16,006	16,609	15,539	3,403	2,144
CBP-MASSENA, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
COVs	29,024	24,214	22,241	24,552	27,256	26,967	26,092
CBP-NACO, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	0.64	0.55	0.59	0.57	0.70	1.80	2.61
COVs	3958	3661	3018	3201	3579	3124	3289
NOGALES WEST, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	12.24	19.01	11.88	16.69	17.03	15.93	17.86
COVs	312536	310239	320554	328921	334661	337468	349101
NORTON, BORDER CROSSING, POE							
COV Wait Times	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.00
COVs	10,581	10,831	11,390	11,512	12,609	12,219	11,646

See footnotes at end of table.

Table C2 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
OGDENSBURG, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.08	0.12
COVs	34,912	37,455	37,818	37,918	39,279	41,133	40,848
OTAY MESA, EXPORT OUTBOUND							
COV Wait Times	32.92	35.34	31.71	33.75	37.04	34.34	55.31
COVs	831,836	800,493	822,691	873,599	927,111	961,736	953,782
CBP-PEMBINA, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	4.19	4.05	4.16	4.21	3.93	3.92	4.78
COVs	218,493	228,966	218,095	215,866	214,214	222,710	221,051
POINT ROBERTS, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	1.41	1.22	1.12	1.49	1.00	1.73	1.06
COVs	17,174	17,748	18,286	15,449	13,560	14,608	12,303
CBP-PORT HURON, BLUE WATER BRG							
COV Wait Times	2.62	5.03	4.60	3.40	5.97	7.11	11.33
COVs	719,204	760,651	797,688	833,276	830,905	818,994	821,917
PRESIDIO, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	0.37	0.41	0.29	0.01	0.02	0.03	1.10
COVs	9,610	10,194	9,490	7,407	8,551	8,807	9,812
PROGRESO, INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE							
COV Wait Times	15.8	11.01	8.92	5.86	4.26	2.31	33.92
COVs	45,103	39,928	37,965	45,580	53,223	50,065	52,874
RIO GRANDE CITY, POE INTL BR							
COV Wait Times	0.18	0.39	0.11	0.67	0.20	1.05	1.79
COVs	26,878	31,733	30,673	34,722	37,545	37,608	40,666
ROMA, BORDER CROSSING							
COV Wait Times	0.57	0.73	1.16	0.97	1.10	1.11	1.46
COVs	7,029	7,778	7,949	7,455	7,638	7,677	10,956
SAN LUIS, II POE LAND BORDER							
COV Wait Times	0.00	0.01	0.28	0.59	1.65	1.59	2.01
COVs	34,133	31,658	33,699	31,499	32,808	28,105	34,228
SANTA TERESA, PASSENGER OPS							
COV Wait Times	8.2	8.3	10.66	14.6	14.32	14.94	9.28
COVs	80,692	84,615	95,932	106,708	113,357	116,064	127,443
CBP-SAULT ST MARIE, POE							
COV Wait Times	3.04	1.97	1.34	1.37	1.79	0.91	0.90
COVs	40,827	39,255	37,323	39,636	41,501	40,979	39,951
SUMAS, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	3.66	4.32	4.27	5.67	4.70	3.89	2.50
COVs	141,337	148,016	152,845	157,690	156,956	159,024	153,942
CBP-SWEETGRASS, BORDER LANE							
COV Wait Times	4.71	4.14	3.55	4.45	3.85	3.40	4.60
COVs	133,295	143,836	134,786	127,829	127,310	128,527	140,195
TECATE, PORT OF ENTRY							
COV Wait Times	9.57	13.74	12.60	16.32	17.14	12.25	16.96
COVs	45,625	51,736	51,965	55,414	58,221	61,713	63,484

[1] Wait Times for COVs in regular COV Lanes.

[2] All COVs processed in regular COV and FAST Lanes.

Source: OFO.

Appendix D – Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate at Each Land POE

Table D1.

Number of Vehicles Processed by OFO Field Office per Booth-Hour, FY 2013 to 2019

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Boston	BEECHER FALLS, VT	Beecher	21.5	21.7	24.1	27.3	30.5	28	28.3
		Canaan	16	16.4	14.8	15.2	15.8	15.8	15.5
		Pittsburg	30.2	36.5	38.5	39	46.5	43.5	NA
	BRIDGEWATER, ME	Bridgewater	20.1	19.1	16.1	14.9	14.9	14.7	15.0
	CALAIS, ME	Ferry Pt	58.7	54.5	48.6	45.2	46.3	46.7	46.4
		Int'l Ave	29.7	28.2	21.8	20.9	21.3	20.4	20.6
		Milltown	36.9	35	30.5	24.7	24.9	24.7	24.2
	DERBY LINE, VT	Beebe	17.2	17.3	15.3	15	17.1	15.6	15.4
		Derby Line	28.5	30.6	28	27.7	29	25.6	26.8
		Derby Line 5	37.8	37.6	30.7	26.5	27.4	29.1	26.9
		North Troy	18.6	18.7	16.4	15.8	18	16.6	16.0
	EASTPORT, ME	Eastport	19.9	14.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Lubec	28.1	28.4	27.1	27.2	27.5	27.4	26.6
	FORT FAIRFIELD, ME	Easton	55.6	55.8	92.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Ft Fairfield	28	26.9	21.3	19.5	19.6	19.3	19.1
	FORT KENT, ME	Estcourt	17.9	18.8	20.2	29.4	69.4	NA	NA
		Ft Kent	30.9	29.8	25.7	21.8	21.1	21.5	20.8
	HIGHGATE SPRINGS/ ALBURG	Alburg	17.6	18.3	16.4	16	16.8	17.3	17.4
		Highgate	34.1	34.4	32.8	32.8	32.9	28.0	29.4
		Morses Line	16.3	17.9	16.3	16.2	16.2	17.2	17.7
	HOULTON, ME	Houlton	37.4	37.6	31.1	29.5	34.8	33.9	29.9
		Monticello	75	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Orient	27.2	27.1	24	25.1	43.7	41.6	NA
	JACKMAN, ME	Coburn Gore	16	16.2	14.4	14.6	15.1	15.6	15.7
		Jackman	17.1	20	15.7	15.9	17.4	17.6	17.8
		St Aurelie	27.8	24.3	22.7	21.5	23.3	21.7	20.9
		St Just	70.5	60.1	69.7	63.2	59.4	41.4	NA
		St Pamphile	41.4	36.8	41.8	44.8	53.7	NA	NA
		St Zacharie	28.1	27.5	32.9	31.4	40.4	NA	NA
	LIMESTONE, ME	Limestone	15.2	15.8	18.7	21.6	24.2	24.6	24.6
	MADAWASKA, ME	Madawaska	55.9	51.7	45.5	41.6	43.8	45.1	45.5
	NORTON, VT	Norton	19.4	19.3	16.3	16.8	17.9	18.1	19.5
	RICHFORD, VT	E Richford	36.1	36.3	38.2	31.1	37.1	56.8	NA
		Pinnacle	30	29.1	28.5	30	35.4	32.4	NA
		Richford	20	20.9	17.1	15.7	14.9	15.1	14.8
		W Berkshire	14.8	16.6	15.4	15.7	15.3	14.7	14.2
	VAN BUREN, ME	Hamlin	24.7	24.1	19.1	15.3	15.5	15.7	16.8
		Van Buren	25.7	25.1	21.3	18.5	18.8	18.6	18.5
	VANCEBORO, ME	Vanceboro	14	14.3	14.8	17.6	20.2	20.3	21.0

See footnotes at end of table.

Table D1 (Continued)

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Buffalo	ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY	1000 Island Br	32.4	33	27.9	28.8	30.7	30.5	28.5
	BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS NY	Lewiston	40.8	41.9	38.1	38	40.4	42.0	43.8
		Peace Bridge	40.9	41.5	38.3	37.3	36.6	35.9	36.4
		Rainbow	39.8	41	35.3	33.7	36.8	38.3	39.6
		Whirlpool	59.4	59.5	49.9	45.3	47.2	49.7	47.9
	CAPE VINCENT, NY	Cape Vincent	12.1	14.1	13	12.5	13.3	12.8	13.2
	CHAMPLAIN-ROUSES POINT	Cannons	16.7	17.3	17	18.3	17.9	17.7	19.2
		Champlain	34	35	32.9	31.2	32.4	33.5	34.9
		Mooers	17.5	17.4	15.3	15.1	15.1	15.7	15.8
		Overtons	20.1	20.3	18.3	17.3	17.7	17.6	18.5
		Rouses Pt	21.7	22.2	19.3	18.7	20.1	20.3	20.7
	MASSENA, NY	Massena	45.5	47	45.5	42.2	46.2	44.7	46.8
	OGDENSBURG, NY	Ogdensburg	40.6	40.3	34.7	34.8	35.9	35.6	36.3
	TROUT RIVER, NY	Burke	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Chateaugay	14.4	15.1	14	14.2	14.5	14.3	14.5
		Churubusco	18.9	21.3	23.7	27.2	36.6	40.6	NA
		Ft Covington	18.5	19.2	17.4	16.2	16.4	17.3	16.3
		Trout River	14.5	14.9	14.2	13.8	14.4	14.7	14.8
Chicago	TOLEDO, OH	Sandusky	NA	12.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Detroit	ALGONAC, MI	Algonac	10.7	15.7	13.4	13.3	NA	NA	NA
	DETROIT, MI	Ambassador	36	36.1	36.6	37.9	39	41.9	42.9
		Windsor	36.9	39.5	42.7	43.9	46.9	50.0	51.8
	PORT HURON, MI	Marine City	14.1	20.5	16	16.2	NA	NA	NA
		Port Huron	42.8	42.2	38	34.8	38.9	41.5	42.4
	SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	SSM	41	42	38.6	40.2	40.9	41.6	41.7
El Paso	COLUMBUS, NM	Antelope	5.4	7.5	6.6	7	8.1	8.7	9.1
		Columbus	32.7	28.4	29.9	32.6	37.7	41.1	42.2
	EL PASO, TX	BOTA	44.2	48.3	50.3	51	54.3	55.5	52.5
		PDN	38	39.9	44	43.5	46.5	47.9	45.8
		Stanton St	110.1	119.6	114.9	123.2	132	133.0	148.8
		Ysleta	45.9	49.7	53.4	56.3	59.7	62.5	65.9
	PRESIDIO, TX	Presidio	41.1	40.9	43.5	44.1	45.7	47.5	48.7
	SANTA TERESA	St Teresa	30.4	32.5	35.2	36.6	37.4	38.3	38.9
	TORNILLO,TX	Ft Hancock	14.9	15	14.5	15.2	15.7	17.1	20.8
		Tornillo	32.9	29	29.8	33.1	34.3	35.1	41.1
Laredo	BROWNSVILLE, TX	B&M	52.7	57.6	56.8	58	67	67.2	63.1
		Gateway	42.7	42.3	41.8	46.1	51.1	50.8	48.3
		Los Indios	35.5	36.4	34.1	39.1	42.6	44.5	45.0
		Veterans	50.1	51.2	49.5	52.1	58.1	61.0	59.6
	DEL RIO, TX	Amistad	25.6	24.6	25.7	21.9	23	29.3	44.0
		Del Rio	47.5	48.2	51.8	56.2	62.5	64.1	64.2
	EAGLE PASS, TX	Eagle Pass I	51.9	51.5	51.4	52.5	54.5	54.2	52.5
		Eagle Pass II	47.2	49.5	49.3	51	52.5	51.0	48.1
	HIDALGO,TX	Anzalduas	57.7	55.9	51.5	52.1	52.3	50.1	52.1
		Hidalgo	46.3	47.6	49.6	48.2	48.9	47.7	49.5
		Pharr	53.1	50.7	47.4	46.8	48.7	47.8	52.1
	LAREDO, TX	Col Solidarity	29.2	30.4	29.8	32	34.7	37.2	35.0
		Convent	26.2	29.7	34.8	37.3	NA	64.9	68.5
		Lincoln-J	41.2	41.6	45.7	46	46.8	44.0	33.7

See footnotes at end of table.

Table D1 (Continued)

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Laredo (cont.)	PROGRESO, TX	Donna	41.2	42.5	42.2	42.8	44.1	46.6	49.4
		Progresso	33.7	33.8	33.2	36.6	37.2	38.1	38.2
	RIO GRANDE CITY, TX	Los Ebanos	16.2	15.8	14.8	15.4	14.7	14.8	14.5
		Rio Grande	32.6	32.5	33.6	37.6	41.5	43.6	45.1
	ROMA, TX	Falcon Dam	14.7	15.1	15.4	17.3	18.7	20.0	21.6
		Roma	35.3	35.9	37.7	40.7	41.4	43.4	40.7
Portland	ALCAN, AK	Alcan	16.3	16.3	13.8	17.5	20.6	20.9	16.8
	DALTON CACHE, AK	Dalton	17.2	17.6	16.6	15.7	14.4	14.1	14.2
	KETCHIKAN, AK	Ketchikan	12.9	13.6	13.3	13.5	14	14.4	13.6
	SKAGWAY, AK	Skagway	23.4	24.6	20.5	20.6	22	24.2	25.3
San Diego	ANDRADE, CA	Andrade	32.5	35.6	39.8	42.6	45.8	49.6	49.6
	CALEXICO-EAST	Calexico/E	60.8	65.2	71.1	74.9	78.7	74.2	71.5
	CALEXICO, CA	Calexico/W	48.9	49.3	53.1	55.1	57.6	57.6	65.2
	OTAY MESA	Otay Mesa	63.7	74.3	76.9	81.4	79.2	84.9	83.9
	SAN YSIDRO	San Ysidro	52.4	56.9	72.2	69.6	71.1	77.5	78.6
	TECATE, CA	Tecate	55.7	57.7	59.5	65.3	73.2	75.8	74.6
San Juan	MAYAGUEZ, PR	Mayaguez	NA	33	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Seattle	AMBROSE, ND	Ambrose	88	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	ANTLER, ND	Antler	15	17.1	22.2	22.6	27.3	25.9	NA
	BAUDETTE, MN	Baudette	28.8	29.7	28.3	28.3	29.9	30.6	29.0
	BLAINE, WA	Pacific Hwy	65.4	68.7	59.7	55.4	59.3	64.2	58.4
		Peace Arch	79.3	83.1	70.6	63.5	66.4	64.7	60.7
	BOUNDARY, WA	Border Patrol	24.8	23.1	18.1	15.6	15	15.4	15.9
	CARBURY, ND	Carbury	12.1	13.2	14.7	16.3	15.4	15.7	15.5
	DANVILLE, WA	Danville	17	16.9	15.7	15.3	15.1	14.8	14.6
	DEL BONITA, MT	Del Bonita	12.6	15.6	15.6	15.4	15.6	15.7	14.1
	DUNSEITH, ND	Dunseith	15	15.5	13.8	13.6	13.8	13.6	13.8
	EASTPORT, ID	Eastport ID	20.3	23.7	21.1	23.1	21.9	23.9	20.0
	FERRY, WA	Ferry	17.4	17.8	21.3	16.4	17.2	16.7	15.1
	FORTUNA, ND	Fortuna	18.5	22.1	18.4	19.9	19.5	16.9	17.5
	FRONTIER, WA	Frontier	14.6	15.2	14.2	13.8	13.9	13.9	13.7
	GRAND PORTAGE, MN	Grand Portage	38.5	39.6	36.8	34.4	35	35.4	34.0
	HANSBORO, ND	Hansboro	21.4	25.9	32.2	29.3	31.5	26.3	NA
	INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN	Int'l Falls	38.3	41.1	39.5	38.4	40.6	38.7	37.0
	LANCASTER, MN	Lancaster	14.2	14.1	13.1	12.7	13	12.5	12.5
	LAURIER, WA	Laurier	16.2	16.3	16.5	15.5	14.9	15.5	15.2
	LYNDEN, WA	Lynden	51.7	53.1	43.4	40.8	42.2	47.3	45.8
	MAIDA, ND	Maida	17.3	18.4	20.7	23	27.8	23.7	NA
	METALINE FALLS	Metaline	12.1	12.7	12.7	12.8	13.1	13.3	12.2
	MORGAN, MT	Morgan	16.6	18.3	19.9	22.8	21.9	21.7	NA
	NECHE, ND	Neche	16.5	16.4	14.9	14.8	14.6	14.6	14.7
	NIGHTHAWK, WA	Nighthawk	15.2	17.3	22.1	22.5	24.7	26.4	NA
	NOONAN, ND	Noonan	13.1	13.3	12.8	12.9	13.7	13.9	13.8
	NORTHGATE, ND	Northgate	12.4	12.8	13.1	14.1	15.3	15.5	16.3
	OPHEIM, MT	Opheim	60.4	54.7	60.5	68.9	63.7	65.2	NA
	OROVILLE, WA	Oroville	24.9	23.8	20.6	20.9	20.5	20.0	19.2
	PEMBINA, ND	Pembina	28	29.9	26.8	26.9	27.9	28.6	28.5
	PIEGAN, MT	Piegan	19.9	22	19.9	21.1	20	20.6	22.1
	PINECREEK, MN	Pine Creek	29.7	34.1	43.3	48.1	65.2	69.7	NA

See footnotes at end of table.

Table D1 (Continued)

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Seattle (cont.)	POINT ROBERTS, WA	Pt Roberts	78.4	82.6	84.2	78.7	77.4	83.9	79.4
	PORTAL, ND	Portal	17	17.4	15.3	14.5	14.7	14.8	14.3
	PORTHILL, ID	Porthill	35.1	35.4	30.1	26.2	25.9	28.5	26.2
	RAYMOND, MT	Raymond	13.1	14.3	14.3	13.7	14	14.0	14.6
	ROOSVILLE, MT	Roosville	28.6	30.1	26.8	24.9	25.7	26.5	26.7
	ROSEAU, MN	Roseau	12.6	12.9	12.2	12.3	12.7	12.6	12.5
	SARLES, ND	Sarles	39.8	51.8	53.8	41.4	44.8	33.3	NA
	SCOBEY, MT	Scobey	29	26.6	33.8	42.4	42.2	40.0	NA
	SHERWOOD, ND	Sherwood	13.6	14.7	14.6	15.2	15.9	15.4	16.2
	ST JOHN, ND	St. John	13.3	14.1	16.1	17.7	18.8	19.8	17.9
	SUMAS, WA	Sumas	51.8	53.7	49.5	46.1	47.7	49.2	44.0
	SWEETGRASS, MT	Sweetgrass	27.9	30.3	27.1	27.4	28.6	28.5	26.5
	TURNER, MT	Turner	13.4	15	17.2	18.8	19.9	21.0	19.0
	WALHALLA, ND	Walhalla	13.8	14.4	13.2	13.1	13.1	13.0	13.1
	WARROAD, MN	OARS	NA	13.8	24.5	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Warroad	17.5	17.8	17.6	17.7	19.2	19.2	17.8
	WESTHOPE, ND	Westhope	14.2	15.9	16.9	19.5	21.6	22.2	20.3
	WHITLASH, MT	Whitlash	59.6	NA	55.4	72.3	NA	55.2	NA
	WILDHORSE, MT	Wildhorse	12.3	13.2	12.6	12.9	13	13.1	14.1
	WILLOW CREEK, MT	Willow Creek	17.1	19.1	35.5	41.1	49	39.2	NA
Tucson	DOUGLAS, AZ	Douglas	42.9	40.6	40.2	40.2	42.3	43.2	41.9
	LUKEVILLE, AZ	Lukeville	28	29.6	30.5	33.6	37.4	38.9	38.7
	NACO, AZ	Naco	33.6	37	38.7	37.9	37.8	40.0	41.5
	NOGALES, AZ	Deconcini	44.4	46.1	48.7	51.7	52.3	54.6	49.9
		Mariposa	36.6	39.2	39.9	40.4	41.7	44.4	38.4
	SAN LUIS, AZ	San Luis	40.2	43.3	45.4	48.2	48.6	51.8	53.1
	SASABE, AZ	Sasabe	18	16.8	15.3	15.1	16	15.6	15.1

Note: As of 2019, OFO no longer reports on the crossings of Burke at Trout River, NY, Sandusky at Toledo, OH, Mayaguez at Mayaguez, PR, and OARS at Warroad, MN. These crossings are retained for historical purposes.

Source: OFO.

Appendix E – Frequency of Secondary Inspections at Each Land POE

Table E1.

OFO Northern Land Border Passenger Inspection Rate, FY 2013 to 2019

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Northern Land	**7.70%**	**7.67%**	**7.50%**	**7.30%**	**7.23%**	**3.44%**	**3.47%**
Alcan, AK	0.95%	0.87%	5.20%	5.48%	6.69%	2.67%	4.19%
Alexandria Bay, NY	6.94%	7.09%	7.74%	8.36%	4.81%	4.43%	5.00%
Ambrose, ND	3.54%	4.15%	2.49%	2.73%	3.07%	1.69%	6.01%
Anacortes, WA	2.15%	2.32%	2.36%	2.12%	NA	2.38%	6.81%
Antler, ND	3.54%	3.38%	2.42%	2.36%	2.74%	25.99%	3.15%
Bar Harbor, ME	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.73%	NA
Baudette, MN	5.84%	5.69%	6.04%	7.08%	3.83%	4.38%	6.00%
Beecher Falls, VT	10.04%	11.14%	11.23%	10.80%	3.55%	1.90%	2.02%
Blaine, WA	10.66%	10.05%	9.42%	8.08%	7.85%	3.35%	3.52%
Boundary, WA	9.86%	9.03%	11.76%	8.82%	3.64%	3.30%	2.05%
Bridgewater, ME	1.93%	2.20%	2.21%	2.08%	2.12%	2.00%	2.52%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY	5.99%	5.96%	6.08%	6.87%	5.72%	2.78%	2.75%
Calais, ME	3.28%	3.22%	3.50%	4.00%	3.79%	2.60%	2.72%
Cape Vincent, NY	2.21%	2.47%	2.25%	1.46%	1.94%	0.56%	0.57%
Carbury, ND	25.12%	24.77%	25.61%	25.92%	4.67%	3.76%	2.47%
Champlain-Rouses Point, NY	20.04%	21.37%	21.94%	15.43%	7.50%	4.42%	4.02%
Dalton Cache, AK	2.86%	1.65%	2.91%	1.39%	3.83%	1.14%	1.38%
Danville, WA	2.92%	5.85%	1.37%	1.69%	2.24%	1.36%	2.51%
Del Bonita, MT	3.07%	2.49%	2.47%	2.60%	3.79%	2.17%	3.91%
Derby Line, VT	3.43%	3.67%	3.89%	4.23%	4.67%	2.40%	3.10%
Detroit, MI	8.27%	8.76%	7.61%	6.56%	3.80%	3.01%	2.76%
Dunseith, ND	4.77%	3.65%	2.62%	3.32%	4.76%	5.51%	6.07%
Eastport, ID	7.03%	15.04%	6.85%	10.83%	8.58%	5.57%	6.05%
Eastport, ME	1.15%	1.87%	2.70%	3.31%	2.95%	1.36%	1.30%
Ferry, WA	7.44%	12.96%	4.20%	5.01%	4.47%	2.29%	3.96%
Fort Fairfield, ME	1.33%	1.14%	1.64%	1.67%	1.88%	1.15%	1.06%
Fort Kent, ME	3.64%	3.07%	3.64%	3.94%	3.49%	2.07%	2.08%
Fortuna, ND	9.24%	9.29%	7.37%	7.12%	4.31%	3.90%	4.22%
Friday Harbor, WA	9.64%	11.14%	10.09%	8.41%	0.61%	30.49%	21.23%
Frontier, WA	5.84%	4.93%	7.74%	3.34%	4.52%	3.21%	3.42%
Grand Portage, MN	2.69%	1.70%	1.45%	1.41%	3.13%	3.02%	3.42%
Hannah, ND	10.01%	8.09%	15.12%	8.35%	13.51%	9.74%	8.47%
Hansboro, ND	5.71%	6.11%	3.43%	2.99%	5.28%	4.75%	3.98%
Highgate Springs-Alburg, VT	2.82%	4.82%	5.31%	4.06%	7.94%	4.88%	4.68%
Houlton, ME	3.39%	3.13%	3.25%	3.89%	3.90%	2.38%	2.92%
International Falls-Ranier, MN	7.56%	5.55%	6.41%	5.44%	2.77%	2.71%	4.29%
Jackman, ME	4.11%	4.21%	4.44%	5.37%	4.95%	3.42%	5.42%
Ketchikan, AK	2.99%	1.41%	1.44%	3.40%	1.11%	1.73%	2.28%
Lancaster, MN	8.90%	9.40%	11.07%	11.10%	6.56%	3.32%	4.64%

See footnotes at end of table.

Table E1 (Continued)

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Laurier, WA	1.80%	1.83%	2.59%	7.76%	4.03%	2.10%	2.22%
Limestone L, ME	1.99%	1.61%	2.41%	2.03%	2.25%	1.67%	1.36%
Lynden, WA	3.19%	3.44%	5.48%	4.37%	6.31%	5.94%	5.84%
Madawaska, ME	1.75%	1.80%	2.22%	1.85%	2.51%	1.47%	1.53%
Maida, ND	12.52%	16.94%	18.00%	16.46%	7.59%	5.07%	8.50%
Massena, NY	2.62%	2.89%	2.63%	2.88%	1.89%	2.92%	2.83%
Metaline Falls, WA	12.42%	10.32%	6.81%	6.29%	6.19%	4.22%	4.89%
Morgan, MT	11.48%	7.77%	10.73%	7.69%	16.87%	44.84%	37.36%
Neche, ND	6.12%	8.92%	12.34%	13.06%	6.78%	5.52%	5.84%
Nighthawk, WA	1.26%	1.57%	0.77%	1.13%	4.08%	2.33%	2.21%
Noonan, ND	9.02%	6.92%	9.19%	10.13%	3.21%	2.51%	4.57%
Northgate, ND	2.14%	3.25%	3.21%	2.79%	3.72%	2.92%	2.95%
Norton, VT	13.02%	13.79%	17.08%	23.18%	2.84%	1.51%	1.48%
Ogdensburg, NY	7.78%	8.32%	8.48%	9.18%	4.07%	5.56%	5.76%
Opheim, MT	0.49%	1.08%	5.52%	5.04%	11.40%	8.66%	5.58%
Oroville, WA	16.28%	18.86%	18.65%	15.66%	11.46%	15.41%	15.61%
Pembina, ND	13.98%	7.50%	6.95%	7.12%	7.55%	7.16%	6.36%
Piegan, MT	10.64%	13.46%	6.25%	5.94%	6.34%	2.18%	1.49%
Pinecreek, MN	9.50%	9.96%	12.98%	13.06%	7.25%	6.83%	8.53%
Point Roberts, WA	9.32%	9.26%	6.63%	4.95%	3.98%	1.95%	1.81%
Port Angeles, WA	1.88%	2.48%	2.42%	2.68%	NA	28.09%	8.53%
Port Huron, MI	7.45%	7.34%	7.85%	11.41%	3.94%	12.48%	3.04%
Portal, ND	12.82%	15.85%	12.02%	12.67%	10.87%	3.22%	22.32%
Porthill, ID	14.77%	14.56%	14.24%	15.04%	3.92%	3.18%	11.28%
Portland, ME	NA	4.08%	3.95%	2.06%	1.49%	1.71%	1.14%
Raymond, MT	5.77%	4.10%	6.60%	16.67%	15.44%	5.61%	3.19%
Richford, VT	13.12%	3.08%	5.79%	5.96%	5.31%	2.81%	2.84%
Roosville, MT	3.35%	3.08%	3.41%	4.08%	6.11%	3.58%	3.16%
Roseau, MN	9.64%	10.39%	9.38%	8.10%	7.15%	6.60%	8.36%
Sarles, ND	17.57%	17.15%	20.64%	15.77%	9.80%	5.54%	8.26%
Sault Sainte Marie, MI	3.95%	2.70%	3.22%	2.74%	2.32%	2.06%	2.05%
Scobey, MT	1.75%	1.79%	1.98%	3.89%	11.65%	9.19%	8.23%
Sherwood, ND	1.70%	2.82%	1.88%	2.24%	1.69%	1.38%	1.61%
Skagway, AK	2.08%	1.70%	4.10%	4.03%	8.10%	3.03%	4.39%
St. John, ND	32.22%	32.29%	32.22%	32.30%	3.07%	5.17%	3.83%
Sumas, WA	7.03%	8.06%	8.70%	10.20%	4.76%	2.38%	2.48%
Sweetgrass, MT	10.27%	5.80%	2.71%	2.40%	9.32%	5.09%	6.17%
Trout River, NY	1.73%	1.53%	1.52%	1.46%	2.13%	1.30%	1.37%
Turner, MT	5.93%	4.83%	5.92%	7.76%	4.87%	3.60%	8.74%
Van Buren, ME	3.17%	2.67%	3.15%	3.82%	3.11%	2.19%	1.95%
Vanceboro, ME	3.79%	7.06%	15.86%	29.83%	12.29%	3.13%	3.04%
Walhalla, ND	12.29%	15.35%	15.99%	12.56%	6.66%	4.52%	5.09%
Warroad, MN	10.15%	8.73%	5.94%	4.27%	3.35%	3.42%	3.42%
Westhope, ND	12.98%	7.97%	6.70%	10.77%	2.39%	3.75%	4.13%
Whitlash, MT	1.07%	1.34%	1.25%	1.93%	3.25%	3.59%	2.81%
Wildhorse, MT	1.34%	1.38%	2.36%	2.47%	5.51%	3.52%	3.27%
Willow Creek, MT	NA	NA	NA	NA	8.21%	12.36%	7.67%

Source: OFO.

Table E2.

OFO Southwest Land Border Passenger Inspection Rate, FY 2013 to 2019

SW POEs Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Southwest Land	**12.60%**	**11.82%**	**12.06%**	**11.88%**	**12.20%**	**3.38%**	**3.05%**
Andrade, CA	4.71%	6.71%	7.14%	4.03%	3.59%	2.55%	2.65%
Boquillas, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.09%	0.67%	1.16%
Brownsville, TX	15.61%	14.89%	15.45%	15.96%	5.33%	4.72%	4.21%
Calexico East, CA	5.70%	5.26%	4.23%	3.68%	2.77%	2.49%	2.27%
Calexico, CA	16.49%	15.20%	16.32%	12.78%	3.28%	3.10%	2.81%
Columbus, NM	28.38%	28.06%	22.89%	27.41%	5.93%	6.41%	3.45%
Del Rio, TX	6.46%	6.49%	4.55%	4.38%	2.46%	5.47%	4.83%
Douglas, AZ	6.26%	5.68%	5.74%	6.68%	3.93%	3.79%	3.71%
Eagle Pass, TX	10.84%	11.69%	12.11%	13.84%	3.48%	3.73%	3.26%
El Paso, TX	13.18%	14.34%	17.99%	16.83%	2.87%	2.55%	2.22%
Hidalgo, TX	19.08%	16.25%	16.79%	16.84%	5.30%	4.99%	4.13%
Laredo, TX	34.31%	30.82%	28.18%	28.15%	3.00%	3.35%	3.25%
Lukeville, AZ	2.62%	2.17%	1.87%	2.08%	6.00%	4.19%	3.96%
Naco, AZ	4.20%	5.34%	4.91%	4.28%	4.42%	4.00%	3.51%
Nogales, AZ	9.66%	9.67%	9.82%	9.76%	3.66%	3.10%	2.99%
Otay Mesa, CA	6.05%	4.58%	4.74%	4.57%	3.86%	3.43%	3.12%
Otay-Cross Border, CA (UFA[1])	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.48%	1.20%
Presidio, TX	9.61%	11.89%	9.58%	8.32%	3.50%	3.06%	2.76%
Progreso, TX	8.00%	8.72%	9.18%	7.99%	3.56%	3.13%	3.30%
Rio Grande City, TX	12.67%	10.89%	8.63%	8.69%	4.46%	4.81%	4.85%
Roma, TX	18.94%	17.40%	16.24%	15.12%	4.63%	3.28%	3.14%
San Luis, AZ	15.07%	14.26%	16.06%	16.65%	3.12%	2.75%	2.81%
San Ysidro, CA	2.37%	2.13%	1.99%	2.75%	4.48%	5.92%	4.61%
Santa Teresa, NM	15.55%	9.80%	8.03%	7.71%	3.99%	3.19%	2.74%
Sasabe, AZ	6.05%	5.69%	5.41%	5.53%	6.05%	6.73%	11.63%
Tecate, CA	6.59%	6.66%	6.43%	5.43%	4.41%	3.08%	2.74%
Tornillo, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	8.83%	7.46%	6.56%
Valley International Airport, TX (UFA)	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.98%	NA	1.27%
Ysleta, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.39%

[1] User Fee Airport.

Source: OFO.

Appendix F – Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned – Maritime POE

Table F1.

Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned from FY 2016 to 2019 (with comparison of FY 2019 to 2018)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers				Ratio of 2019-2018
	2016	2017	2018	2019	
1401 - NORFOLK, VA	2,411	1,313	687	170	0.25
1404 - RICHMOND-PETERSBURG, VA	0	0	0	0	0.00
1409 - CHARLESTON, WV	2	1	0	0	0.00
1501 - WILMINGTON, NC	111	76	19	4	0.21
1511 - BEAUFORT-MOREHEAD CTY, NC	0	0	0	0	0.00
1512 - CHARLOTTE, NC	2	0	4	0	0.00
1601 - CHARLESTON, SC	2,563	1,734	1,095	257	0.23
1604 - COLUMBIA, SC	0	0	0	0	0.00
1701 - BRUNSWICK, GA	0	1,619	0	0	0.00
1703 - SAVANNAH, GA	2,910	0	933	222	0.24
1704 - ATLANTA, GA	15	947	0	0	0.00
1101 - PHILADELPHIA, PA	333	25	248	90	0.36
1102 - CHESTER, PA	22	47	16	0	0.00
1103 - WILMINGTON, DE	23	0	0	3	0.00
1104 - PITTSBURGH, PA	0	0	0	0	0.00
1105 - PAULSBORO, NJ	0	0	0	0	0.00
1107 - CAMDEN, NJ	0	0	0	0	0.00
1108 - PHIL. INTERNATIONAL AIR	0	0	0	0	0.00
1195 - UPS HUB, PHILADELPHIA, PA	0	930	0	0	0.00
1303 - BALTIMORE, MD	1,673	0	333	185	0.56
1305 - BWI AIRPORT	2	13	0	0	0.00
0101 - PORTLAND, ME	31	0	19	3	0.16
0103 - EASTPORT, ME	0	0	0	0	0.00
0105 - VANCEBORO, ME	0	0	0	0	0.00
0107 - FORT FAIRFIELD, ME	0	0	0	0	0.00
0131 - PORTSMOUTH, NH	0	0	0	0	0.00
0132 - BELFAST, ME	0	0	0	0	0.00
0152 - SEARSPORT, ME	0	681	0	0	0.00
0401 - BOSTON, MA	551	0	105	31	0.30
0403 - WORCESTER, MA	0	24	0	0	0.00
0405 - NEW BEDFORD, MA	0	0	0	0	0.00
0406 - PLYMOUTH	0	1	0	0	0.00
0407 - FALL RIVER, MA	1	0	0	0	0.00
0408 - SALEM, MA	0	0	0	0	0.00
0410 - BRIDGEPORT, CT	0	0	0	0	0.00
0412 - NEW HAVEN, CT	0	0	0	0	0.00

See footnotes at end of table.

Table F1 (Continued)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers				Ratio of 2019-2018
	2016	2017	2018	2019	
0413 - NEW LONDON, CT	0	0	0	0	0.00
0501 - NEWPORT, RI	0	0	0	0	0.00
0502 - PROVIDENCE, RI	6	0	0	0	0.00
0701 - OGDENSBURG, NY	0	0	0	0	0.00
0715 - TROUT RIVER, NY	0	0	0	0	0.00
0901 - BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS	0	0	0	0	0.00
0903 - ROCHESTER, NY	0	0	0	0	0.00
0904 - OSWEGO, NY	0	0	0	0	0.00
1002 - ALBANY, NY	0	0	0	0	0.00
3327 - VANCOUVER, BC, CANADA	0	0	0	0	0.00
3501 - MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, MN	3	0	0	0	0.00
3510 - DULUTH, MN	0	0	0	0	0.00
3701 - MILWAUKEE, WI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3702 - MARINETTE, WI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3703 - GREEN BAY, WI	0	1	0	0	0.00
3901 - CHICAGO, IL	64	2	3	0	0.00
4101 - CLEVELAND, OH	0	0	0	0	0.00
4102 - CINCINNATI, OH	1	0	0	0	0.00
4103 - COLUMBUS, OH	1	0	0	0	0.00
4105 - TOLEDO, OH	0	0	0	0	0.00
4106 - ERIE, PA	0	0	0	0	0.00
4110 - INDIANAPOLIS, IN	2	0	0	0	0.00
4115 - LOUISVILLE, KY	1	0	0	0	0.00
4122 - ASTABULA/CONNEAUT	0	0	0	0	0.00
4501 - KANSAS CITY, MO	1	0	0	0	0.00
3801 - DETROIT, MI	1	0	0	0	0.00
3802 - PORT HURON, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3803 - SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3804 - SAGINAW/BAY CITY, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3806 - GRAND RAPIDS, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3808 - ESCANABA, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3809 - MARQUETTE, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3815 - MUSKEGON, MI	0	0	0	0	0.00
2101 - PORT ARTHUR, TX	0	0	0	0	0.00
2102 - SABINE, TX	0	0	0	0	0.00
2103 - ORANGE, TX	0	0	0	0	0.00
2104 - BEAUMONT, TX	0	4,224	0	0	0.00
5301 - HOUSTON, TX	7,003	0	2,539	779	0.31
5306 - TEXAS CITY, TX	0	0	0	0	0.00
5310 - GALVESTON, TX	0	1	0	0	0.00
5311 - FREEPORT, TX	9	0	4	0	0.00
5312 - CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	0	0	0	5	0.00
5313 - PORT LAVACA, TX	0	0	0	0	0.00
5501 - DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX	2	0	0	0	0.00
5504 - OKLAHOMA CITY, OK	1	0	0	0	0.00
2301 - BROWNSVILLE, TX	0	3,308	0	0	0.00
2704 - LOS ANGELES, CA	10,673	3,658	1,751	590	0.34
2709 - LONG BEACH, CA	7,631	0	1,598	588	0.37

See footnotes at end of table.

Table F1 (Continued)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers				Ratio of 2019-2018
	2016	2017	2018	2019	
2711 - EL SEGUNDO, CA		130	0	0	0.00
2713 - PORT HUENEME, CA	16	0	55	0	0.00
2720 - LOS ANGELES INT AIRPORT	2	0	0	0	0.00
2722 - LAS VEGAS, NV	1	3,838	0	0	0.00
5201 - MIAMI, FL	5,649	2,327	1,590	403	0.25
5203 - PORT EVERGLADES, FL	3,200	147	1,277	181	0.14
5204 - WEST PALM BEACH, FL	303	0	17	10	0.59
5205 - FORT PIERCE, FL	0	0	0	0	0.00
5210 - FT LAUDERDALE INTL AIRPORT	0	56	0	0	0.00
1901 - MOBILE, AL	85	4	18	1	0.06
1902 - GULFPORT, MS	22	0	0	0	0.00
1903 - PASCAGOULA, MS	0	0	0	0	0.00
2001 - MORGAN CITY, LA	27	295	0	0	0.00
2002 - NEW ORLEANS, LA	350	0	145	34	0.23
2004 - BATON ROUGE, LA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2006 - MEMPHIS, TN	2	0	0	0	0.00
2007 - NASHVILLE, TN	2	0	0	0	0.00
2010 - GRAMERCY, LA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2017 - LAKE CHARLES, LA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2097 - NASHVILLE, TN CARTAGE-CON	0	450	0	0	0.00
1001 - NEW YORK, NY	6,069	5,562	389	230	0.59
4601 - NEW YORK/NEWARK AREA	10,773	0	3,749	1,621	0.43
4602 - PERTH AMBOY, NJ	0	0	0	0	0.00
2901 - ASTORIA, OR	0	0	0	0	0.00
2902 - NEWPORT, OR	0	0	0	0	0.00
2903 - COOS BAY, OR	0	0	0	0	0.00
2904 - PORTLAND, OR	4	0	0	0	0.00
2905 - LONGVIEW, WA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2908 - VANCOUVER, WA	9	0	0	0	0.00
3101 - JUNEAU, AK	0	0	0	0	0.00
3102 - KETCHIKAN, AK	0	0	0	0	0.00
3103 - SKAGWAY, AK	0	0	0	0	0.00
3106 - DALTON CIRCLE, AK	0	0	0	0	0.00
3115 - SITKA, AK	0	12	0	0	0.00
3126 - ANCHORAGE, AK	21	4	0	1	0.00
3127 - KODIAK, AK	0	0	0	0	0.00
3307 - DENVER, CO	1	0	0	0	0.00
2501 - SAN DIEGO, CA	56	0	0	0	0.00
2805 - MONTEREY, CA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2809 - SAN FRANCISCO, CA	6	0	0	0	0.00
2810 - STOCKTON, CA	0	1,816	0	0	0.00
2811 - OAKLAND, CA	3,235	0	782	318	0.41
2812 - RICHMOND, CA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2820 - MARTINEZ, CA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2830 - CAQUINEZ STRAIT, CA	0	0	0	0	0.00
2835 - SACRAMENTO INTL AIRPORT	0	219	0	0	0.00
3201 - HONOLULU, HI	352	0	71	32	0.45
3202 - HILO, HI	0	0	0	0	0.00

See footnotes at end of table.

Table F1 (Continued)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers				Ratio of 2019-2018
	2016	2017	2018	2019	
3203 - KAHULUI, HI	0	0	0	0	0.00
3303 - SALT LAKE CITY, UT	3	2	0	0	0.00
4904 - FAJARDO, PR	1	0	0	0	0.00
4907 - MAYAGUEZ, PR	0	0	0	0	0.00
4908 - PONCE, PR	0	685	0	0	0.00
4909 - SAN JUAN, PR	1,560	0	193	276	1.43
5101 - CHARLOTTE AMALIE, VI	0	0	0	0	0.00
5104 - CHRISTIANSTED, VI	0	819	0	0	0.00
3001 - SEATTLE, WA	1,934	783	502	265	0.53
3002 - TACOMA, WA	2,015	0	407	333	0.82
3003 - ABERDEEN, WA	0	0	0	0	0.00
3004 - BLAINE, WA	0	0	0	0	0.00
3005 - BELLINGHAM, WA	0	19	0	0	0.00
3006 - EVERETT, WA	10	0	7	0	0.00
3007 - PORT ANGELES, WA	0	0	0	0	0.00
3008 - PORT TOWNSEND, WA	0	0	0	0	0.00
3010 - ANACORTES, WA	0	0	0	0	0.00
3029 - SEATTLE-TACOMA INTL AIRPORT	1	0	0	0	0.00
3604 - INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN	0	44	0	0	0.00
1801 - TAMPA, FL	136	143	18	4	0.22
1803 - JACKSONVILLE, FL	375	1	37	23	0.62
1805 - FERNANDINA BEACH, FL	7	14	7	4	0.57
1816 - PORT CANAVERAL, FL	37	6	0	0	0.00
1818 - PANAMA CITY, FL	22	0	0	1	0.00
1819 - PENSACOLA, FL	0	235	0	0	0.00
1821 - PORT MANATEE, FL	7	0	7	3	0.43
1822 - FORT MYERS	3	0	0	0	0.00
2605 - PHOENIX, AZ	3	0	0	0	0.00

Notes: Potentially high-risk containers are identified based on the maximum (highest) score within the Best Arrival Date and Best Arrival Date +1 day. The container counts are for the containerized shipments only (non-containerized data are excluded). The report provides a distinct count of containers at individual port level. The rolled-up totals across the ports or field office(s) may include duplicate container counts.

Source: OFO.

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